BERDIMUHAMMEDOV AND PUTIN DISCUSS INCREASED GAS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ASHGABAT 000430

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (PERRY)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2017
TAGS: EPET PGOV PREL RS SCUL TX
SUBJECT: BERDIMUHAMMEDOV AND PUTIN DISCUSS INCREASED GAS
EXPORTS FROM TURKMENISTAN

REF: ASHGABAT

ASHGABAT 00000430 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Jennifer L. Brush for reasons 1.
4 (B) and (D).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Turkmenistan President Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedov's
April 23-24 working visit to Moscow, described by local press
as "a political sensation," resulted in no written agreements
but represented a step forward in the bilateral relationship.
Energy discussions topped the Russian agenda, with Russian
President Vladimir Putin offering the possibility of
expanding a northern Caspian littoral pipeline for
Turkmenistan's gas. Berdimuhammedov brought several specific
proposals for cooperation in the education sector. Security
cooperation was notably mentioned in the publicized
communique, representing a new area of bilateral discussion.
Putin agreed to visit Ashgabat, probably in mid-May, and
Russian press reports speculated that although
Berdimuhammedov made no concrete promises during his meetings
with the Russian president, "real" agreements would be signed
during Putin's visit. Foreign Minister called in Charge
immediately upon his return to assure her that the Caspian
littoral pipeline was nothing new, the discussion in Moscow
was how to increase the current volume. Meredov instructed
her to tell Washington that the Trans-Caspian Pipeline
concept remained on the table, in spite of assertions to the
contrary by the Moscow press. End Summary.

"HISTORIC AND RELIABLE PARTNERS"
--------------


2. (U) Turkmenistan President Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedov's
visit to Russia, characterized in glowing terms by Russian
and local press, resulted in no solid agreements between the
two sides. Russian President Vladimir Putin reminded
Berdimuhammedov of the "historic and reliable partnership"
between the two countries, and each side agreed to move
forward with cooperation in the economic, security, and
cultural spheres. The visit, which opened April 23 at
Putin,s country residence in Novo-Ogarevo and continued at
the Kremlin the next day, resulted in a published communique
that pledged strengthening of mutual trade and economic ties
and enhancement of security and cultural cooperation.


3. (SBU) Berdimuhammedov's decision to visit Russia during
the first months of his presidency came as no surprise to
most local observers; whether he was seduced or cajoled by
his northern neighbor, local observers agree that Russia was
a natural destination for the new leader. (Comment: Some
here speculated that Berdimuhammedov's visit to Saudi Arabia
) a visit that squarely followed the example of former
President Niyazov ) was a largely symbolic trip intended to
portray his new government as purified after undertaking the
rituals of the hajj. The president was accompanied on his
visit to Saudi Arabia by some 40 government officials,
including Presidential Security Chief Rejepov, Deputy
Chairman of the Committee for Religious Affairs Garriyev, and
Deputy Chairman Meredov. Some local press coverage of the
visit was religious in nature and accompanied by educational
articles on Islam. End Comment.)


4. (SBU) On his trip to Moscow, Berdimuhammedov was
accompanied by three Deputy Chairmen of the Cabinet of
Ministers as well as Defense Minister Mammetgeldiyev and
Minister of National Security Ashyrmuhammedov, who held
breakout meetings with their Russian counterparts during
Berdimuhammedov and Putin's official meeting at the Kremlin.


ASHGABAT 00000430 002.2 OF 004



5. (U) Berdimuhammedov made no concrete promises during his
meetings with Putin, and some Russian media outlets suggest
that "real" agreements would not be signed until Putin
visited Ashgabat, which a spokesperson for Turkmenistan's
Embassy in Moscow said would probably occur around May 13.

ENERGY TOPS RUSSIAN AGENDA
--------------


6. (U) Press accounts of the meetings between the two heads
of state focused primarily on energy issues, which appeared
to top Putin's agenda during the presidential discussions.
Berdimuhammedov promised during the Kremlin talks that he
would work with Russia in "all areas of cooperation, first
and foremost in the economic sphere and the distribution of
Turkmenistan gas," according to The Moscow Times. Both
presidents spoke in detail about the present state of ) and
future prospects for ) cooperation in the gas sector.


