Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ASMARA162
2007-02-21 08:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Asmara
Cable title:  

EASTERN FRONT PEACE AGREEMENT: STRUGGLING WITH

Tags:  PREL PGOV SU ER 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASMARA 000162 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV SU ER
SUBJECT: EASTERN FRONT PEACE AGREEMENT: STRUGGLING WITH
IMPLEMENTATION


Classified By: AMBASSADOR SCOTT H. DELISI, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASMARA 000162

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV SU ER
SUBJECT: EASTERN FRONT PEACE AGREEMENT: STRUGGLING WITH
IMPLEMENTATION


Classified By: AMBASSADOR SCOTT H. DELISI, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: In the aftermath of the October 14 signing
of the Eastern Front Peace Agreement (EFPA),the undercurrent
of tensions, personal ambition and animosities between
Eastern Front (EF) leaders came to a head, with a near
collapse of the entity in December. The intercession of the
Eritrean mediator and pressure from other members of the
Eastern Front group appear to have pushed the Eastern Front
leadership back into a more-or-less united front in February
to proceed, albeit slowly, with working out the details of
implementation. Significant ) and possibly show-stopping
issues - remain to be resolved, such as who will fill the
three cabinet/ministerial-level positions designated for the
Eastern Front in the Government of National Unity (GNU). End
Summary.

PROBLEMS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE AGREEMENT
--------------


2. (C) In November, the Eastern Front began to move forward
on implementation of the EFPA provisions, beginning first
with efforts to build support for the EFPA with the people of
Eastern Sudan. Working with the Center for Peacebuilding in
the Horn of Africa, the EF distributed copies of the EFPA in
Arabic and through other media outlets throughout Eastern
Sudan. EF attempts to develop more cohesion as a political
party, however, were less successful. Personal rifts between
the EF leadership widened over the issue of proposed nominees
for the GNU political positions granted to the Easterners
under the EFPA.


3. (C) One member of the Eastern Front, Dr. Hassan of the
Habab clan, related to Poloff that tensions continued to
escalate through December between EF Chairman, Mussa
Muhammed, and Dr. Amna Dirar. The main point of contention
has been the nomination for the newly created position of
Advisor to the President. During the EFPA negotiations, Dr.
Dirar seemed the likely EF choice to to fill this position.
Mussa had maintained at the time that he was not interested
in the political positions, but rather sought the position of
General in the military. However, according to Dr. Hassan,

Mussa was later approached by leaders of his own (Beja
Hadendowa) tribe and pressed to seek the position of Advisor
to the President and to insist on a bigger portion of the
EFPA pie for the Beja Hadendowa claiming that they represent
a large percentage of the population. These leaders also
urged Mussa to push out Dr. Dirar, a member of the Beni Amer
Beja, who they viewed as a threat to their interests. In
December, scathing accusations against Dr. Dirar appeared in
Arabic press in the region, particularly in Khartoum.
(Comment: The implication was that Mussa and the Beja
Hadendowa placed these items. End Comment.) Other members of
the Eastern Front not directly involved in this power
struggle began to express their concern that implementation
was not moving forward productively.


4. (C) By mid-December, as the dynamics within the Eastern
Front became increasingly untenable and with no progress
being made on implementation, advisors to the Eastern Front
began to speak up. Dr. Taisier Ali of the Center for
Peacekeeping in the Horn of Africa raised his concerns with
lead Eritrean mediator Yemane Ghebreab. Ghebreab reportedly
stepped in and began meeting with EF members to resolve the
internal disputes.


PICKING UP THE PIECES
--------------


5. (C) In a February 15 meeting with Poloff, Dr. Dirar
indicated that the Eastern Front seemed to be more-or-less
back on track. Dirar said that she had left Eritrea in
December to handle a personal family matter. Upon her return
to Eritrea in January, she insisted on meeting with Mussa
face-to-face. In a series of contentious meetings, she said
that she had told Mussa if he continued his false accusations
and propaganda campaign, she would fight back and expose what

ASMARA 00000162 002 OF 003


he had done. Dr. Dirar relayed to Poloff her suspicions that
the National Congress Party (NCP) had encouraged Mussa,s
machinations. Furthermore she alleged the Wali of the Red
Sea, who is paid by the NCP, had tried to bribe younger EF
members into speaking out against the EF. (Comment: The
intercession by the Eritrean mediator and the direct
confrontation between Dirar and Mussa seemed to have yielded
some fruit as, according to Dirar, the Eastern Front
leadership restarted discussions with the mediator in the
last weeks of January about moving forward on EFPA
implementation. End Comment.)

