Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ASMARA346
2007-04-02 15:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Asmara
Cable title:  

EU-ERITREA COURTSHIP?: MEANINGFUL CHANGE SHOULD BE

Tags:  PREL PHUM ER SO SU UK EU 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ASMARA 000346 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM ER SO SU UK EU
SUBJECT: EU-ERITREA COURTSHIP?: MEANINGFUL CHANGE SHOULD BE
REQUIRED OF THE GSE

REF: A. ASMARA 328

B. ASMARA 339

C. ASMARA 336

Classified By: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

-------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ASMARA 000346

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM ER SO SU UK EU
SUBJECT: EU-ERITREA COURTSHIP?: MEANINGFUL CHANGE SHOULD BE
REQUIRED OF THE GSE

REF: A. ASMARA 328

B. ASMARA 339

C. ASMARA 336

Classified By: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki has recently
personified (at least for him) reasonableness and cooperation
in meetings with the EU representatives and UN Special Envoy
for Darfur Jan Eliasson. Simultaneously, however, the
Government of the State of Eritrea (GSE) continues to
excoriate the USG for "neocolonialist" exploitation of the
Horn of Africa and "misguided regional ambitions veiled
behind claims of fighting terrorism". The GSE also continues
to impede Embassy operations and disregard its obligations
under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR).
Although we would like to believe, as many of our European
colleagues do, that Eritrea is seeking to reengage positively
with the international community, the GSE's words have not
been matched by constructive actions in Sudan, Somalia, or
domestically. Unfortunately, we do not expect that they will
be. In anticipation of possible GSE meetings with senior
British and EU officials in the coming days and weeks, we
should urge our European colleagues not to mistake
manipulation for progress. Nor should they allow vaguely
constructive GSE rhetoric to obscure the fact that what we
need from Eritrea is real change in their conduct on Somalia,
Sudan, domestic human rights, and in their engagement with
their international partners. End Summary.

-------------- --------------
Courting, and Being Courted By, the Europeans and the UN
-------------- --------------


2. (C) In early February, President Isaias Afwerki received
Louis Michel, EC Commissioner for Development and Aid on a
visit to Asmara. Michel, in an effort to induce Eritrea to
reengage with the international community, chose not to raise
with Eritrea the difficult issues of human rights, the
seizure of European food aid, or its highly troubling role in

introducing weapons and fighters into an already troubled
Somalia in 2006 in support of the Council of Islamic Courts
(CIC). In the absence of a serious challenge from the EC on
policy issues, Isaias was cordial in return - especially as
the GSE was clearly looking to reestablish itself as a
serious regional actor in light of Ethiopia's military
success in Somalia. Eritrea was also seeing prospects for
its role as "the" mediator of the Darfur conflict
increasingly slipping away despite the support of the
Government of Sudan, and, we believe, President Isaias was
keen to encourage European acceptance of Eritrea as central
to the resolution of issues in Sudan.


3. (C) As part of this largely non-substantive exchange,
Michel invited Isaias to Brussels and the normally reclusive
Eritrean leader apparently accepted enthusiastically the
invitation in principle. No date for a visit has been set,
and perhaps it may yet be derailed given Louis Michel's
reported pending departure to seek a return to elective
office. (Note: It is unclear how broadly Michel's enthusiasm
for engaging Eritrea is shared within EC headquarters. End
Note.) Subsequently, Isaias, in meetings with both UN
Special Envoy for Sudan Jan Eliasson and in the EU Troika on
Somalia (Refs A and B),made it clear that he was looking
forward to visiting Brussels soon.


