SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT TO TURKMENISTAN OF DRL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 ASHGABAT 001293

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN AND DRL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ECON EPET TX
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT TO TURKMENISTAN OF DRL
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ERICA BARKS-RUGGLES, DECEMBER
7-9, 2007


1. Sensitive but unclassified. Not for public Internet.


2. (SBU) SUMMARY: Embassy Ashgabat warmly welcomes the
visit of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Rights and
Labor Erica Barks-Ruggles to Turkmenistan. Your visit will
help to reinforce the U.S. government's message as it has
sought to "turn a new page" in its overall relationship with
Turkmenistan that the United States values democratic
development, rule of law, and respect for human rights.
Although the new president, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, is
making significant changes in some sectors, it is important
to realize the country is at the very beginning of a new era.
The wreck of a country left behind by the now-deceased
President-for-Life Niyazov, combined with 70 years of
colonial Soviet rule, compounded by nomadic/tribal customs
that lacked a modern nation-state concept, create the need
for a new model. Turkmenistan was never North Korea, but it
is not yet Denmark. Rather, the current state offers a rare
opportunity to develop a new model; a model molded by, and
representative of, the proud people of Turkmenistan, with
patient but consistent nudges by the international community
toward international standards and practices. We recommend
that the tone in this first encounter should be positive and
constructive -- to encourage more openness and new ways of
thinking -- but not hortatory. We feat that demands would be
counterproductive. END SUMMARY.

TURKMENISTAN POST-NIYAZOV


3. (SBU) A hydrocarbon-rich state that shares borders with
Afghanistan and Iran, Turkmenistan is in the midst of an
historic political transition. The unexpected death of
President Niyazov on December 21, 2006, ended the
authoritarian, one-man dictatorship that by the end of his
life had made Turkmenistan's government among the most
repressive in the world. The peaceful transfer of power
following Niyazov's death confounded many who had predicted
instability because the former president had no succession
plan. President Berdimuhamedov quickly assumed power
following Niyazov's death with the assistance of the "power
ministries" -- including the Ministries of National Security
and Defense, and the Presidential Guard. His position was
subsequently confirmed through a public election in which the
population eagerly participated, even though it did not meet
international standards.

NIYAZOV'S LEGACY


4. (SBU) Berdimuhamedov inherited a country that former
President Niyazov had come close to running into the ground.
Niyazov siphoned off much of Turkmenistan's hydrocarbon
proceeds into non-transparent slush funds used, in part, to
finance his massive construction program in Ashgabat at the
expense of the country's education and health-care systems.
Politically, his increasing paranoia -- particularly after
the 2002 armed attack on his motorcade -- led to high-speed
revolving-door personnel changes at the provincial and
national level, and an obsessive inclination to micro-manage
the details of government. Criticizing or questioning
Niyazov's decisions was treated as disloyalty, and could be
grounds for removal from jobs, if not worse. Niyazov's
"neutral" foreign policy led to Turkmenistan's political and
economic isolation from the rest of the world. His policies
calling for mandatory increases in cotton and wheat
production led to destructive agricultural and water-use
policies that left some of Turkmenistan's arable land salty
and played-out.

EDUCATION -- "DIMMER PEOPLE EASIER TO RULE"


5. (SBU) Niyazov's attacks on the educational system grew
increasingly destructive in his later years. The Soviet-era
educational system was broadly turned into a system designed

ASHGABAT 00001293 002 OF 006


to isolate students from the outside world and to mold them
into loyal Turkmen-speaking presidential thralls. President
Niyazov famously defended this policy when, in 2004, he told
a fellow Central Asian president, "Dimmer people are easier
to rule." Niyazov's destruction of his country's education
system included cutting the Soviet standard of ten years of
compulsory education to nine, firing large numbers of
teachers, and introducing his own works as core curriculum at
the expense of the traditional building blocks of a basic
education. He slashed higher education to two years of study
and discouraged foreign study by refusing to recognize
foreign academic degrees. Taken together, these steps
created a "lost generation" of under-educated youth
ill-equipped to help Turkmenistan take its place on the world
stage in the 21st century.

