HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR TO TEHRAN ON TURKMENISTAN AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASHGABAT 000422

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (PERRY)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV TX IR
SUBJECT: HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR TO TEHRAN ON TURKMENISTAN AND
IRAN

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Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Jennifer L. Brush for reasons 1.
4 (B) and (D).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) During an April 20 meeting, Hungarian Ambassador to
Iran and Turkmenistan Istvan Venczel discussed developments
in Turkmenistan and briefed Charge on the current political
situation in Iran. Venczel, who has lived in Tehran since
2003, commented on issues of concern in Turkmenistan --
including pipeline construction, human rights, and Russian
influence -- and provided his impressions of Iranian
leadership, Iran's nuclear intentions, and public opinion
towards the United States. Among the issues raised by
Venczel:

-- Iran did not have "friends" in the international
community, and its isolation helped to justify its belief
that it needed nuclear weapons.

-- Many factions were competing for power in Tehran and
President Ahmedinejad's position was far from secure.

--Ahmedinejad's belligerence, which made some Iranians
nervous, had turned public opinion against him in some
pockets of the population.

--Ordinary Iranians still liked Americans, partly because of
the large Iranian diaspora in the West and continued travel
of Iranians to the United States.

-- Iran was in a very strong position in Iraq, and there
would be no peace in Iraq without Iran's cooperation.

End Summary.

VENCZEL ON TURKMENISTAN: PIPELINES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND RUSSIAN
INFLUENCE
--------------


2. (SBU) Hungarian Ambassador to Iran and Turkmenistan Istvan
Venczel called on Charge on April 20 during a visit to
Ashgabat. Venczel, who has lived in Tehran since 2003 and
formerly headed the OSCE Center in Ashgabat, plans to retire
from the diplomatic corps and may seek an OSCE position in
Central Asia. Charge welcomed him and said that Hungary's
diplomatic presence, along with that of other Eastern
European countries, was critical for Turkmenistan, and
commented that the accreditation of the new Polish Ambassador
to Turkmenistan and the opening of a Polish Embassy in
Ashgabat were steps forward in the relationship between
Eastern European countries and Turkmenistan.


3. (C) Venczel opened by asking Charge about U.S. intentions
regarding the Trans-Caspian pipeline, commenting that he had
heard of USG interest in reengaging Turkmenistan on that
issue. Charge commented that in order for a Trans-Caspian
pipeline to be realistic, Turkmenistan would have to improve
its foreign investment climate and the Europeans would need
to show more support for the plan, but that Turkmenistan's
increased receptivity to engagement with Azerbaijan was
encouraging. Venczel remarked that despite this, he was not
optimistic about either Europe engaging or Turkmenistan
improving its investment climate.


4. (C) Venczel raised the issue of Muhametkuli Aymyradov, a
political prisoner arrested in 1995 on charges of
anti-government plotting, and said that the release of
Aymyradov would be a symbolic gesture for Turkmenistan.
(Comment: Aymyradov, who was associated with Avdy Kuliev's

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opposition group in the early 1990s, was arrested in
Uzbekistan in 1995 and returned to Turkmenistan, where he was
sentenced and imprisoned for 15 years on charges of engaging
in activities aimed at overthrowing the constitutional order.
In 1998, his sentence was extended by 18 years in connection
with an alleged prison break attempt. End Comment.) Venczel
said that Niyazov once promised to release Aymyradov to
Moscow, but never followed up on his promise. Venczel
speculated that Aymyradov's imprisonment was associated with
Niyazov's personal dislike of him, and that Aymyradov --
having no association with the 2002 assassination attempt or
any recent attempt on the government -- did not pose any kind
of threat to Berdimuhammedov.


5. (C) Charge agreed that the world was ready for a gesture
from Berdimuhammedov -- the release of a high-profile
prisoner, for example, or International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) access to prisons. Despite promises, however,
the international community so far had not seen any steps
towards real reform. For example, Berdimuhammedov announced
reforms in the education sector that restore the previous
status quo by increasing the years of education, but he would
not allow the USG to assist with curriculum development or
teaching methodology.