4. (C) In his meetings with Eliasson and with the EU
Troika, Isaias was at his best in many ways. Isaias is,
without question, articulate, intelligent, and has a keen
understanding of the Horn of Africa. Eliasson and the EU
Troika both were impressed with the breadth of his knowledge,
his analytical assessment of the challenges that lie ahead,
and his reasonably non-critical, and at times even positive,
characterization of the role of the UN-AU in Sudan and the
role that the EU could play in Somalia. His calls for an

ASMARA 00000346 002 OF 004


inclusive and comprehensive process in both countries in many
ways echoed internationally accepted positions. In Sudan,
his offer to remain in touch with Eliasson and to continue to
"share information" was welcomed by the SRSG and left the
door open for an Eritrean role in the broadly inclusive
political process Eliasson and Salim seek to encourage.
Equally for Somalia, the EU Troika was encouraged by Isaias'
surprisingly objective assessment of the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) in Somalia and that he was analytically
circumspect in his characterization of the CIC; reportedly
acknowledging that they were not "representative" but had
"filled in a gap" in the quest of Somalis for peace and
security.

--------------
The Other Face
--------------


5. (C) The positions articulated by Isaias in those
meetings have encouraged some in the European diplomatic
community to hope that Eritrea may be newly-prepared to
engage more constructively in the region and the world. The
French Ambassador to Eritrea is particularly enthused,
believing Eritrea to have been "misunderstood" and arguing
for sensitivity to Eritrea's "fundamental security concerns"
which have compelled it to act as it has in the face of
threats to its existence from Ethiopia. The French seem
eager to see Eritrea assume a broader role in a Somalia
reconciliation effort and for Eritrea to play a prominent
role in Sudan as well. We have repeatedly cautioned our
European colleagues here, however, that despite all of
Isaias' thoughtful analyses and dialogue with the Europeans
and the UN, nothing on the ground has changed. Nor has
Eritrea offered its support in any meaningful way on any
issues of concern to the U.S.


6. (C) To the contrary, reports from Khartoum and from
Ndjamena, where the senior Eritrean advisor on Sudan, Yemane
Ghebreab, has been for almost two months, all suggest that
Eritrea is still seeking to initiate a mediation process on
Sudan independent of the UN-AU process. There is no dialogue
from the GSE on how or whether it would work within a UN-AU
framework nor is there any signal that they are serious about
a role for the international community in their initiative.
Norway, their closest non-regional international partner on
the issue of Sudan, has tried tirelessly to get the GSE to
work more broadly with the international community on Sudan.
Nonetheless, the Norwegians apparently remain as much in the
dark about Ghebreab's agenda as the rest of us (although the
Norwegian Ambassador to Eritrea calls him in Chad several
times a week). Similarly, Isaias' seemingly dispassionate
assessment of the CIC in his analytical overview does not
square at all with the strongly pro-CIC rhetoric and actions
of the GSE over the past ten months. Isaias's threats
against the Ugandan peacekeepers (Ref C),his repeated
attacks on the U.S. and Ethiopia all ring with an intensity
and venom that was, we believe, carefully edited in his
discussion with the Europeans.

-------------- -
DETERIORATED BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.
-------------- -


7. (C) Meanwhile, even while cultivating European ties,
Isaias and his government appear determined to keep relations
with the USG at their nadir. As noted, the rhetorical
attacks on the USG remain undiminished and GSE officials
remain unwilling to meet with us on almost any level. A key
advisor in the Office of the President has noted that
relations are "quite bad" across the board including on key
policy questions. However, neither he, nor the MFA officials
with whom the Ambassador has spoken, have responded to the
Ambassador's repeated offer to meet and discuss seriously the
issues. Furthermore, the GSE, despite our insistence over
the past two months, has not been willing to meet with us to
try and resolve the VCDR problems associated with the GSE
refusing to allow our diplomatic bags to enter the country
without inspection. (Note: We have refused such inspections
and none of our diplomatic bags have entered Eritrea for over

ASMARA 00000346 003 OF 004


two months. The GSE is now insisting on inspecting the UK's
latest diplomatic bags as well. End Note.) Travel, of
course, remains restricted and our staff is unable to leave
Asmara without ten days notice to and prior approval of the
GSE, which is seldom forthcoming for official travel.


