TURKMENISTAN'S EVOLVING FACE OF NEUTRALITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASHGABAT 001149

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR TX
SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN'S EVOLVING FACE OF NEUTRALITY

Classified By: Charge Richard E. Hoagland for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Eight months into his term in office,
Berdimuhamedov's diplomatic activity and public statements
this year have begun to reveal a redesigned version of
Turkmenistan's longstanding policy of "permanent neutrality"
that may well assure the country's security and independence,
while enabling greater international cooperation and
facilitating the country's much-needed development. Although
strong military or security relations in any one direction
continue to be unlikely, Russia is regaining ground in the
security relationship that was lost under former President
Niyazov. Having begun at the zero mark, however, the limited
nature of Russia's gain suggests that Berdimuhamedov's
government is more interested in normalizing and balancing
foreign relationships and avoiding geographically-complicated
security partnerships than in choosing military allies. END
SUMMARY.

NEW INTERPRETATION OF AN OLD IDEA


2. (C) In his February inauguration speech, President
Berdimuhamedov, among other things, promised citizens that he
would continue Niyazov's "permanent, positive neutrality"
policy while also expanding relations with other countries in
a way that would benefit Turkmenistan. To that end,
Berdimuhamedov has already made 11 foreign trips, and his
government has welcomed very close to 300 foreign delegations
-- all since February. In practice, however,
Berdimuhamedov's government has been interpreting the
neutrality policy in a significantly different way than his
predecessor, who used the policy in part to isolate the
country from neighbors and the rest of the world and
strengthen his internal control. The new interpretation is
allowing this president selectively to consider
Turkmenistan's participation in bilateral and multilateral
partnerships that have the potential to facilitate the
development of national energy resources, promote improvement
of social conditions, gradually reform the economy, and
modernize its military.


3. (C) Berdimuhamedov's government is well aware that it
lacks the expertise and tools to engage in these changes
alone. Since taking office, Berdimuhamedov has shown every
sign that he wants to establish strong relations with
multilateral fora, such as the United Nations, the EU, and
possibly the CIS, on the condition that these partnerships
tangibly serve his long-term goals of reversing the country's
isolation, and jumpstarting development and economic and
social reform to bring Turkmenistan into the 21st century.

NEUTRALITY HAS ITS MERITS


4. (C) The president's calculated use of the neutrality card
since coming into office suggests that he values the policy's
utility to enable Turkmenistan to rebuff neighboring state
and multilateral pressure to join organizations with military
or security elements, including the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO),the Commonwealth of Independent States
and its security subset, the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CIS/CSTO),or NATO. He stated in February,
shortly after taking office, that Turkmenistan would limit
its involvement in regional or multilateral fora until it is
convinced that participation in any group would have
long-term utility.


5. (C) But his interpretation of neutrality has also allowed
Turkmenistan to participate in multilateral organizations on
a level that he perceives useful in helping Turkmenistan with
some of its problems. For example, this year, Turkmenistan

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signed up to be a member of the UN-sponsored Central Asia
Regional Information Coordination Center (CARICC),which
fosters regional cooperation on counter-narcotics and other
issues. Turkmenistan's Border Guard chief participated in
this year's CIS Border Guard Chief Conference, and President
Berdimuhamedov attended the SCO Summit in Bishkek and the
CIS/CSTO Summit in Dushanbe, but senior officials appear more
intent on keeping abreast of developments within these
organizations than in participating in their initiatives.

NEUTRALITY - CALCULATED AVOIDANCE


6. (C) Berdimuhamedov's actions suggest that he is
evaluating Turkmenistan's participation in all military and
security-oriented multilateral organizations, and is unlikely
to be interested in doing much more than observing them for
the foreseeable future. Berdimuhamedov's government has two
good reasons for maintaining the neutrality policy in this
narrow vein. First, the policy has shown its value in
staving off Russian and possibly Chinese pressure to engage
in multilateral military cooperation via the SCO or CSTO.