6. (C) For now, Charge commented, Russia appeared to be
either seducing or threatening Berdimuhammedov, or both,
judging from the president's urgent working visit to Russia,
and she asked whether Venczel believed that the Kremlin had
the power to unseat Berdimuhammedov. Venczel replied that
Berdimuhammedov would certainly be more open with Russia than
Niyazov had been, because Niyazov was more of a Turkmen
nationalist. Russia, Venczel suggested, had a strong
position in Turkmenistan, although not as strong as in other
Central Asian states, and Berdimuhammedov might fear --
rightly or not -- that Russia had some influence over his
political position.

IRAN NOT CONCERNED ABOUT U.S. PRESENCE IN TURKMENISTAN
--------------


7. (C) Venczel claimed that Iran was not worried about U.S.
engagement with Turkmenistan, although the Iranian leadership
watched U.S. activities in Azerbaijan with concern. Iran had
a good relationship with Turkmenistan. However, Iran became
more cautious under Khatami and now made no effort to export
the Revolution to Central Asia; most of the mosques in
Turkmenistan that had been opened with outside support were
established by Saudis. (Comment: Most Saudi-sponsored
mosques were shut down under Niyazov. End Comment.) Venczel
said that the Turkmen minority in northern Iran faced no
major problems and that generally there were no problems with
minorities in Iran, everyone suffered equally.


IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM: QUESTION OF INTENT
--------------


8. (C) Charge asked Venczel's opinion of Iranian press
reports that Berdimuhammedov -- following his March 16
meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Motaki -- expressed
support for Iran's "peaceful nuclear activities." (Comment:
The Turkmenistani and Iranian media offered differing reports
of Berdimuhammedov's meeting with Motaki. In addition to
reports on bilateral cooperation, the Iranian press also
reported that Berdimuhammedov gave strong support for Iran's
"peaceful nuclear activities." End Comment.) Venczel
responded that, while there was no problem with support for a
truly peaceful nuclear program, the Iranian position had
worsened because Iran insisted on enriching uranium. Iran
was not technically in violation of international

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regulations, according to Venczel, so judgment hinged on the
question of intent. Venczel said that, based on his knowledge
of Tehran, he was inclined to believe that Iran's leadership
wanted to have a nuclear weapon.


9. (C) According to Venczel, Iran's insistence on a nuclear
program rested on its increased nationalism since the
Revolution. Because Iran had few friends in the world, it
had to look out for itself. Venczel said that Arabs and
Central Asians were afraid of Iran, and Pakistan and
Afghanistan were displeased with Iran, so Iran had no clear
alliances in this region.

DIVISIONS WITHIN THE IRANIAN REGIME
--------------


10. (C) According to Venczel, there were divisions within the
Iranian regime, making generalizations difficult. Venczel
noted that Iran's regime was weaker than it appeared and that
the government was not united behind Ahmedinejad.
Ahmedinejad, he said, was not exactly "the Supreme Leader's
man." Former President Rafsanjani and Mayor of Tehran
Ghalibal, he said, had opened separate dialogues. The Mayor
of Tehran, for example, made a recent statement encouraging
closer relations with the international community, and was
considered a "dove."

IRANIAN SOCIETY PRO-AMERICAN
--------------


11. (C) Despite official belligerence towards the United
States, most ordinary Iranians liked Americans, according to
Venczel. A recent opinion poll in Iran showed that most
Iranians wanted to reengage with the United States, and the
large Iranian diaspora in the West -- and the fact that the
Iranian regime allowed travel to and from the United States
-- was important to perceptions of the West within Iran.
Venczel suggested that, if Americans returned to Iran, there
was good work to be done.


12. (C) Venczel claimed many in Iran hated Ahmedinejad and
said that some Iranians would welcome an attack on their
country to liberate them from their President. Venczel
caveated this observation by noting that the diplomatic corps
had little contact with everyday Iranians, but said that it
was interesting that he had heard this comment more than
once. Iran could not be invaded by ground, he said, but an
air invasion might be possible because the Iranian air force
was unsophisticated.

IRAN KEY TO IRAQ WAR
--------------


13. (C) Venczel said that Iran had a very strong position in
Iraq, and there would be no peace there without Iranian
cooperation.

COMMENT
--------------


14. (C) Embassy is presenting the above information as
Venczel provided it. Although Venczel is retiring from his
position in the diplomatic corps, conversations with
Hungarian and other Western diplomats stationed in Tehran
continue to provide a small window into internal political
developments in Iran. Embassy welcomes such visits and
encourages these embassies to continue to meet with us when
visiting Ashgabat from Tehran. End Comment.
BRUSH