TURKMENISTAN: LOSS OF BLANKET CLEARANCE - WHAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ASHGABAT 001303

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2017
TAGS: PREL EAIR MARR MCAP MOPS US TX
SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN: LOSS OF BLANKET CLEARANCE - WHAT
HAPPENED AND WHY

REF: A. ASHGABAT 1255

B. ASHGABAT 1281

C. SECSTATE 158849

Classified By: CHARGE SYLVIA REED CURRAN FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: After first declining to renew an existing
blanket clearance for U.S. aircraft, Turkmenistan changed its
position and granted the renewal when the U.S. government
challenged the decision. A combination of factors probably
led to the initial denial, includig pressure from Russia,
concerns that the overflights may not all be "humanitarian"
in nature and thereby could threaten their neutral status,
attempts to tighten their air control generally, and a strong
desire to not have to extend this arrangement to others. The
realization that a new clearance regime, given the volume of
flights, would be more work than it's worth, and a wish to
preserve good relations with the United States appear to be
the reasons why Turkmenistan recanted. Blanket air clearance
is now secure for another year, and U.S. aircrews should
expect a vigilant Turkmenistan air control function to insist
upon strict adherence to its air protocols. END SUMMARY.

BLANKET APPROVAL LOST AND REGAINED


2. (C) On November 20 the Embassy received notice by
diplomatic note that the Government of Turkmenistan would not
renew the annual blanket clearance for U.S. military aircraft
that overfly Turkmen airspace to and from Afghanistan in
support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Instead, there
would be a new procedure requiring overflight and landing
clearance to be sought for each flight and detailed
information on each cargo (Ref. A). On November 26, the
Government of Turkmenistan reversed its decision and agreed
to renew the blanket clearance number (Ref. B). The renewed
permission will take effect on 1 December 2007 and extend
through 30 November 2008. It came with a single caveat from
the Turkmenistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs: U.S. flights
must not exceed the number of missions flown this year
(approximately 1600). The timing of the renewal ensures no
immediate interruption in airlift missions to and from the
Afghanistan theater of operations.


3. (C) The decision to renew the blanket clearance came
after days of bilateral negotiations in the United States and
Turkmenistan. Soon after Embassy Ashgabat received
notification that the Government of Turkmenistan would not
renew the blanket clearance, a senior U.S. Department of
Defense representative met with Turkmenistan Ambassador Meret
Orazov in Washington, DC, while U.S. Embassy diplomats
concurrently engaged Turkmen officials at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in Ashgabat. Within days, a decision to
renew the blanket permission was endorsed by Turkmenistan
President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov and the news was
delivered to the U.S. Charge d,Affaires by Foreign Minister
Rashit Meredov (Ref. B).


4. (C) The successful U.S. diplomacy that led to the
Government of Turkmenistan changing its position and renewing
the blanket clearance involved three components: a) U.S.
negotiators made the importance of this issue clear to
Turkmenistan, b) the U.S. side gave Turkmen officials a way
to save face, and c) the U.S. showed a willingness to comply
with any reasonable requirement from the Turkmen in return
for the blanket air clearance.


5. (C) When U.S. officials contacted Turkmen counterparts
after the initial notification not to renew the blanket
clearance, every Turkmen official claimed surprise. The
Foreign Minister, the Turkmenistan Ambassador, and the
Americas Department Director at MFA all said they were
unaware of the action to deny the blanket permission. U.S.

ASHGABAT 00001303 002 OF 004


Embassy staff were deeply skeptical of this answer, but no
one on the American side challenged the assertion in order to
allow Turkmen officials some room to save face.