7. (SBU) Putin's energy agenda was reflected in his side's
representatives during official discussions at the Kremlin.
Putin's foreign aide Sergei Prikhodko, Industry and Energy
Minister Viktor Khristenko, Gazprom head Alexei Miller,
TNK-BP Executive Director German Khan, and head of
Stroitransgas Viktor Lorenz all attended the meeting. (Note:
Stroitransgas is Gazprom's main pipeline builder. End Note.)
Russia's Ambassador to Turkmenistan Blatov and Itera's Igor
Makarov also are pictured in photographs of the meetings in
Turkmenistan's local press. The Kremlin said in a statement
that companies such as LUKoil, Zarubeshneft, Itera,
Soyuzneftegaz, Stroitransgas and RusAl were eager to carry
out "promising projects" in Turkmenistan. A LUKoil spokesman
said that LUKoil Overseas was considering greater involvement
in Turkmenistan's oil and gas development.


8. (U) The published communique reports that Berdimuhammedov
and Putin verbally agreed to honor the 25-year gas deal that
Niyazov signed in 2003.


9. (SBU) Putin announced during the visit that Russia has
"re-launched" the Caspian littoral pipeline at Turkmenistan's
request, and suggested that expansion of this pipeline, which
skirts the northern shore of the Caspian via Russian
territory, would help to increase Turkmenistan's gas exports.
(Comment: Putin raised this pipeline option in January 2006
with former President Niyazov, who enthusiastically suggested
that Russia and Turkmenistan jointly construct an expansion.
End Comment.) Putin noted that the pipeline currently
carried 5 million cubic meters of gas daily, representing an
annual export of just 1.8 billion cubic meters. (Comment:
Post has heard on several occasions that this pipeline,
presumably the Central Asia Center-3, has been in constant
operation. End Comment.) Berdimuhammedov deferred
commitment on this issue, promising only to take the option
under consideration back home. In a publicized statement,
Berdimuhammedov said that he would "provide the option for
the consideration of our experts." Local press quoted
Berdimuhammedov as emphasizing that the Caspian littoral
pipeline was just one of many options for bringing Turkmen
energy to the world market.


10. (SBU) Some local observers noted that Berdimuhammedov
handled his meeting with Putin with caution, listening
closely to his counterpart's suggestion while avoiding
promises. He declined to publicly endorse Niyazov's
September 2006 pledge to refrain from joining a Trans-Caspian
project at any time in the future, according to press, and
the two presidents made no headway on Caspian delimitation
issues. (Comment: A Caspian Sea working group met in
Ashgabat from April 23-24, with the usual rhetoric and no
concrete result. End Comment).

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BERDIMUHAMMEDOV ENCOURAGES RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT IN EDUCATION
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11. (U) Although he appeared to approach other areas of
cooperation with reservation, Berdimuhammedov came armed with
several specific proposals for cooperation in education.
During their first official meeting, Berdimuhammedov invited
Putin to take part in the groundbreaking ceremony for the
enlargement of the "Pushkin School," the joint
Turkmen-Russian school. He also welcomed opening a branch of
Moscow State University at the "Ruhnama University," a
Niyazov-era proposal for a large international university.
Berdimuhammedov suggested that Turkmenistan also could open a
local branches of the Gubkin University in the Turkmenistan
Polytechnic Institute.


12. (U) Berdimuhammedov invited Russian scholars to
participate -- along with international scholars -- in the
future Ruhnama University, and asked for Russian assistance
in curriculum development for secondary schools. (Comment:
Some observers here speculated that Russia could be a natural
partner for Turkmenistan in curricular reform because of the
shared Soviet roots of the two countries' systems of
education, despite the wreckage of Turkmenistan's educational
system through Niyazov-era "reforms" and the reduction in
Russian language training, which created a generation raised
speaking only Ruhnama-sourced Turkmen. End Comment.)

