EU DELEGATION DISCUSSES SOMALIA WITH PRESIDENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASMARA 000339

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2017
TAGS: PREL ER SO
SUBJECT: EU DELEGATION DISCUSSES SOMALIA WITH PRESIDENT
ISAIAS

Classified By: AMB Scott H. DeLisi for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) A four-person EU delegation on Somalia, led by
Ambassador-at-large of the German Federal Foreign Office
Michael Klor-Berchtold, briefed the EU, Norwegian and U.S.
Embassies March 27 about their meeting with President Isaias
earlier in the day. The delegation said they emphasized to
Isaias the responsibilities of the Government of the State of
Eritrea (GSE) in promoting an all-inclusive peace process for
Somalia. Ambassador Klor-Berchtold categorized the meeting
as positive with both sides engaged in frank discussion on a
variety of ideas for moving the Somali political process
along and commented that Isaias' presented his views as a
"thorough, broad-based assessment."


2. (C) During the 90-minute meeting, President Isaias told
the visitors that a "reconciliation" process would not solve
Somalia's political problems, but rather, the situation
requires a "reconstitution" similar to the political process
for the formation of the Afghan government. While the
delegation was not entirely clear on Isaias' distinction
between "reconciliation" and "reconstitution, they noted his
emphasis that the success of any political process in Somalia
would require participation beyond members of the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Council of
Islamic Courts (CIC),to include, in particular, the Somali
diaspora and civil society. Isaias also ventured that the
political talks might be more successful in a different
venue, such as Djibouti, rather than Mogadishu, due to the
insecurity there. The delegation disagreed with him on an
offshore venue, which in their view would move any political
process back to the days when the TFG was operating from
Kenya.


3. (C) Isaias commented that the EU could play a positive
role as an "honest broker" in a political process. As for
the AU, Isaias briefly observed that without a clear
political process in place, the AU peacekeeping exercise in
Somalia is "dangerous." (Note: Klor-Berchtold commented that
Isaias had been much more critical in a prior telephone
conversation with the EU, when he noted that the "AU lacks
planning capacity." End Note.) The delegation noted that the
president seemed to be quietly gloating (unsurprisingly)
about the increased violence the Ethiopians are facing in
Somalia. Isaias said that in the past few weeks, Mogadishu
was turning into the "quagmire" that he had predicted. He
was skeptical about the durability of a ceasefire and
critical of Ethiopia's continued military occupation which,
he said, has no exit strategy.


4. (C) The delegation stated their plans to travel to
Djibouti, Addis Ababa and Nairobi from March 28-30
respectively for one-day consultations with various parties
involved with Somalia. Some members of the delegation may
attend the April 3 Somalia Contact Group meeting in Cairo.
They also mentioned tentative plans to travel to Qatar to
meet with Somali opposition, dependent on the outcome of
their meetings this week. The delegation also said they had
discussed with President Isaias the possibility of his
traveling to Brussels in the upcoming months to discuss
Somalia. (Note: The proposal for Brussels consultations
follows on an invitation made to President Isaias by EU
Commissioner Louis Michel during his February visit to
Eritrea. The delegation noted that should Isaias visit
Brussels, the agenda would be on a broad range of issues to
include food security, economic development and regional
issues. End Note.) The delegation was clearly pleased with
the tone of the meeting with President Isaias, which they
felt represented a positive change toward greater openness
and cooperation with the EU on Somalia. Nonetheless, the
delegation was not unreservedly optimistic. Ambassador
Klor-Berchtold commented during the briefing that the
President did not articulate a clear GSE strategy towards
Somalia, and in fact, Eritrea may not have one at this point.
And the delegation clearly felt that Eritrea's actions in
Somalia have been, and will likely continue to be, driven by
the long-term objective of weakening Ethiopia.
Klor-Berchtold also cautioned that Isaias appeared to be
pushing a parallel political process outside of the Nairobi

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framework -- a strategy which post notes (and raised at the
briefing) is consistent with the GSE's modus operandi in
trying to jumpstart a separate political mediation track for
Darfur outside of the UN-AU framework.


5. (C) Comment: While the European delegation seems to view
the "new and improved" Isaias with an appropriate degree of
skepticism, they, like most of our European counterparts in
town, continue to pursue a carrot approach in engaging the
GSE -- even in the absence of any positive actions to
accompany the GSE's shiny new words. The Europeans continue
to feel that if they can get the GSE to re-engage in any sort
of dialogue -- and promoting its regional ambitions would be
the real draw for the GSE -- eventually, the EU will be able
to broach the sensitive topics of the border demarcation and
human rights. Post accepts that anything's possible, and
would agree that the Eritrean's newly-discovered affability
it dealing with the EU is indeed fueld by a desire to
reestablish its somewhat tarnished regional credentials. We
continue to caution our EU colleagues, however, that the
GSE's new "open" approach to the EU -- when viewed in tandem
with their continued targeted antagonism towards the U.S. --
is more likely a GSE gambit to split the U.S. and EU rather
than any true change of heart. End Comment.
DeLisi