IMPLEMENTATION IS BEGINNING BUT STILL FACES HURDLES
-------------- --------------


6. (C) In separate meetings with Dr. Dirar and the Sudanese
Deputy Chief of Mission Hussein Mohammed Hussein, both
assured Poloff that implementation of the EFPA provisions are
now moving forward. The integration of Eastern Front troops
may occur as soon as February 25. The camps are ready and
General Tekle, the Eritrean General responsible for
overseeing the integration, is scheduled to travel to the
camps in the Red Sea the week of February 19. While no
decision about the integration of officer positions has been
made yet, the GNU and the EF both state that they will work
toward enrolling 150 Eastern Front soldiers into the police
and military officer academies. Hussein also told Poloff
that the GNU was ready to proceed with establishing the
development fund. He noted that President Bashir had issued
the necessary proclamations to secure the funds, however the
EF has yet to present its three nominees to participate in
the oversight committee. Dr. Dirar confirmed this latter
comment, telling Poloff in confidence that she hopes to
nominate a financial expert, a regional expert, and a
development expert from Eastern Sudan to represent the EF on
the board. She added that she had not yet discussed these
nominees with EF leaders Mussa and Mabruk Mubarak Salim.


7. (C) The main and unresolved point of contention remains
the identification of the nominees for the three high-ranking
positions in the GNU ) Advisor to the President, Assistant
to the President and a Ministerial position in the Red Sea.
According to the agreement, the EF must present President
Bashir with three nominees for each post and he will make the
final selection. Whereas prior to the EFPA signing, Mussa
asserted he wanted to be a General, Dr. Dirar said she wished
to serve in the Parliament, and Mabruk claimed he would
return to his profitable business enterprises, throughout the
winter, all shifted positions in favor of competing for the
job of Advisor to the President. According to both the
Sudanese DCM and Dr. Dirar, this problem has been resolved
and the three leaders have apparently agreed on an
arrangement in which each will hold one of the three
positions.


8. (C) The Eastern Front also continues its uphill struggle
in establishing itself as a viable political entity. Dr.
Dirar noted that the EF is working to establish a
constitution and develop an organizational structure. She
believes that both will be accomplished soon and will
facilitate the implementation process and reduce further
internal conflicts. Another EF member was less optimistic in
his assessment with Poloff. He commented with frustration
that implementation was not going well. He noted that recent
statements in the media that everything was &fine8 within
the EF leadership were not entirely true. Nonetheless, he
also expressed hope that the on-going discussions about the
structure and operational framework for the EF as a political
party will serve to coalesce and strengthen the EF.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) While the signing of the EFPA is seen by many
Easterners as a victory in itself, the internal difficulties
within the Eastern Front leadership -- differences deeply
rooted in historic tribal conflict -- will continue to hamper
its ability to effectively implement the agreement

ASMARA 00000162 003 OF 003


provisions. Already outgunned by the GNU in terms of
political savvy and experience, the tribal cleavages and
self-interestedness of the EF leaders will continue to
provide the GNU with easily exploitable vulnerabilities. The
ability of the EF leadership to amicably resolve the issue of
its political representation in the upcoming months will be
critical to the EF,s continuation as a cohesive political
entity. To its credit, the EF leadership appears to have
moved past a critical breaking point in December. Post,
while not overly optimistic at this point about the
durability of either the EF or the permanency of the EFPA is
nonetheless encouraged that implementation does, in fact,
appear to be moving forward at this time, albeit slowly. We
are similarly encouraged that EF members themselves continue
to express hope that through the establishment of by-laws, a
constitution and clear political platforms the EF has the
potential to develop into a stronger political entity, which
in turn, they believe will be able to achieve the goals of
stabilizing and developing Eastern Sudan. End Comment.


10. (U) Minimize Considered.
DELISI