FOREIGN MINISTER MEREDOV TELLS SCA DAS FEIGENBAUM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 10 ASHGABAT 000044

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN (PERRY)
NSC FOR MILLARD, MERKEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM OSCE MARR TX US
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER MEREDOV TELLS SCA DAS FEIGENBAUM
TURKMENISTAN IS READY TO TURN A PAGE

ASHGABAT 00000044 001.2 OF 010


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Jennifer L. Brush for reasons 1.4 (B)
and (D).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) During a three and a half hour meeting, Foreign
Minister Rashit Meredov on January 10 told SCA Deputy
Assistant Secretary Evan Feigenbaum that Turkmenistan was
willing to consider improving bilateral relations on a range
of issues from human rights to trade to security. Meredov
welcomed Feigenbaum's message that the United States wanted
to "turn a page" in bilateral relations and expand
cooperation in the areas where joint efforts already were
robust, increase cooperation in areas where full potential
had not been reached in the past, and address areas where
there had been "profound differences." In specific changes
from the Niyazov regime, Meredov said the Government of
Turkmenistan would:

-- Finalize a cooperation plan with the International
Committee of the Red Cross, including a prison visit regime;

-- Establish a cooperative relationship with the OSCE's
Office for Democratic Initiatives and Human Rights (ODIHR),
including ODIHR technical assistance with the February 11
presidential election, followed by full-scale ODIHR
observation missions to the December 2007 provincial
elections and 2008 parliamentary elections;

-- Improve registration of religious groups, including
registering the Catholic Church;

-- Explore expanded cooperation in education, public health,
agriculture, security, trade, and involvement with
Afghanistan; and

-- Discuss freedom of movement, where "we would find a
solution."


2. (C) Meredov also agreed to a pre-election (late January)
expert-level cooperation delegation with participation
reflecting the range of areas in the bilateral relationship.
End Summary.

Meredov Relaxed and Focused
--------------


3. (C) Getting the meeting with Meredov was a fight; Embassy
had been told "we won't meet with anyone until after the
February 11 elections." During the January 10 session,
however, Meredov was relaxed, focused, engaged, and
occasionally self-deprecating. The meeting, originally
scheduled for two hours, ran to three and a half hours.
Meredov thanked the USG for Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice's message of condolence and A/S Boucher's presence at
the December 24 Niyazov funeral. Meredov apologized that
neither he nor Acting President Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedov
had been able to meet with Boucher, but noted there had been
no official meetings with visiting VIPs during the funeral.

U.S. Wants to "Turn the Page," But Needs to See Change
--------------


4. (C) Feigenbaum told Meredov he had requested the meeting
so the foreign minister could hear directly from the USG --
rather than through media speculation or third parties and
third countries -- about U.S. goals in Central Asia and
Turkmenistan. Recognizing that Turkmenistan was in the midst

ASHGABAT 00000044 002.2 OF 010


of a transition and might not be ready to make final
decisions about the future direction of the relationship,
Feigenbaum said he had come to Ashgabat to begin a dialogue
between the Governments of the United States and Turkmenistan
about the future direction of the bilateral relationship.
The United States:

-- Was prepared to work with Interim President
Berdimuhammedov and the Government of Turkmenistan during the
transition;

-- Wanted to see a peaceful and stable transition, but also a
transition that led to more possibilities, justice,
democracy, and openness across-the-board for the people of
Turkmenistan;

-- Was prepared to work with the outcome of Turkmenistan's
political system;

-- Respected Turkmenistan's relations with its neighbors and
would not seek to disturb existing contracts;

-- Did not believe the relationship had lived up to its full
potential;

-- Needed to see serious changes in Turkmenistan and in the
U.S.-Turkmenistan relationship;

-- Wanted to explore whether and how to achieve a more
cooperative relationship in future;

-- Recognized that achieving a more cooperative relationship
would not be easy;

-- Recognized that, although the two countries had many
common interests, they also had "profound differences"; and

-- While the two countries needed to work on resolving those
differences, these differences should not preclude
cooperation in areas where the two countries shared interests.