6. (C) Meanwhile, simultaneous U.S. pressure applied at the
Turkmenistan Embassy in Washington, DC, and at the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in Ashgabat signaled the importance of the
issue. In an attempt to get the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
to speed up its decision, the Charge told Americas Department
Director Serdar Bashimov November 23 that they could expect a
call from Washington on November 26. Bashimov mid-day on
November 26 said he had relayed the news of an impending
phone call immediately to the Minister, who called in the
Charge early on the 26th in order to avoid the phone call
from Washington. In the end, the Government of Turkmenistan
decided to renew the blanket clearance if the United States
would simply hold the annual number of overflights at or
below the current level.

VITAL TO OEF SINCE 2003


6. (FOUO) The Turkmenistan blanket clearance number 999C was
first granted to U.S. military aircraft in 2003. It has
never provided unlimited permission to operate within Turkmen
airspace, and for this reason is sometimes described as a
restricted blanket clearance. The blanket permission is
authorized solely for delivery of humanitarian assistance and
to help stabilize and rebuild the nation of Afghanistan.
Aircraft must follow strict flight profiles and can utilize
only select call signs. Aircraft are required to file a DOD
International Flight Plan prior to entering Turkmenistan
airspace and cannot deviate from that flight plan while in
Turkmenistan. Blanket permission is limited to registered
U.S. military aircraft. Civil Reserve Air Fleet and DOD
contract carriers are not eligible for the automatic
clearance. In spite of these limitations, the Turkmenistan
blanket number 999C is considered vital in maintaining an
effective western air bridge to U.S. Forces in Afghanistan.

WHY BLANKET CLEARANCE WAS INITIALLY LOST --

THE RUSSIANS


7. (C) Why did the Turkmen initially decide to not renew
blanket clearance? There are several likely factors. One,
for example, could be Russian influence on Turkmenistan
government officials. On more than one occasion Russian
attaches at social events have adroitly commented on the
volume of U.S. air traffic across Turkmenistan. Not
questioning--simply commenting, as if to quietly let it be
known they are fully aware of the U.S. activity. It is
certainly believable that Russian officials might have tried
to exert some influence on Turkmenistan officials to
discontinue favorable access for American air assets,
especially given apparent Russian unease about Turkmenistan's
budding ties with the West.

WORRIES U.S. MILITARY OVERFLIGHTS CHALLENGE NEUTRAL STATUS


8. (C) In a similar vein, Turkmen officials may have felt
they needed to change U.S. air clearance procedures in order
to protect Turkmenistan,s official neutral status.
Turkmenistan airport and air clearance workers have
occasionally wondered aloud how so many U.S. air missions,
composed of military transports as well as commercial charter
aircraft, could all be classified as humanitarian. If the
Turkmen were asking such questions, nearby governments in
Russia and Iran were also likely to be asking Turkmenistan
the same thing. It is worth noting, however, that the
decision to deny renewal of the blanket air clearance did not
deny U.S. access to Turkmenistan,s airspace, but instead
changed the clearance procedure. The new clearance procedure

ASHGABAT 00001303 003 OF 004


required each aircraft to identify its mission purpose and
cargo. Knowing that each U.S. request would be clearly
identified as a humanitarian mission with humanitarian cargo,
the Government of Turkmenistan technically was allowing the
United States to continue flying while covering its action
with a humanitarian declaration for every aircraft. That
documentation could later be used to rebut any outside
argument that U.S. overflights violated Turkmenistan,s
neutrality.

DID NOT WANT TO EXPAND BLANKET CLEARANCE TO OTHERS


9. (C) Another possible factor in Turkmenistan,s initial
decision is that it became increasingly difficult for
Turkmenistan to defend the U.S. blanket air clearance to ISAF
partners who wanted a similar arrangement. During the past
year, an increasing number of Coalition nations asked for
permission to over fly Turkmenistan in order to support their
own deployed forces. These requests were sometimes denied.
In July 2007, for example, Turkmenistan denied overflight and
refueling permission to a Lithuanian Air Force C-27. The
Lithuanian aircraft was attempting to re-supply Lithuanian
units and rotate its deployed personnel. When President
Berdimuhamedov later visited Brussels, during a 7 November
meeting at NATO Headquarters, media reports indicated that
Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer asked President