7. (C) Such cooperation would run the risk of putting off
Western countries interested in and ready for a long-term
energy partnership. Of course, it also negates the
likelihood of significant Western partnerships on other than
a limited bilateral basis, because the neutrality policy
would collapse if it were applied only in one direction.
Since Turkmenistan has little in the way of territorial
enemies, the country's leadership has likely assessed the
loss as acceptable.


8. (C) Second, the Turkmen government knows that maintaining
the policy has a calming effect on Iranian concerns that the
West might want to threaten them from Turkmen territory.
With the shared 992 kilometer border in mind, the Turkmen
government in the past has successfully promoted its
neutrality policy to Iranian leaders as a hedge against
potential hostile action from the north.

NATO RELATIONS HEALTHY, BUT UNLIKELY TO EXPAND MUCH


9. (C) On the other hand, as a NATO Partnership For Peace
(PFP) member since the mid-1990's, Turkmenistan has had a
small, but steady level of cooperation with NATO. The
country's partnership plan has remained unchanged for years
and consists of familiarization and training courses. Rather
than ending Turkmenistan's relationship with NATO, the
current partnership plan with Turkmenistan, and
Berdimuhamedov's apparent interest in increasing military
cooperation in all directions, is likely to provide NATO a
sound basis for further discussions in such areas as the
re-evaluation or expansion of transit options to support ISAF
operations in Afghanistan. Both NATO and EU officials are
cautiously optimistic that partnership opportunities with
Turkmenistan will increase in the near term. Berdimuhamedov
is scheduled to meet with a variety of EU officials in
Brussels for three days in early November, and NATO
representatives are hoping to meet with him as well.

BILATERAL MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS BLOSSOM -- WITHIN THE
NEUTRALITY VASE


10. (C) Berdimuhamedov has allowed senior military officials
to travel abroad in support of the government-wide effort to
expand its foreign relations and modernize the military.
Defense Minister Mammetgeldiyev has visited Belarus, Russia,
and, according to press reports, plans to visit China in
November to discuss bilateral military cooperation. As of
early April 2007, Turkmenistan had invited Russia, Belarus,

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and Ukraine to compete for the right to repair and upgrade
its aging Soviet-era equipment. Turkmenistan also appears to
be resurrecting modest bilateral military cooperation with
Russia. Such datapoints demonstrate that Berdimuhamedov
seeks a balanced series of relationships with players from
Russia, the East, and the West.


11. (C) During discussions with U.S. military leaders,
Turkmenistani officials have consistently cast all military
cooperation within the framework of Turkmenistan's
neutrality. Basing is not an option, but Berdimuhamedov has
continued the country's support of U.S. military operational
agreements, such as the USAF refueling operation at Ashgabat
Airport, overflight and landing clearance,and the Mary Divert
arrangement. However, this has not impeded the steady
expansion of the U.S. bilateral military-to-military
cooperation program. Although still very limited and
difficult, the United States likely has had the most robust
bilateral relationship of all Turkmenistan's security
partners.


12. (C) The impact of the neutrality policy on bilateral
versus multilateral relationships was evident during the
USCENTCOM Commander's June visit to Ashgabat. Berdimuhamedov
expressed his concern about Caspian maritime security and
said cooperation with the U.S. military provided Turkmenistan
a good alternative. He indicated that the CIS-sponsored
Caspian Force (CASFOR) was mandated to ensure Caspian
security, but Turkmenistan's cooperation with CASFOR was not
possible because of the neutrality policy.


13. (C) COMMENT: The neutrality policy is likely to have a
long shelf life here, since it provides the cornerstone for
so much of the country's foreign policy. The realities of
the country's geography, combined with its energy resource
ambitions, all but guarantee that Turkmenistan will continue
to manage its growing number of security relationships on a
bilateral basis, at a rate with which it is comfortable. But
even though Berdimuhamedov will continue to manipulate the
policy as he sees fit, he will also value it as a convenient
tool to facilitate cooperation with relevant partners who can
lead Turkmenistan through economic, security, and social
development without undermining the country's effort to find
balance. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND