Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ASMARA310
2007-03-19 13:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Asmara
Cable title:  

SUDANESE PITCH (AGAIN) AN ERITREAN-LED MEDIATION

Tags:  PREL SU ER 
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VZCZCXRO9020
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHAE #0310/01 0781311
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191311Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASMARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8784
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEPADJ/CJTF-HOA J2X CAMP LEMONIER DJ PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0616
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASMARA 000310 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF/E AND SE NATIOS
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2017
TAGS: PREL SU ER
SUBJECT: SUDANESE PITCH (AGAIN) AN ERITREAN-LED MEDIATION

REF: A. FEBRUARY 26 EMAIL - MCINTYRE-AF/SPG


B. ASMARA 307

Classified By: AMB SCOTT H. DELISI FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASMARA 000310

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF/E AND SE NATIOS
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2017
TAGS: PREL SU ER
SUBJECT: SUDANESE PITCH (AGAIN) AN ERITREAN-LED MEDIATION

REF: A. FEBRUARY 26 EMAIL - MCINTYRE-AF/SPG


B. ASMARA 307

Classified By: AMB SCOTT H. DELISI FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)


1. (C) DCM met with Sudanese DCM in Eritrea Hussein Mohammed
Hussein at his request on March 14. Hussein asked for
clarification of the USG position on a proposed Eritrean-led
mediation for Darfur, a subject which he had first raised
with DCM on February 25 (Ref A). DCM responded that the U.S.
supported the UN/AU mediation effort. She added that the
U.S. would continue to welcome the Eritreans' views on how
they see their role within an international mediation. DCM
reminded Hussein that since their last conversation on the
same subject, the Government of the State of Eritrea (GSE)
still had not approached anyone in the U.S. government, nor
to our knowledge the UN, AU, or even the Norwegians (who have
championed a role for the GSE) with a concrete proposal.


2. (C) Hussein commented that Eritrean President Isaias and
Sudanese President Bashir had discussed Darfur in meetings
held in Doha March 7-8 with Sheikh Hamid Al-Thani, Emir of
Qatar. While he professed ignorance as to the substance of
the Doha discussion on Darfur, Hussein said he believed that
the meeting had included a proposal for Qatar to serve as the
conduit to the international community to reconcile the
proposals for an Eritrean/Libyan-led Darfur mediation with a
UN/AU initiative. (Hussein's briefing on other aspects of
the Qatar meetings reported in Ref B.) Hussein also said he
had spoken recently with the French Ambassador to Eritrea who
had expressed French support for Eritrean involvement in a
mediation. (Comment: Hussein did not elaborate whether the
French supported an Eritrean-led mediation or advocated a GSE
role within the framework of an international mediation. The
French Ambassador told Ambassador in a separate discussion,
however, that he envisioned Eritrea playing a role as part of
a larger mediation process. End Comment.) Hussein added
that the French Foreign Minister would be in Asmara during
the week of March 19 to discuss Darfur with the Eritreans.
The French Ambassador claimed to have no knowledge of a visit

in a meeting with Ambassador.


3. (C) DCM asked Hussein whether Yemane Ghebreab, Political
Chief of the ruling PFDJ and the GSE's Sudan expert, had been
making progress in his meetings with the non-signatories to
the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). Hussein commented that
Ghebreab was finding his discussions with the DPA
non-signatories "difficult", noting that unlike the CPA talks
in which John Garang emerged as a clear leader, the
Darfurians have been unable to coalesce behind a single
figure. (Comment: Ghebreab has been in N'djamena for over a
month now reportedly trying to unite the various non-DPA
factions behind a single agenda. He apparently has extended
his visit several times supporting Hussein's comments that he
is fighting an uphill battle. End Comment.)


4. (C) DCM inquired about the political situation between
Chad and Sudan following the February meeting in Tripoli.
Hussein said the relationship between Chad and Sudan was now
"perfect", commenting that both countries had agreed to stop
providing safehaven to each other's rebel factions, and to
this end, Chad had recently refused a visa to one SLM leader.
He added that Libya was playing a proactive role in
negotiating between the Government of Chad and the Chadian
rebel groups. Hussein further noted that Eritrea, Libya,
Chad and Sudan already have sent 15 military advisors each to
study the Sudan-Chad border. This study is in preparation
for an agreed-upon deployment of 600 soldiers from each
country in order to provide monitoring and control over the
border. (Comment: Post has heard rumors, separately, from
the Norwegians and one of our regular Sudanese interlocuters,
that Iran was also approached and agreed to contribute border
monitors either in lieu of, or in addition to, this proposed
force. Perhaps only a coincidence, Post notes that Iran
contributes personnel to the UNMEE force monitoring the
Ethiopia and Eritrean border -- to our knowledge, the only UN
operation in the world in which the Iranians participate.
End Comment.)


5. (C) Comment: Hussein clearly requested the meeting to
press again for U.S. support of an Eritrean-led mediation
outside of the UN/AU framework. He continues to assert that

ASMARA 00000310 002 OF 002


the Eritreans recognize the need for "international
involvement" in a mediation, although he provided no further
illumination on what sort of role is envisioned for the
broader international community. Given that Yemane Ghebreab
continues to pursue separate track discussions with the DPA
non-signatories without trying to engage the broader
international community, post remains skeptical about GSE
intentions. The GSE's receptivity to UN Special Envoy
Eliasson, who is slated to visit Asmara March 21, may provide
some indication as to the GSE's intentions toward working
cooperatively within a larger UN/AU initiative. End Comment.
DeLisi