5. (C) Feigenbaum said the core of his message was to
reiterate Secretary Rice's and A/S Boucher's message that the
United States was ready to turn a page in the relationship --
if the Government of Turkmenistan was also prepared to turn
the page. Indeed, there had been a natural sequence in USG
actions since President Niyazov's death: the Secretary of
State had sent a message that the United States was prepared
to turn the page, A/S Boucher had come to Turkmenistan to
communicate that wish directly, and DAS Feigenbaum had come
to explore what that wish meant and what Turkmenistan was
prepared to do. And, when Turkmenistan was willing, the
United States was prepared to send a working-level delegation
to explore in greater depth what could be done in various
areas of the relationship -- trade and economics, democracy
and human rights, security cooperation, and cooperation on
transnational issues, such as environment, energy, narcotics,
and health -- to turn the page.

Meredov: Bilateral Relations Sound in Many Ways
--------------


6. (C) Meredov recalled that relations between Turkmenistan
and the United States had been established on the first day
of Turkmenistan's independence, and that then-Secretary of
State James Baker had a fruitful meeting with President
Niyazov in Ashgabat just a few days after Turkmenistan
adopted its constitution. Over the intervening 15 years,
there had been good cooperation. Noting that there were some

ASHGABAT 00000044 003.2 OF 010


areas where "different approaches" had led to problems, he
said Turkmenistan had always preferred to resolve those
questions through constructive dialogue, rather than to avoid
them. Turkmenistan viewed the United States as a friend.


7. (S) Meredov then listed examples of "positive cooperation"
between the United States and Turkmenistan:

-- Trade and Commerce. To date, 48 companies with U.S.
capital were involved in 90 projects, worth $1.9 billion.
Textiles manufactured in Turkmenistan were being exported to
the United States through well-known companies.
Turkmenistan's oil and gas, textile, energy and agriculture
sectors all remained open to U.S. products.

-- Security and counter-narcotics cooperation. Concrete
border security and counter-narcotics law enforcement
cooperation, as exemplified by the Altyn Asyr border
checkpoint station on the Iran border, built and equipped by
the United States. Turkmenistan had also been a member of
the coalition in the war on terrorism since 2001 and had
assisted the U.S. by allowing transits by U.S. aircraft and
plane refueling at Ashgabat airport. Turkmenistan had also
signed the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in 2005,
and, within that framework, had refused to allow aircraft
suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction or their
components to transit Turkmenistan airspace.

-- Education cooperation. The USG had created opportunities
for children and teachers to grow, learn, and develop through
a number of exchange programs, including FLEX, UGRAD, the
Muskie Fellowship and the Fulbright program. In 2006,
Turkmenistan had followed through with another Embassy
initiative -- hosting the International Teachers of English
Conference (ITEC) in Ashgabat. When problems emerged, the
Government of Turkmenistan worked with the Embassy to find a
mutually satisfactory solution, according to Meredov
(Comment: Only partly true, the government cooperated on
arranging the conference but worked overtime to prevent its
own teachers from traveling from the provinces to attend.
End Comment.).


8. (C) Referring to the problematic 2006 FLEX recruitment
season, Meredov said "we" worked with the United States to
re-test in three cities where local officials had not
cooperated sufficiently. Expressing the hope that education
cooperation would continue, he noted that all of
Turkmenistan's presidential candidates in recent days had
mentioned the need for changes in education. "Some" (i.e.,
Interim President Berdimuhammedov) had called for even more
concrete steps, including enhanced overseas educational
exchanges with the United States. A number of U.S.
organizations, including both USAID and the Peace Corps, were
doing much to help, he said; their efforts had been valued by
President Niyazov, who had written a message that was to have
been read by Meredov to the new group of Peace Corps
volunteers being sworn in on December 21. Unfortunately,
that message had never been delivered, due to Niyazov's death.

U.S. Interest in Central Asia
--------------


9. (C) Feigenbaum stressed that, since 1991, the core U.S.
interest in Central Asia had been support for the sovereignty
and independence of the countries of the region. Media
discussion of a "Great Game" belied the fact that U.S.
actions in Turkmenistan -- and in the region as a whole --
were focused on supporting Central Asian countries and their
sovereignty, and on giving those countries opportunities in

ASHGABAT 00000044 004.2 OF 010


every field. The United States did not regard Central Asians
as mere objects of struggle with outsiders but as actors in
their own right and sought to work with them in all areas --
economics and trade, political reform, human rights and
democracy promotion, security cooperation, and to address
transnational cooperation on problems such as terrorism,
narcotics trafficking, environment, energy, and border
security.


