EASTERN SUDAN PEACE AGREEMENT: A STRUGGLE TO IMPLEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASMARA 000491

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2017
TAGS: PREL ER SU
SUBJECT: EASTERN SUDAN PEACE AGREEMENT: A STRUGGLE TO IMPLEMENT


CLASSIFIED BY: CDA Jennifer A. McIntyre, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The disunity between Eastern Front(EF) leaders
continues to obstruct implementation of the Eastern Sudan Peace
Agreement (ESPA). While in the past, they appeared to be working
together constructively, the internal fissures within the EF and the
lack of any formal structure have proven too much for the weak
leadership to overcome. In response, the Eritrean mediators - who need
the ESPA to be successful - and the Sudanese People's Liberation
Movement (SPLM) have called for additional resources and support to
help the EF address the current situation. Even with these stepped-up
efforts, the ESPA may not ultimately succeed, thus preventing the
people of Eastern Sudan from reaping the benefits of the agreement, and
possibly undermining the Eritreans' careful efforts over the past year
to build their reputation as a regional leader and garner support for
their bid to assume the role of mediator for a Darfur negotiation. End
Summary.

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THE EF FRACTURES; THE MEDIATOR AND SPLM STEP IN
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2. (U) After months of fruitless discussions regarding how to allocate
the 120 political positions granted to the East under the ESPA, EF
leaders sought out the Eritrean mediator the beginning of May and
requested he determine how the positions should be distributed. The EF
leaders agreed to the mediator's proposal that 60 of the positions be
distributed based on tribal representation within the EF: 18 positions
for the Hadendawa, 16 for the BeniAmer, 14 for the Rashaida and the
remaining 12 for the other ethnic groups, such as the Nubians,
represented in the EF. The individuals for these positions would be
nominated by the leaders of their respective tribes and ultimately
vetted for final approval by Sudanese President Bashir. For the
remaining 60 positions, the local communities would agree by consensus
on the nominees. (Note: These positions do not require President
Bashir's approval. End note.) The three EF leaders also consented to
the mediator's proposed nominees to the top three posts: EF Chairman
Musa Mohammed Ahmed will be nominated for the Assistant to the
President, Dr. Amna Dirar for the Advisor to the President and Mubrouk
Mubarak Salim for the State ministerial position.


3. (C) Concerned over the political bickering between EF leaders and
the continuing viability of the EF - and Eritrea's credibility should
the ESPA crumble - the Eritrean mediators recently approached Dr.
Taisier Ali of the Center for Peacekeeping in the Horn of Africa for
training assistance. In response, Dr. Taisier is developing a
week-long training program for 105 members of the EF, including those
first 60 individuals nominated to the political positions. The
training will address issues of leadership and management and work
toward the establishment of a much-needed formal structure for the EF.
Dr. Taisier hoped the training will begin in early June, timing which
appears too optimistic. The mediators have offered their full support;
however, the level of commitment by the EF to the training remains
uncertain. (Note: Earlier and similar training requested by the
mediator following the signing of the ESPA was scheduled in fall 2006
and trainers flown in. Although the EF consented to the training and
promised they would participate, on the first day of training, not a
single member of the EF appeared. End Note.)


4. (C) The Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM),who are
long-time allies of the EF and who participated in the ESPA
negotiations as part of the Government of Sudan negotiating team, also
expressed concerns. The week of May 14, they sent a message to the EF
leaders pressing them to resolve their problems and stay together as a
political entity. The message appears not to have bolstered the EF at
all. According to Dr. Taisier, Musa dismissed the SPLM's plea, saying
"the EF no longer exists." Dr. Amna echoed this sentiment in a
conversation with Poloff, stating there was "no hope for the EF". She
added that she was considering abandoning her position and moving to
Doha as she could no longer live in Eritrea or Sudan.

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MILITARY INTEGRATION STALLED
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5. (C) Meanwhile, the integration of EF troops with Sudan's armed
forces has not progressed. The EF armed rebels are a combination of
the troops of the Beja Congress and the Rashaida Free Lions with each
group paying and commanding their own troops. While most EF soldiers
reportedly planned to return to civilian life, some were expected to
join Sudan's military. The delays in implementing the integration have
lead to desertions of EF soldiers as the EF (and more specifically the

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Beja Congress) is unable to pay its troops. According to Dr. Amna,
nearly half of the Beja Congress troops (approximately 500) have
already disappeared into civilian life, with any weapons they may have
held. The Rashaida Free Lions troops are in a slightly better economic
position due to their profitable import/export business in the region,
and thus while most of the 3000 troops plan to become civilians, they
continue to be paid and accounted for in the Free Lions troops.

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THUG TACTICS & RABBLE ROUSING WITHIN EASTERN SUDAN
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6. (C) Further jeopardizing the weak alliance are challenges within the
Beja Congress to Dr. Dirar and increasing negative rhetoric from
Eastern Sudan about the EF. Dr. Dirar claims two Beja Congress members
recently challenged her leadership and physically threatened her in
public over the issue of obtaining a greater share of political
representation. At one public meeting with representatives of the
Government of Sudan and the EF, two men hassled her and attempted to
grab her, yet no one present intervened or rose to her support. In
addition, Dr. Dirar told Poloff that a group from Eastern Sudan has
emerged claiming to be the "People's Front for Eastern Sudan" and is
launching a campaign against the EF in general, and more specifically,
aimed at discrediting her. Although the group publicly claims they are
supported by Ethiopia, Dr. Dirar speculates this effort is supported by
the Government of Sudan's National Congress Party (NCP) as part of its
efforts to undermine the EF.

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COMMENT
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7. (C) Since the inception of the EF as a political entity, the
tentative alliance between the Beja Congress, (itself divisive between
the Beja BeniAmer and Hadendawa tribes),the Rashaida Free Lions, and
other smaller tribes of Eastern Sudan, has been an uneasy partnership.
While many assume the greatest tension is between the Rashaida and the
Beja, the difficulties within the Beja - particularly the personal
difficulties between Musa and Dirar - are proving the most problematic
to the viability of the EF. The fractures within the Beja Congress,
and the continuing unwillingness of the three EF leaders to build,
develop and lead the EF organization is fulfilling the most pessimistic
predictions that the ESPA could end up existing only on paper. As the
EF slowly dissipates, the Eritreans have cause to be alarmed, and post
anticipates the Eritreans will attempt to prop up the EF and keep them
alive. The Eritreans have a lot riding on the success or failure of
the ESPA as a demonstration of their government's ability to
effectively take on a leadership role in the region and in support of
their assertions of being the most suitable mediator for a Darfur
negotiation. End Comment.
MCINTYRE