RULE OF LAW -- A LOW BAR


6. (SBU) Niyazov seriously harmed Turkmenistan's political
system. His capricious authoritarianism left a legacy of
corrupt officials lacking initiative, accountability, and --
in many cases -- the expertise needed to do their jobs.
Young officials who came of age after Niyazov's destructive
changes to the education system are particularly deficient in
skills and broader world vision needed to facilitate
Turkmenistan's entry into the international community. Many
laws lack transparency and provision for oversight and
recourse. The population's lack of understanding of the
meaning of rule of law has left the bar low in terms of
citizens' expectations of their government.

BERDIMUHAMEDOV BEGINS TO REBUILD THE SYSTEM


7. (SBU) Berdimuhamedov still pays nominal lip service to
maintaining his predecessor's policies, but he has started
reversing many of the most destructive, especially in the
areas of education, health, and social welfare. He has
restored and -- in many cases -- increased old-age pensions
that Niyazov had largely eliminated. The president is
embarking on a course of hospital-building, with the main
focus on improving medical facilities in Turkmenistan's five
provinces. To this end, he has already authorized
construction of five provincial mother-and-children
(maternity) hospitals. He has also publicly committed to
improve rural infrastructure and to ensure that every village
has communications, electricity and running water.


8. (SBU) In education, Berdimuhamedov is reversing many of
the policies Niyazov ordered him to implement while he served
as Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers for Education
and Health. Since his inauguration, Berdimuhamedov has
ordered a return to the compulsory standard of ten years'
education, a return of universities to five years of
classroom study, and a new emphasis on exchange programs and
the hard sciences. On July 13, he called for recognition of
foreign academic degrees, a major step which would allow
exchange students to receive credit for their overseas study.
The goal is to repair Turkmenistan's broken education system
as quickly as possible and to give the country the educated
workforce that it needs to compete commercially. These
efforts, however, are hampered by old-thinking bureaucrats,
especially in the Ministry of Education and Ministry of
National Security, who sometimes block or otherwise impede
foreign assistance programs. This may perhaps be a legacy of
the culture of xenophobia Niyazov had encouraged.

ELIMINATING THE CULT OF PERSONALITY


9. (SBU) Berdimuhamedov has incrementally started
dismantling Niyazov's cult of personality. Huge posters of
the deceased president are beginning to be removed from
public buildings. References to Niyazov's "literary" works,
especially the Ruhnama, are less frequent and probably will

ASHGABAT 00001293 003 OF 006


fade away over time. The new president has banned the huge
stadium gatherings in his honor and requirement for students
and government workers to line the streets, often for hours,
along presidential motorcade routes. That said, in some
places, Niyazov's picture has been replaced by
Berdimuhamedov's, and the new president's quotations have
replaced Ruhnama quotations on newspaper mastheads. However,
these are practices common in Central Asia. One hopeful
trend is that Berdimuhamedov appears to be signaling that the
country should draw its inspiration from its history rather
from the cult of the leader. Posters of Turkmen historical
figures have started to appear. In addition, all but one of
the new currency banknotes scheduled to introduced in 2009
will carry pictures of historical and cultural figures (the
largest bill has Niyazov on it).

FIRST STAGES OF POLITICAL REFORM


10. (SBU) Berdimuhamedov has replaced some of the ministers
he inherited from Niyazov. His focus seems to be on finding
better-qualified individuals. On August 24, he established a
"Human Rights Commission" to help bring the practices and
policies of Turkmenistan's government agencies into line with
international standards and human rights conventions. He has
established a state commission to review complaints of
citizens against law enforcement agencies, which has become a
vehicle for pardoning at least some of those imprisoned
(including for complicity in the 2002 attack on the
presidential motorcade) under Niyazov. Berdimuhamedov
pardoned 11 prisoners, including the former Grand Mufti of
Turkmenistan, Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah, in early August, and
promised he would pardon more in the future. Several other
prisoners of concern were freed in the October amnesty.
Berdimuhamedov has also agreed to allow UNDP to provide human
rights training to police.