10. (C) Feigenbaum noted that many U.S. programs were
multi-dimensional in nature -- they had implications for and
benefits in more than one area. For example, rule of law was
essential to democracy but was also a building block of trade
and commerce. Likewise, while secure borders and modern
customs helped to assure security they also contributed to
trade. The United States wanted to work in a
multi-dimensional way on these issues to support countries'
sovereignty and independence.

The Way Forward
--------------


11. (S) DAS Feigenbaum reviewed the history of
U.S.-Turkmenistan relations. He then said the bilateral
relationship with Turkmenistan reflected three elements:

-- A track record of shared success in many areas. The
United States was proud of that record and hoped Turkmenistan
was equally proud of that success. The USG was pleased with
Turkmenistan's cooperation in Afghanistan, and was grateful
for Turkmenistan's support. Security cooperation was strong
and appreciated. There had been excellent cooperation on
borders. There also had been much success in
non-proliferation and other issues -- areas not discussed
publicly and not always apparent, such as North Korea.
Feigenbaum noted a number of areas of productive cooperation
and suggested the United States and Turkmenistan should try
to build on that track record.

-- Unfulfilled potential in more areas. Berdimuhammedov's
comments over the last few days on expanding exchanges,
restoring some subjects to the education curriculum and
offering Internet access to all offered new hope that
Turkmenistan's leaders were re-ordering priorities. Yet,
USAID's Participation, Education and Knowledge-Strengthening
(PEAKS) program had not been approved, even though it would
have strengthened Turkmenistan's own efforts to build up its
education curriculum, and three Internet Access Training
Programs (IATP) centers had been closed. The United States
also had encountered significant problems with its FLEX
program. In the spirit of improving cooperation, the United
States wanted to see those centers reopened. Trade and the
rule of law were other areas where more cooperation
beneficial to Turkmenistan might have been possible but
Turkmen policies had stood in the way. The United States did
not want to unsettle existing contracts between Turkmenistan
and its partners, but believed options and competition would
benefit Turkmenistan and others.

-- Profound differences in other areas, not least on issues
related to human rights, political reform, and democracy.
DAS Feigenbaum emphasized that we needed to work on these
differences and the United States hoped to see real change in
Turkmenistan.

-- Feigenbaum stressed that differences should not preclude
cooperation in areas where the two countries shared
interests. The United States hoped to turn areas of profound
difference into a positive in the relationship.

ASHGABAT 00000044 005.2 OF 010




Profound Differences Can be Resolved
--------------


12. (C) As discussion turned to political issues and
democracy, DAS Feigenbaum told Meredov, "it's no secret the
United States hopes to seen an open society in Turkmenistan."
A/S Boucher had recently made this point during a VOA
interview. The USG wanted greater openness everywhere -- in
travel, trade, access to information, citizen participation
in the political process, religion and belief, and the press
-- in short "comprehensive openness in every sphere." This
did not mean the USG expected all countries to look like
carbon copies of the United States; instead, it recognized
that each country would develop its economy, society and
culture in its own way.


13. (C) However, there were some issues that had prevented
further cooperation and had affected the U.S. perception of
Turkmenistan. The United States wanted a new relationship,
but there had to be changes in these areas. If Turkmenistan
wanted to turn the page, these areas had to be resolved,
including:

-- Participation in the political life of the country. DAS
Feigenbaum noted that Meredov had just hosted a delegation
from the OSCE's Office of Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights (ODIHR) and hoped that the visit had been productive.
The United States was very interested in seeing how
Turkmenistan's dialogue with ODIHR developed, including on
technical assessment of elections and observer missions.
Perhaps the United States could also be helpful on elections.

-- Freedom of movement on travel. The issue came down to the
need to allow citizens of Turkmenistan greater opportunities
for exchanges and connections. When Berdimuhammedov had
discussed Internet access, he had been discussing increased
connections with the rest of the world. Travel was another
way of accomplishing the same goal. If people could not
travel, then they needed to have an understanding of why they
could not travel.

-- Civil/civic engagement. Activities of all sorts of groups
-- private, independent and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) -- were a vital part of the life of society. All such
groups should be able to register.

-- Religious freedom. The United States wanted to see
people, including members of minority religious groups,
engage in religious activity. All minority religious groups
and their branches should be able to register.