8. (C) Equally problematic, the GSE continues to refer all
requests for visas for USG employees to Asmara for approval.
Virtually no official visas, other than for our two regional
doctors which were finally issued after months of badgering
on our part, have been forthcoming over the past six months.
We have been forced to suspend a critical building project on
the Embassy compound, have been unable to update our IT
programs, and have not support visits in almost a year in
areas of security, management and building maintenance. We
have been compelled to close certain other-agency operations
and suspend public operations, including visa services (no
NIVs have been issued since December). Despite our
suspension of visa services for GSE officials and
restrictions placed on issuance of visas of GSE-sponsored
travelers world-wide, the GSE continues to deny visas for our
support staff. The most recent denial is a cleared USG
air-conditioning technician who previously had been issued
visas for Eritrea. We note that our visas requests are
apparently reviewed by Eritrean National Security officials
rather than the MFA. Under the circumstances, given that
even A/C techs are being denied, we have to assume that the
GSE has no intention of issuing visas to any of our
applicants any time soon.


9. (C) As noted above, the Norwegians, who have been one of
Eritrea's most-engaged partners over the years, including
during their independence struggle, have pushed Eritrea hard
to engage more constructively. The GSE has, however, ignored
the clear benchmarks laid out by Norwegian Deputy Foreign
Minister Johannsen in a meeting with Yemane Ghebreab in Oslo
in early February. At that time, the Norwegians insisted
that the GSE had to find a way forward with the USG if it
wanted to be a serious player in the region and the world and
Johannsen called on them to show their commitment to work
with Norway, and the international community, by lifting the
visa restrictions on U.S. government travelers, allowing
pouches to enter in compliance with the VCDR, and by easing
the rhetoric. Despite assurances from Ghebreab that Eritrea
understood the need to move forward, there has been no change
on any of these issues and the Eritreans have so far avoided
any substantive discussion with Norway, at least so far as we
know, on the reasons for the unresponsiveness.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) So far, of course, the Europeans have made it easy
for Isaias to hit the right notes. None of his recent
interlocutors has been willing to push the Eritreans on
issues such as human rights or their destabilizing role in
the region as a purveyor of weapons and supporter for many,
if not most, of the insurgent elements in Sudan, Somalia and
Ethiopia. They posit that raising the tough issues might
push Eritrea away before they can be brought into a
meaningful and constructive engagement. That logic, while
often applicable in diplomatic engagement, is not compelling
to us in this setting. We believe that the GSE has no
intention of reengaging broadly with the international
community - and certainly not with the USG - in the near
future. In fact, we believe that the GSE has made the
calculated decision that it benefits from having the USG as
the "enemy" as it seeks to realign itself within the region
with Sudan, with the CIC in Somalia, and with various actors
in the Persian Gulf including, possibly, Iran. The fact that
they have not even raised with us the closure of the visa
section for four months now, even though they are regularly
complaining to the UK about their similar closure, suggests
to us that they are prepared to accept the costs of cutting
their ties to the USG.


11. (C) Comment continued: At the same time, however, we
believe that the GSE is seeking to reestablish itself as a

ASMARA 00000346 004 OF 004


"player" in the region. The GSE, we believe, is hoping that
the promise of a more constructive Eritrea might lure the EU
and split them from the U.S., at least in terms of muting any
public criticism of Eritrea by the EU despite all the reasons
to do so. We believe, for example, that the EU sends the
wrong signals on Somalia by treating the GSE as a partner
that, like us, seeks stability in Somalia without even
addressing the fact that the GSE was, and still is, an actor
exacerbating the problems there. We need to emphasize to the
Europeans - and we note that Yemane Ghebreab may be meeting
with the UK's Lord Triesman later this week - that vague
platitudes about dialogue and working together are not
enough. If Eritrea wants to be taken seriously we need to
see real and constructive actions in partnership with the
international community on Sudan and Somalia, and we need
equally to see an Eritrea prepared to be more responsible on
human rights and its engagement with international partners.
Given the GSE's past track record of irresponsibility in its
international commitments, absent clear and concrete actions
by the GSE, we believe that isolation, rather than
engagement, is the most appropriate response. End Comment.
DeLisi