11. (SBU) In addition, he has slowly begun to walk back some
of the most restrictive controls on movement within the
country, first removing police checkpoints on the roads
between cities, then -- on July 13 -- eliminating the
requirement for Turkmenistan's citizens to obtain permits to
travel to border zones (however, the permit system remains in
force for foreigners). Although the president has been
slower to strengthen rule of law, correct Turkmenistan's
previous human rights and religious freedom record, and
promote economic reform, he has told U.S. officials he wants
to "turn the page" on the bilateral relationship and is
willing to work on areas that hindered improved relations
under Niyazov. He has approved an unprecedented number of
visits by U.S. delegations since he took office, including
those directed toward promoting change.

ECONOMY AND FINANCE


12. (SBU) Turkmenistan's economy is closely controlled by
the state and is heavily dependent on hydrocarbon revenue.
Although the government for many years regularly proclaimed
its wish to attract foreign investment, it made little effort
up to now to change the state-control mechanisms, restrictive
currency-exchange system and dual currency exchange rates
that created a difficult foreign investment climate.
However, in recent months, we have seen greater willingness
among upper-level personnel at Turkmenistan's main economic
and financial institutions -- including both the Ministry of
Economy and Finance and the Central Bank -- to acknowledge
that reforms are necessary. Part of this new attitude is
linked to the president's growing frustration, expressed
publicly during several cabinet-level meetings in August,
with Turkmenistan's complex, opaque web of on- and off-budget
funds, which have made a thorough accounting of state income
and disbursements/expenses virtually impossible. And, in
fact, President Berdimuhamedov's frustration with the lack of
accountability in the budget was one of the key factors that

ASHGABAT 00001293 004 OF 006


led, in late July, to the creation of a Supreme Auditing
Chamber. That said, growing interest in investing in
Turkmenistan among western businessmen in hopes that the new
government eventually will make the changes necessary to
improve the investment climate is also providing an incentive
for change.

FOREIGN POLICY: A NEW FOCUS ON ENGAGEMENT


13. (SBU) Notwithstanding his statements that he plans to
continue the "neutrality" policies of his predecessor,
Berdimuhamedov -- probably on the advice of Deputy Chairman
of the Cabinet of Ministers and Foreign Minister Rashit
Meredov -- has put a virtually unprecedented emphasis on
foreign affairs. Indeed, Berdimuhamedov has met or spoken by
telephone with all the leaders in the region -- including
with President Aliyev of Azerbaijan, with whom Niyazov had
maintained a running feud. He has exchanged visits with
Russia's President Putin, and held a high-profile gas summit
with Putin and Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev in
Turkmenistan's Caspian seaside city of Turkmenbashy
(Krasnovodsk). China has a strong and growing commercial
presence in Turkmenistan, and continues to court
Berdimuhamedov through a series of high-level commercial and
political visits. In mid-July, Berdimuhamedov made a state
visit to China, focused mainly on natural gas and pipeline
deals. While Turkey has given Berdimuhamedov top-level
treatment, including an invitation to Ankara, its
relationship with Turkmenistan continues to be colored more
by the image of its lucrative trade and construction
contracts that are siphoning hundreds of millions of dollars
away from state budgets here than by generous development
assistance or fraternal support. He has also held positive
meetings with high-level U.S. State Department officials and
leaders of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) and United Nations to discuss areas of
potential assistance. He met with UN High Commissioner on
Human Rights Louise Arbour in May, the Head of the OSCE's
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR),
Christian Strohal, and agreed to a visit by the UN's Special
Rapporteur on Religious Freedom at an as-yet undetermined
date. He most recently made his first trip to the United
States as president to participate in the UNGA session in
September. November 5-7 was his first visit to EU and NATO
headquarters in Brussels.

ENERGY RESOURCES


14. (SBU) Turkmenistan has world-class natural gas reserves,
but Russia's near monopoly of its energy exports has left
Turkmenistan receiving much less than the world price and
overly beholden to Russia. Pipeline diversification,
including both a pipeline to China proposed for 2009 and the
possibility of resurrecting plans for Trans-Caspian and
Trans-Afghanistan pipelines that would avoid the Russian
routes, and construction of high-power electricity lines to
transport excess energy to Turkmenistan's neighbors,
including Afghanistan, would not only enhance Turkmenistan's
economic and political sovereignty, but also help fuel new
levels of prosperity throughout the region. Berdimuhamedov
has told U.S. interlocutors he recognizes the need for more
options and has taken the first steps to this end, but he
also took the first steps needed to increase the volume of
gas exports to Russia -- agreeing in principle to refurbish
and enlarge a Soviet-era Caspian littoral pipeline -- during
the May tripartite summit in Turkmenbashy. He will require
encouragement and assistance from the international community
if he is to maintain a course of diversification in the face
of almost certain Russian efforts to keep Turkmenistan from
weaning itself away from Russia.