-- Openness to information. Noting that Washington was
"intrigued" by Berdimuhammedov's comments on open access for
all to the Internet, allowing Turkmenistan's students to go
abroad on expanded exchanges, and restoration of banned
subjects to the curriculum, Feigenbaum said this concept
supported the larger idea of increasing access to information
in Turkmenistan. One way to ensure this access would be to
accredit more foreign journalists in Turkmenistan and to
expand media freedoms. More correspondents in Turkmenistan
would promote more information about Turkmenistan. Although
this was an area of difference, over time this could become
an area of greater cooperation.

-- Prisons. Noting that Turkmenistan was talking with ICRC,
DAS Feigenbaum hoped the government could find a mutually
agreeable way to work with the ICRC and to ensure ICRC

ASHGABAT 00000044 006.2 OF 010


access. He pushed for more transparency in Turkmenistan's
prison system and about prisoners, including political
prisoners.

Meredov: There Are No Political Prisoners, But We're Working
with ICRC
--------------


14. (C) According to Meredov, notwithstanding reports by some
media, all prisoners in Turkmenistan had broken laws and had
been convicted of those crimes. Reports from opposition
representatives of political prisoners were incorrect.
Turkmenistan had no political prisoners. Indeed, even now,
there were people who had committed grave crimes that were
living outside Turkmenistan and were considered opposition
leaders. However, Turkmenistan had filed warrants against
those people with INTERPOL, and had evidence to prove those
individuals -- many of whom had received protection from
foreign countries -- were criminals.


15. (C) Meredov said the Government of Turkmenistan was
negotiating a draft "Plan of Cooperation for 2007" with ICRC.
This plan laid out a number of areas of cooperation,
including in humanitarian law, health, and the functioning of
the prison system. Unfortunately, Niyazov's death had
preempted a December 21 meeting between the government and
the ICRC's regional representative, Mr. Michel. Meredov
hoped the ICRC would reschedule the meeting, and said the
government wanted a constructive dialogue on a visit regime.

Meredov on ODIHR and Elections: Starting a Long-term
Relationship Over Several Elections
--------------


16. (C) Meredov said the ODIHR team met with all the main
players -- candidates, the Central Election Commission,
members of the Mejlis (parliament) and diplomatic missions --
during its two days in Ashgabat. During its outbrief with
Meredov, the team told him it considered the visit a success,
and that the mission saw a possibility of future cooperation.



17. (C) More concretely, the delegation had outlined two
directions which election cooperation could take: a
broad-based observer program or a technical assistance
program. The ODIHR team had stressed that the timing for
observation teams outlined in the Copenhagen Document did not
allow for an observer mission, since long-term observers --
usually in-country six weeks prior to elections -- would have
had to be on the ground already. However, the ODIHR team had
said that, particularly since this was Turkmenistan's first
major experience working with ODIHR on elections, a technical
team might be the way to go.


18. (C) Meredov stressed the Government of Turkmenistan's
willingness to work with an ODIHR group of experts, which
would come as an OSCE field mission, and to allow the team
full access at all levels of the election process. "We are
ready to meet with them and listen attentively to their
recommendations and to learn more about the international
experience in elections," he indicated.


19. (C) Meredov described a program of long-term cooperation,
designed to work with Turkmenistan through several elections.
Beyond the February 11 presidential election, election
cooperation with ODIHR would extend into the future,
including possible full observer missions for elections at
the end of 2007 for welayat (provincial)-level people's
councils, and in 2008 for the Mejlis (parliament). Meredov

ASHGABAT 00000044 007.2 OF 010


stated that the ODIHR team had also discussed other areas of
cooperation.

Meredov on Freedom of Movement: Willing to Discuss
-------------- --------------


20. (C) Acknowledging that he had frequently met with the
embassy to discuss "different approaches" to this issue,
Meredov said that he always tried to explain the law and
discuss specific cases, as they were affected by existing
legislation. The Government of Turkmenistan was willing to
discuss problems in order to see whether a mutually
acceptable solution was possible. While Meredov give DAS
Feigenbaum an immediate answer, he was willing to continue
the dialogue and "find a solution."

