EU SPECIAL REP PEKKA HAAVISTO CALLS ON ERITREAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASMARA 000363

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2017
TAGS: PREL PINR ER SU
SUBJECT: EU SPECIAL REP PEKKA HAAVISTO CALLS ON ERITREAN
PRESIDENT ISAIAS

REF: ASMARA 346

Classified By: AMB. Scott H. DeLisi for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) In discussions on April 7 with EU Special
Representative for Sudan Pekka Haavisto, Eritrean President
Isaias Afwerki clearly stated Eritrea would not attend the
scheduled April 28 meeting on Darfur in Tripoli. Haavisto
reported that President Isaias appeared definite - and
perhaps slighted that Eritrea was not included in the initial
invitations from Libya. Isaias did say, however, that he
planned to meet with the Government of Sudan on April 21 and
perhaps that meeting might result in a change of heart.
According to Haavisto, Isaias seemed concerned about the
Tripoli agenda, noting that discussions "could go in the
wrong direction in Libya." Haavisto came away with the
impression that there remains some competition between
Eritrea and Libya over who is leading the initiative.
Finally, in discussing the Tripoli meeting, President Isaias
advised Haavisto that the Government of Sudan needs to be
represented in Tripoli by the Sudanese Government of National
Unity (GNU),including the Sudan People's Liberation Movement
(SPLM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) - Minni Minawi
and not just the National Congress Party (NCP).


2. (C) In the two and one half hour meeting, Isaias offered
Haavisto a history of the relationship between Eritrea and
Sudan, an opinion on sanctions, and asserted that Eritrea was
willing to "work together" with the EU on Darfur. Isaias,
sounding a note far different from what we have heard over
the past year, characterized the Bashir government as "a
terrorist regime" and said that Eritrea would prefer not to
work with President Bashir. (Comment: This is a theme
Eritrea voiced regularly when it was hosting the SPLM and
before deciding over a year ago that the time had come to
rebuild bridges to Bashir and the NCP. End Comment.) At this
point, Isaias continued, there was "nothing Eritrea could do
about that." On sanctions, Isaias said he felt they were
"not enough to change anything." Haavisto commented in his
post-meeting briefing with the western diplomatic community
that Isaias seemed committed to Eritrea playing a key role in
the negotiations. During the briefing French Ambassador
Gerard Sambrana echoed this and noted that the French had met
recently with the Eritreans in Abeche and in Paris and they
too had the impression that the Eritreans were proceeding as
if they were leading the negotiations. (Comment: It is not
clear to us, however, that the Government of the State of
Eritrea (GSE) is prepared to engage constructively within the
UN/AU process as opposed to having their own, Eritrea-led,
mediation effort. End Comment.)


3. (C) In his briefing for the diplomatic community Haavisto
also shared parts of his conversations during his trip to
Sudan and Chad with the G-19, the National Redemption Front
(NRF),Eritrea's People's Front for Democracy and Justice
(PFDJ) Head of Organizational Affairs and point person on
Sudan, Abdella Jabir, and GOS Head of Intelligence Salah
Abdallah Gosh. According to Haavisto, a majority of the SLM
commanders are in favor of both returning to peace talks and
with using the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),and not just the
principles, as a basis for discussion. He also reported that
tensions remain between the commanders who still support
Abdulwahid and the G-19. Yet, some of the commanders
expressed to Haavisto frustration at being dependent on the
regional players such as Chad and Eritrea and at being caught
in their machinations. Commenting on his meetings with
Eritrea's Abdella Jabir, Haavisto indicated that he believes
even Abdella recognizes that Eritrea can not get all of the
non-signatories to come to Asmara. In addition, Haavisto
assessed that members of the NRF have not come together with
other non-signatories and that there are rebels, such as
Ahmed Abdelshafei (SLM) and Khalil Ibrahim (NRF/JEM),and
possibly Abdulwahid(SLM) that do not wish to return to
Asmara. Haavisto reinforced to the NRF they even with their
opposition to certain unnamed members of the proposed UN/AU
negotiating team, the NRF cannot choose the UN/AU reps. In
addition, in Haavisto's conversations with Salah Gosh, Gosh
stated that the GNU is encouraging the SPLM and Salva Kiir to

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take a more active role in the peace efforts, but did relay
to Haavisto that this will require the "opening up of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) as the NCP only has 52
percent and has nothing left to give."


4. (C) Comment: This trip was Haavisto's final one to Asmara
as EU Special Envoy as he will be taking up his seat in the
Finnish Parliament the beginning of May. The news that
Eritrea is in a huff and refusing to go to Tripoli is not
surprising. Eritrea's absence from the initial invitation
list was most likely perceived by President Isaias as a snub
by Libya which Isaias sees as much as a competitor as a
partner in trying to resolve the issues in Sudan. Disinclined
to take a back seat to the Libyans it may take some serious
Sudanese persuasion to get him to change his mind. As for
Isaias' expressed willingness to "work together" with the
Europeans on Darfur, Post remains skeptical about Eritrea's
"new image" (reftel),especially given the GSE's continued
rejection of many of the international community's
fundamental concerns about the humanitarian and security
situation in Darfur. Nonetheless, we continue to accept that
Eritrea could play a useful part in negotiations on Darfur.
We believe, however, we must continue to remind our European
and UN partners that we will need to make it clear to Eritrea
that for its role to be meaningful and welcomed it will need
to be played out in support of the UN/AU process. End
Comment.
DeLisi