TIME TO SPEAK UP: A NEW STRATEGY FOR ERITREA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASMARA 000036

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL UNSC ECON EAID SOCI KIRF KPAO ER
SUBJECT: TIME TO SPEAK UP: A NEW STRATEGY FOR ERITREA


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CLASSIFIED BY: CDA Jennifer A. McIntyre, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

REFTEL: ASMARA 28


1. (C) Summary and Introduction: The serious abuses of human rights fo
which the Government of Eritrea is responsible and its continued
rejection of even the most fundamental democratic principles in
governance remain serious problems and a major impediment to improvemen
of bilateral ties. (reftel) Over the past year, we have scaled back ou
engagement with the GSE on many levels, particularly in terms of the
military-military partnership, but we had hoped that there was still
room for engagement on issues of mutual concern such as Sudan and the
unresolved border dispute with Ethiopia. The GSE, however, appears to
have made a strategic decision to reject engagement with the USG and to
seek closer ties with a range of states, including Iran and Venezuela,
who do not share our world view. In so doing, the GSE has also become
force for greater regional instability, with their direct support for
the CIC in Somalia, and the channeling by Eritrea of weapons and men,
standing as an example.


2. (C) We believe that in order to support both our policies and our
principles, we must accept that quiet efforts to engage Eritrea on huma
rights have been ignored by the GSE. Thus, our efforts must become mor
public and assertive. We believe that with more vocal efforts we will
expose Eritrea to more intense international scrutiny. Moreover, as th
true nature of this regime is revealed, we will: lessen its credibility
reduce the flows of critical funding from the diaspora; and ultimately
decrease Eritrea's ability to insert itself in unhelpful ways in issues
beyond its own borders. We have no illusions that the GSE will be
quickly responsive - except perhaps negatively. Nonetheless, we hope
that USG leadership will elicit or compel support from at least our EU
partners to speak out as well. Post suggests a multi-faceted approach
involving the use of radio and internet media, increased people-to-
people interaction with the Eritrean people through means of the
Ambassador's self help grants and coordinated outreach to the Eritrean
diaspora, members of Congress, and our international partners. And
while post will once again aggressively seek to engage the GSE in
discussion on human rights issues, a strong and visible Washington role
will be necessary to frame our message and concerns and to build the
base of support we need outside the Department. End Summary and
Introduction.

PUTTING THE GSE ON NOTICE
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3. (C) In our engagement with GSE representatives, post routinely raise
our concerns on human rights abuses and the lack of civil liberties.
GSE officials, however, largely disregard our concerns and cavalierly
dismiss criticisms of their human rights performance. In fact, as note
reftel, the government seems to take an almost perverse delight in its
role of human rights "bad boy" and relishes its "in-your-face" defiance
of international concerns. Our requests for dialogue and engagement on
these issues are ignored and, as a general rule, GSE officials refuse t
meet with Embassy officers to answer even the most basic of questions
regarding Eritrea's laws and policies. Our EU colleagues have faced
similar stonewalling as well. We have persistently requested meetings
with officials in the Office of Religious Affairs and with the Director
of National Security. With the former we have had our requests
routinely refused for over a year and with the latter we were told
recently to "stop calling." (Note: We continue our efforts
nonetheless.) Most recently, in response to the designation of Eritrea
as a country of particular concern for severe restrictions on religious
freedoms, one GSE official told the Ambassador that for Eritreans "bein
detained in a shipping container is a luxury."


4. (C) Despite the GSE's callous indifference to our concerns, post
plans to embark on a more aggressive USG human rights campaign in
Eritrea. Our strategy calls for the Ambassador to press even more
strongly for a series of formal calls on officials in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the Office of Religious Affairs, the Office of Nationa
Security, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Local Government and
the Office of the President to seek greater engagement with the GSE on
issues of human rights and the restrictions of civil liberties. In
these calls the Ambassador will, on the one hand, encourage greater
bilateral interaction to clarify any possible confusion over GSE laws,

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proclamations and practices and, on the other, let the GSE know that th
USG will not hesitate to publicly voice our concerns on these issues an
hold the GSE accountable for its actions in appropriate fora.

USING OUR WEBSITE, AMERICAN CORNERS, THE OPPOSITION AND PUBLIC FORA
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5. (C) With no free media, no civil society and nearly no opportunities
for public discussions, countering GSE propaganda within Eritrea is
difficult. To date, the internet is the only source of external media
the GSE has not restricted. As part of our strategy, Post will use
internet-based resources aggressively while also seeking to expand our
public outreach - although doing so on human rights-specific issues wil
be challenging in the face of GSE restrictions and hostility. We
propose as initial steps to prepare short and easy-to-read fact sheets
detailing both U.S. policy and our concerns on GSE human rights abuses
that we can post on our website, print out for distribution and provide
as backgrounders to media, opposition websites, and interested NGOs. W
will use our monthly speakers program with the American Club to focus o
subjects concerning civil society and civil liberties. We will continu
efforts to reach out to schools in addressing younger audiences on
similar topics through the use of films and discussion. We also wish t
explore the possibility of podcasts, discussion boards, list-serves and
other live on-line means of conversations with Embassy/State Department
staff that could reach Eritreans with internet access within Eritrea an
those within the diaspora. We would also seek to increase VOA's
Tigrinya broadcasting and explore VOA-Arabic broadcasting that focuses
on Eritrea as well. (Note: Given the political issues associated with
translation within Eritrea - and the arrest of two FSNs allegedly for
translating opposition documents in 2001 - Post would need assistance
from Washington to procure Tigrinya and Arabic translations. End Note.)