Meredov on Religion: An Area of Positive Cooperation
-------------- --------------


21. (C) Meredov described religious freedom as a positive
area of cooperation. While registration of religious groups
was necessary under Turkmenistan's law, the government had
adjusted its registration prerequisite of 500 members down to
2 (sic) members following then-EUR DAS Lynn Pascoe's 2004
visit. (Note: Actually, the government requires 5 members
for registration. End note.) There are now 118 registered
groups: 96 Muslim, 13 Russian Orthodox and 9 other religious
groups. (Comment: The government counts every mosque as a
group; therefore the numbers reflect the existence of 96
registered mosques and 13 Russian Orthodox churches. The
government in the past has shut down non-registered mosques,
typically those who refuse to display/pray from the Ruhnama.
End Comment.) The government also had resolved problems
related to registration of local branches following an
October 2005 roundtable with minority religious groups.


22. (C) While there were other groups that wanted to
register, solutions involved adjustments to local law. For
example, although the Roman Catholic Church was a major world
religion, Turkmenistan law required heads of religious groups
to be citizens of Turkmenistan. However, there were no
Turkmenistan citizens who could be appointed heads of the
Catholic Church in Turkmenistan without at least five to six
years of relevant training. Meredov had met with a
representative of the Papal Nuncio late in December 2006 to
discuss this issue; the two agreed to work toward a solution.
In the meantime, Meredov added, members of the Church,
including Turkmenistan citizens, would be allowed to meet and
practice their faith. "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
the Ministry of Justice will try to find a solution (to the
remaining registration cases)," he said.

Meredov on NGOs: Willing to Discuss Solutions
-------------- -


23. (C) Meredov noted that legislation existed on
registration of public organizations, but said the government
will continue to engage in discussion. "With an atmosphere
of constructive dialogue, anything can be discussed and
solutions can be found," he added.

A Road-Map Forward
--------------


24. (C) DAS Feigenbaum reiterated the U.S. desire to turn the
page on the bilateral relationship. Reviewing U.S. actions
over the past weeks, he said the United States had some ideas
on directions for future cooperation, beginning with a
working-level exchange to explore the ideas. Feigenbaum

ASHGABAT 00000044 008.2 OF 010


proposed that an interagency working-level delegation, headed
by EUR/ACE Coordinator Tom Adams with participation
reflecting all areas of the relationship, including
economics, security, and democracy, visit Turkmenistan in
late January in order to explore how the two countries might
comprehensively expand their cooperation. Subsequently, when
Turkmenistan was ready to make bigger decisions, there could
be follow-on visits, for instance by representatives of the
Department of Defense or the State Department's Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL).


25. (C) DAS Feigenbaum noted that it made sense to expand
cooperation in areas in which Berdimuhammedov already had
expressed interest:

-- Health. Berdimuhammedov had a health background and might
have his own ideas, but joint efforts on disease prevention,
including vaccinations (measles, mumps, and rubella) and a
cooperative plan to improve medical equipment in clinics
outside the capital were possible.

-- Education. Following up on Berdimuhammedov's expressed
interest in expanding exchanges, it made sense for
Turkmenistan to resolve issues related to the FLEX and PEAKS
programs and to reopen closed Internet Access and Training
Centers. However, the two countries should also examine new
areas to expand education cooperation, such as Internet
access and exchanges.

-- Security Cooperation. The two sides could possibly expand
the International Military Education and Training (IMET) and
Marshall Center programs, should conclude the exchange of
diplomatic notes on the emergency divert program for Mary,
and explore other areas of interest, such as additional
cooperation border security and counter-narcotics.

-- Regional Cooperation. DAS Feigenbaum stressed the
importance for Central Asia of finding "opportunities in
every direction" on the compass, including to Afghanistan and
South Asia, and said the State Department structural
reorganization that moved responsibility for Central Asia to
the South Asia bureau had been intended to assist Central
Asian countries to expand economic and other contacts to
supplement existing contacts. The two countries could
explore the possibility of new trade programs within the
scope of the Central Asian Trade Investment Framework
Agreement (TIFA). Noting Turkmenistan's participation in
recent electricity conferences in Istanbul and Dushanbe, he
also suggested that Turkmenistan could explore cooperation in
those areas.

A New Relationship Requires a New Ambassador
--------------


26. (C) Meredov promised to answer promptly whenever a new
U.S. ambassador was proposed, but stressed that, meanwhile,
the Government of Turkmenistan had "open and respectful"
discussions with the Charge.