PUTIN RAISES SECURITY COOPERATION
--------------


13. (SBU) Assuring his guest that he respected Turkmenistan's
neutral status, Putin raised the issue of security
cooperation with Berdimuhammedov. (Comment: Security
cooperation would be a new area of the bilateral
relationship, although Putin raised the issue of cooperation
with Niyazov in the past, to no avail. End Comment.) Local
press reports that Putin underscored the possibility for
renewed cooperation in areas of concern, including the fights
against terrorism, drugs trafficking, and organized crime.
Putin also suggested increasing positive contacts between
Russian and Turkmen military bodies.

JOINT RUSSIAN-TURKMEN COMMISSION
--------------


14. (U) The presidents discussed resuscitation of a Joint
Russian-Turkmen Commission, which would be co-chaired by
Turkmenistan's Deputy Chairman Meredov and Russian Deputy
Prime Minister Sergei Naryshkin. The Commission's next
meeting was scheduled for June. (Note: This commission was
formed under President Niyazov to address issues of economic
cooperation and has been largely inactive for the last four
years. End Note.)

Meredov Calls in Charge
--------------


15. (C) On April 26 Foreign Minister Meredov called in
Charge to debrief her on the trip. He said he had just
arrived from Moscow a couple of hours earlier and wanted to
put debriefing her at the top of his agenda. Meredov said
that he and President Berdimuhammedov had read "with interest
and respect" SCA/CEN PDAS Mann's reftel letter and therefore
wanted to inform Washington that a Trans-Caspian Pipeline
remained on the table. He said to tell Mann that the
proposed dates for a visit for May 29-30 were approved and
that Mann could come with "whomever he wanted." Meredov
emphasized, however, that Turkmenistan was looking for a
"concrete proposal," with specific steps. Meredov said he

ASHGABAT 00000430 004.2 OF 004


knew that this proposal would involve complicated political
and economic issues but that the Turkmenistani side was ready
to address these issues. After Meredov rabbited the mantra
that Turkmenistan's policy was to sell gas "up to the
border," Charge said that direct contact with consumers was
far more beneficial to Turkmenistan. According to
Meredov,"we're willing to address that too." In response to
Charge's comment that she was trying to imagine the day that
Berdimuhammedov would announce ground-breaking for a TCP,
cognisant of possible Russian reactions, Meredov shrugged and
repeated, "we are a sovereign nation."

COMMENT
--------------


16. (C) Although Berdimuhammedov managed to dodge any
specific commitment of Turkmenistan's gas resources, it is
clear that Russia has begun a full court press on
Turkmenistan's leadership for future control of energy export
routes. Russia may have felt that it was losing ground in
Turkmenistan following Niyazov's death because
Berdimuhammedov elected to talk with a variety of private
sector and diplomatic players about the possibilities for
alternative and additional gas pipelines exiting
Turkmenistan. Putin's courting of Berdimuhammedov ) rich
with references to a shared history and culture ) was aimed
at increasing the sense of familiarity and security that the
new president feels in dealing with Russia. References to
Niyazov's agreements with Russia in the gas sector, including
the suggestion that Russia built the Caspian littoral
pipeline at Niyazov's request, represented attempts to secure
the cooperation of a new leader, less experienced in the
politics of energy, but determined to preserve his promise of
following his predecessor's path.


16. (C) Russia's diplomatic offensive )- including Lavrov's
successful visit to Ashgabat earlier this month, with its
focus on cultural affairs )- is intended to re-introduce
Russia as Turkmenistan's main partner, one respectful of
Turkmenistan's foreign policy of "permanent, positive
neutrality," who is genuinely interested in Turkmenistan's
development. Berdimuhammedov's interest in Russian
cooperation in the education sector is not surprising, as the
new president has consistently raised education as his
priority for reform. Russia's emphasis on security
cooperation may resonate more strongly with Berdimuhammadov
than it did with Niyazov. That the new president brought
both his Defense Minister and Minister of National Security
to Moscow represents a new interest in hearing what the
Russian side has to offer. End Comment.
BRUSH