6. (C) In addition, the exiled Eritrean opposition group, the Eritrean
Democratic Party under the leadership of Mesfin Hagos, is eager to
establish radio broadcasting to Eritrea. With the normalization of
relations with Sudan, some of the Eritrean opposition located in
Khartoum has come under increased scrutiny, and the Government of Sudan
(GOS) recently closed down a previous GOS-sanctioned Eritrean oppositio
radio broadcast. Supporting efforts of the Eritrean opposition to
provide alternative news sources could also prove valuable.

REACHING OUT TO A NEEDY COMMUNITY
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7. (U) With the closure of the USAID office by order of the GSE, post
lost a significant tool for promoting democratic values and civil
society, and the means to provide basic humanitarian assistance to
communities. The average Eritrean, particularly those outside of
Asmara, remains isolated. Most are unable to access alternative
information other than the anti-U.S. and anti-Western propaganda
presented by GSE-controlled media outlets and in local meetings with GS
and PFDJ officials. Given the GSE restrictions on travel and the
inability of Embassy staff to meet with, let alone work with, most arms
of the GSE bureaucracy, our strategy includes intensified outreach
efforts and direct support to communities at the grass-roots level. We
have widened our net this fall to seek out more and varied community-
based projects for FY2007 funding under the Ambassador's Self Help (SSH
and Democracy and Human Rights (DHR II) initiatives (Note: Cable fundin
requests will be sent septel. End note.) The implementation of these
projects will expand the visibility of the U.S. Embassy and tangibly
demonstrate the USG's commitment to assisting the Eritrean people.

REACHING OUT TO STAKEHOLDERS: CONGRESS, DIASPORA, AND FOREIGN MISSIONS
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8. (C) The remittances sent and the taxes paid by the diaspora are a
critically needed revenue source for the GSE and we believe that the
diaspora must be educated and exposed to the realities of the Isaias
regime and its blatant disregard for both the welfare of Eritrean
citizens and for the most basic of international norms on democracy and
human rights. Doing so will, we believe, also lead to diminished
remittance flows and may encourage members of the diaspora to speak out
- and these are voices to which the GSE might listen. While
conversations have begun on mechanisms to restrict the transmission of
diaspora remittances, we recognize that there would be many ways of

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circumventing restrictions (e.g. third-country transfers, informal
mechanisms, etc). Thus we believe it is critical to offer the diaspora
an alternative perspective to GSE propaganda and undercut their
motivation to support the GSE. Also critical to this effort will be th
continued restriction on the movement of GSE-sponsored fund-raisers in
the U.S.


9. (C) The engagement with the diaspora will, of necessity, be driven a
much by Washington as by post. We welcome other suggestions from
Washington for increased engagement that will bring greater focus on
Eritrea's human rights abuses. Encouraged by the working group recentl
convened by AF/E, we would propose a similar approach with DRL, the
Office of Religious Freedom, PD and H to discuss other strategies that
would increase the focus on the GSE's human rights violations and
rejection of democratic values and norms. In particular, we would look
for ways to work with legislators concerned both about human rights and
stability in the Horn of Africa.


10. (C) Efforts in Washington and New York to work with our
international partners as well will be important, using various vehicle
including our engagement with the EU troika. We understand from our
German colleagues in Asmara that the EU, under the German presidency,
may seek to develop a more comprehensive EU strategy for the Horn of
Africa. We know that EU member-states with missions in Eritrea are
deeply concerned about the human rights situation and will likely
emphasize that the need for an increased focus on these issues be
factored into any comprehensive strategy. As it is, the EU missions
here, which have sought dialogue with the GSE on human rights under the
framework of the Cotonu agreement, have met with little cooperation fro
the Eritreans. After two years of efforts to dialogue, they are
questioning whether stronger measures are required.

COMMENT
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11. (C) The above suggestions are not exhaustive, but hopefully,
illustrative, of some of the options available to us. We believe
strongly, however, that the USG must be seen as willing to speak out,
especially given Eritrea's deteriorating social, economic, and politica
environment. The Isaias regime, if anything, continues to move in the
wrong direction on human rights and civil liberties and is unlikely to
self-correct. We must speak out with a clarity and purpose that offers
Eritreans, both within Eritrea and the diaspora, an alternative vision
and the realization that their plight is not being ignored.


12. (C) Comment con't. We believe a coordinated strategy involving the
Embassy in Asmara, Washington and other bilateral and multilateral
missions, will have impact - but could possibly result in negative
repercussions directed against the Embassy and our staff. The already
difficult operational problems we face in terms of travel and visa
restrictions and violations of the Vienna Convention could be
exacerbated and the possibility that some U.S. staff members could be
expelled is real. We nonetheless believe that this is the right course
- but suggest that this is all the more reason we need to have
Washington's continued engagement and commitment, to provide a degree o
cover to an already exposed Embassy staff, if we are to proceed as
robustly as we envision. We look forward to working with the Departmen
in discussing and coordinating various options and next steps. End
Comment.

McIntyre