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Berdimuhamedov about transit issues necessary to support
alliance operations in Afghanistan. Two weeks later the
Turkmenistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified the U.S.
Embassy that blanket clearance number 999C, which had been
used since 2003, would not be renewed. In effect, the
Government of Turkmenistan was standardizing the air
clearance procedures for all foreign aircraft. It was a
procedure nearly identical to Turkmenistan,s existing rule
for every other foreign visitor: no one enters Turkmenistan
without prior permission. This is also the likely reason why
blanket clearance was taken away from civilian SOS
International medical flights - the Turkmen want to limit the
number of aircraft getting this permission.

DESIRE TO STIFFEN AIR CONTROL PROCEDURES


10. (C) Outside influence and growing ISAF requests for air
clearances may have driven Turkmenistan to reconsider its
blanket permission for U.S. aircraft. But there is evidence
to show that early this summer Turkmenistan was already
acting to stiffen its air control procedures. On at least
two occasions during the period May-Aug 2007, the Government
of Turkmenistan either denied an air clearance or threatened
to deny a clearance to U.S. aircraft perceived to be
operating out of compliance with its air rules and
procedures. Offenders included Department of Defense
contract carriers as well as U.S. military aircraft.


11. (C) In June 2007, a US Air Force C-17 departed
Afghanistan en route to Ramstein AB, Germany. Prior to
take-off, the aircrew filed a flight plan that indicated an
overflight of Turkmenistan from East to West. Shortly after
take-off the crew decided to stop in Ashgabat and take
additional fuel. The C-17 pilot contacted Ashgabat air
traffic control (ATC) and requested permission to land at
Ashgabat,s Saparmurat Niyazov International Airport.
Ashgabat ATC gave permission for the C-17 to land, and the
C-17 purchased fuel but was then not permitted to depart.
Instead, the aircraft commander and a representative from the
US Embassy were summoned to the airport office where a
Turkmenistan military representative delivered a verbal
reprimand to the crew for landing in Ashgabat without a
proper flight plan. The Turkmen officer instructed the U.S.
Embassy representative that if such a violation is repeated,
the Government of Turkmenistan has the right to detain the
aircraft and crew. After filing a new flight plan, the

ASHGABAT 00001303 004 OF 004


aircraft was permitted to leave.


12. (C) In August 2007, the Turkmenistan State Civil
Aviation Service telephonically notified the U.S. Embassy
that a civil charter aircraft had incorrectly used the
Turkmenistan blanket clearance number to enter and transit
Turkmen airspace. Even though civil aircraft are contracted
by the Department of Defense and assigned call signs
identical to military aircraft, Turkmenistan does not
authorize civil charter aircraft to use its standing
clearance number, only military aircraft are permitted to do
so. The Ministry duty officer warned that civil charter
aircraft would be denied clearance and rerouted if they again
attempted to enter Turkmenistan airspace using the blanket
clearance number. There is probably a financial motive for
the Government of Turkmenistan to adopt this practice since
commercially registered aircraft are eligible for billing
navigational fees that military aircraft are not.

AND WHY DID TURKMENISTAN REVERSE ITS DECISION AND RENEW?


13. (C) In the end, due to U.S. pressure and common sense,
the Turkmen realized that a change was not in their
interests. When the U.S. pushed back, it dawned on Turkmen
officials how much extra work this new regime would entail --
more work than their small MFA was prepared to handle. In
addition, it was also clear how important these flights and
the blanket clearance were to U.S.-Turkmenistan bilateral
relations. Keeping the number of flights at roughly the same
level as in the past, at least gives them cover to say that
"nothing has changed," enabling them to counter those who
have questioned the nature of the flights. The blanket air
clearance is now secure for another year and U.S. aircrews
should expect a vigilant Turkmenistan air control function to
insist upon strict adherence to its air protocols.
CURRAN