Meredov Accepts Roadmap
--------------


27. (C) Meredov accepted the idea of a late-January
expert-level cooperation visit. Turkmenistan would also
continue to consider cooperation projects "with the same
respect as before." Past programs -- including the
Ambassador's Fund for Cultural Preservation and visits to
Turkmenistan of U.S. experts on education, music, art and
libraries -- demonstrated Turkmenistan's commitment to "wide

ASHGABAT 00000044 009.2 OF 010


and comprehensive" cooperation in cultural issues. Trade
initiatives under the TIFA and counter-narcotics work also
offered areas for continued cooperation.

Meredov Seeks U.S. Backing for UN Regional Center
-------------- --------------


28. (C) Meredov said Turkmenistan was interested in expanding
its cooperation in the region not only in economic and
social, but also political areas. One initiative of special
importance was the proposal to establish a Regional Center
for Preventive Diplomacy in Ashgabat. Former UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan had supported the initiative in

SIPDIS
his 2005 annual report, but Turkmenistan also needed Security
Council backing. U.S. support for the center's establishment
was important for Turkmenistan. (Comment: This center was
one of Niyazov's vanity projects and has never enjoyed USG
support. Meredov may have been parroting this request out of
habit, he should know the United States has consistently
failed to support this initiative as a waste of money and
inappropriate given Turkmenistan's isolation. End Comment.)

Regional Energy Issues
--------------


29. (C) DAS Feigenbaum noted that Turkmenistan had been
providing electricity to Afghanistan, and noted a great need
for energy in Afghanistan and the region. Countries were
moving forward on regional electricity initiatives, and
countries such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which had rich
hydropower resources, would found they could get two to three
times more for their energy in the south than they could by
simply sending energy to existing markets. Although
Turkmenistan did not have hydropower, this example
demonstrated the power of competition, markets, and options
and choices in its economy.


30. (C) Meredov noted that Turkmenistan exported electricity
to Afghanistan powered by natural gas. Noting that this was
an "important moment" in the discussion, he said that the
electrical power supplied by Turkmenistan had great potential
in the region. Of course, it was natural that other Central
Asian states with water resources wanted access to the
regional market, but, as demonstrated by Tajikistan, their
supply was unreliable. Although Turkmenistan welcomed the
economic success of all countries in the region, there were
certain rules of economics. But he did not want to discuss
those issues; instead, Meredov wanted to focus on Niyazov's
proposal to develop Afghanistan's electrical network through
provision of electrical power from Turkmenistan.

Meredov Requests Urgent Help on Agricultural Exchanges
-------------- --------------


31. (C) Meredov thanked DAS Feigenbaum for U.S. cooperation,
particularly in the agricultural sector, and noted that
USDA's Cochran exchange and the Farmer-to-Farmer exchange
program had helped send agricultural specialists to the
United States. He asked whether the USG could send three
agricultural specialists to the United States, for "one to
two weeks," to learn about agricultural organization,
management, marketing and methodologies -- especially in the
wheat and cotton sectors. DAS Feigenbaum responded that,
although this was an issue that should be explored during the
working-level visit in late January, he would take the
request backed to Washington.

Comment
--------------

ASHGABAT 00000044 010.2 OF 010




32. (C) Meredov, who often interacts more like the lawyer he
is by training than like a diplomat, was in particularly
statesman-like form. He clearly understood Feigenbaum's
message that a new relationship was possible and desirable;
the United States was ready, but change was needed in many
areas. While Embassy expected him to be receptive about DAS
Feigenbaum's messages on security and counter-narcotics
cooperation, Meredov's positive comments on ODIHR, aspects of
religious freedom, ICRC and prisons, and his willingness to
continue discussion on a number of other issues in the human
dimension basket such as freedom of movement, were clearly
intended to demonstrate Turkmenistan's own willingness to
pursue a new relationship. Unfortunately, old habits die
hard. Following the Meredov meeting, MFA failed to confirm
most of the appointments it had previously approved for the
visit, including a visit to a disabled sports club equipped
by USAID, a visit to the Gaudan border crossing station to
view EXBS-supplied equipment, a meeting with regional
governors, and a visit to a USAID-funded resource center
outside of Ashgabat. After Charge protested to MFA protocol
that MFA's actions did not reflect Foreign Minister Meredov's
positive words about cooperation, a previously approved, then
canceled, visit to the local USAID-funded chapter of Junior
Achievement was rescheduled. End Comment.


33. (U) DAS Feigenbaum cleared this message.
BRUSH