TURKMENISTAN'S "OPPOSITION"


ASHGABAT 00001293 005 OF 006



15. (SBU) Fifteen years of Niyazov's authoritarianism along
with Russian black propaganda touting the dangers of civil
society have left Turkmenistan without an internal opposition
and convinced that efforts to develop civil society actually
represent a plan to promote a colored revolution. Threatened
with imprisonment, most individuals who disagree with the
system here either have learned to turn inwards, or have left
the country. While there are expatriate opposition groups,
those groups have a history of disunity and a reputation for
promoting self-interested agendas as much as human rights.
Although there is no quantifiable method to assess the
popularity of these groups, numerous conversations with local
people have yielded not one voice of support. Instead, most
here simply refer to the leaders of the overseas opposition
-- most of whom have been tainted by the perception that they
committed financial crimes in their earlier incarnations as
office-holders in Turkmenistan -- as "the ones who made it
out before they were imprisoned." This leaves Turkmenistan
without a nascent Vaclav Havel or Nelson Mandela who could
serve as a rallying point for a democratic opposition,
meaning that promoting engagement with the current president
may be the best and only strategy for promoting a more
democratic system.

U.S. POLICY


16. (SBU) U.S. policy in Turkmenistan is three-fold:

-- Encourage democratic reform and increased respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, including support for
improvements in the education and health systems;

-- Encourage economic reform and growth of a market economy
and private-sector agriculture, as well as diversification of
Turkmenistan's energy export options; and

-- Promote security cooperation.


17. (SBU) Turkmenistan remains a tempting target for
increased cooperation on energy and security, but its human
rights record in the past has made this cooperation
problematic for some. In raising its human rights concerns,
the United States:

-- Encourages further relaxation of Niyazov-era abuses and
restrictions on freedom of movement. Post has discovered in
following up on lists of individuals previously not allowed
to travel outside Turkmenistan that the majority of "stop
travel" cases have been or are being positively resolved, and
the government has pledged to work with us to review cases we
bring to its attention. That being said, the U.S. government
needs to keep pressure on the government and to raise
unresolved cases in which we have been able to confirm that
there was no criminal activity involved.

-- Promotes greater religious freedom, including registration
of unrecognized groups like the Roman Catholic Church, and
making legal provision for conscientious objectors. The
government has registered one church and one branch church
since the visit in August of the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom, but problems remain. The
government has acknowledged problems exist and requested U.S.
assistance in overhauling its 2003/2004 Law on Religion, but
the United States has yet to respond formally.

-- Advocates the growth of civil society by urging the
government to register non-governmental organizations. Since
the 2003 law that required all registered NGOs to
re-register, very few independent NGOs have been registered
by the Ministry of Justice. The embassy has determined that
fewer than 10 independent civil society groups have received
NGO registration under the new law. Even those NGOs
registered, however, continue to have problems, including

ASHGABAT 00001293 006 OF 006


monitoring of their activities. The embassy has facilitated
legal consultations on registration issues to civil society
groups wanting to register, but ultimately the law on
registration of organizations will probably need to be
reformed. An achievable first step, however, might be
holding a roundtable with representatives of civic groups and
NGOs to identify problems and come up with a work plan for
addressing those issues.

-- Urges the government to grant the ICRC access to prisons.
The government has agreed to allow ICRC to visit prisons, but
only if ICRC officials are accompanied by government
personnel. There are also concerns that ICRC might not be
allowed into the facilities where the most sensitive
prisoners are housed.

-- Encourages release of additional prisoners of concern.
The government has released approximately 28 to date,
including some imprisoned in connection with the 2002
motorcade attack. Passing a list of specific names whose
cases the United States would like to see reviewed may be
most productive.
CURRAN