Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ASHGABAT1106
2007-10-15 05:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ashgabat
Cable title:  

EU SOLANA'S TURKMENISTAN VISIT: INTENSIFYING

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM EINV EPET SNAR EU IR AF RS TX 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9245
OO RUEHAG RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHAH #1106/01 2880512
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 150512Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
TO RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9539
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 2871
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0692
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0568
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 1144
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1313
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1817
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0594
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASHGABAT 001106 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, NEA/IR, DRL, INL, EEB
PLEASE PASS TO USTDA DAN STEIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM EINV EPET SNAR EU IR AF RS TX
SUBJECT: EU SOLANA'S TURKMENISTAN VISIT: INTENSIFYING
DIALOG ON REGIONAL AFFAIRS AND ENERGY

Classified By: CHARGE RICHARD E. HOAGLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASHGABAT 001106

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, NEA/IR, DRL, INL, EEB
PLEASE PASS TO USTDA DAN STEIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM EINV EPET SNAR EU IR AF RS TX
SUBJECT: EU SOLANA'S TURKMENISTAN VISIT: INTENSIFYING
DIALOG ON REGIONAL AFFAIRS AND ENERGY

Classified By: CHARGE RICHARD E. HOAGLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: French Ambassador Christian Lechervy
briefed the non-EU diplomatic corps October 12 (the EU
ambassadors' briefing was October 11) on the October 9
Ashgabat visit by European Union High Representative for
Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana. The United
States, Ukraine, Turkey, and OSCE attended, but the CIS
embassies were absent. Lechervy's detailed briefing included
the following key points. Turkmenistan is determined to keep
its political -- and, to the extent possible, economic --
distance from Russia. Turkmenistan is truly looking for new
openings to the world, especially in energy, but barely
understands what will be required in the end. Turkmenistan's
energy policies are in flux. President Berdimuhamedov is
increasingly concerned about the potential for Afghan
narcotics to destabilize Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan firmly
asserts its current policies, but is open to an enhanced
expert-level dialog on a range of issues. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) French Ambassador Christian Lechervy reported Javier
Solana met with President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov for
nearly two hours on October 9, separately with Deputy Prime
Minister for Oil and Gas Tachberdi Tagiyev for 45 minutes,
and had a long working lunch with Deputy Prime
Minister/Foreign Minister Rashit Meredov. Lechervy
characterized the Tagiyev meeting as "uncommunicative and
disappointing." On the Turkmenistan side, only Meredov
attended the Berdimuhamedov-Solana meeting.


3. (C) The primary focus of the talks was energy issues and
regional affairs, especially Iran. Secondary focus was human
rights and the recently concluded Commonwealth of Indepdent

States Summit in Dushanbe. Solana also met briefly with
stringers for international wire services and, separately,
gave a full interview to the local BBC stringer.


4. (C) Lechervy characterized the meetings in Ashgabat as an
on-going and intensifying "pedagogical conversation" between
the EU and Turkmenistan. Solana had met with Berdimuhamedov
briefly in New York during the president's UNGA visit, and
they will meet again for more in-depth talks on November 7
during Berdimuhamedov's official visit to Brussels, where he
will also meet with NATO Secretary General de Hoop Shaffer.

VISIT A SUCCESS, INCLUDING ON EU INVESTMENT/HUMAN RIGHTS


5. (C) Ambassador Lechervy characterized the Solana visit as
a success, a word he said he does not use lightly, for two
main reasons. First, Berdimuhamedov suggested he and Solana
have a telephone conversation a week before the president
leaves for Brussels to refine their agenda so both sides can
be fully prepared for a productive meeting.


6. (C) Second, during a brief Solana-initiated one-on-one
exchange at the end of the official meeting, Solana asked for
a resolution of a difficult EU-Turkmenistan issue -- that
Turkmenistan's Ministry of Defense has expropriated a
German-investor private-sector chicken farm and imprisioned
three of the Turkmenistani investor-employees of the project.
Lechervy said Berdimuhamedov remained impassive during
Solana's intervention. However, within three hours, the
three Turkmenistanis had been released from a provincial
prison, declared innocent, flown to Ashgabat, and assured
they could seek full restitution for the expropriated
equipment the investors had lost. (NOTE: According to USAID
Country Director, the Ministry of Defense still claims

ASHGABAT 00001106 002 OF 003


eminent domain over the farm and its infrastructure. END
NOTE.)

ENERGY ISSUES


7. (C) Lechervy briefed that Berdimuhamedov, nearly pounding
the table, said, "We want European entrepreneurs in
Turkmenistan, but your people seem to be sleeping!" Lechervy
said Berdimuhamedov passed two key messages:

-- Don't misunderstand our current relationship with Russia.
It is commercial, not political. Don't overly focus on the
May 12 Putin-Nazarbayev-Berdimuhamedov Summit in Turkmenbashy
(that reportedly agreed to refurbish and build new natural
gas pipelines to Russia). That was expedient politics.

-- Russia's Gazprom is not/not a monopolist in Turkmenistan.
We already have international companies in the Caspian and
on-shore. Our door and our minds are open. We want a
Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline, but you have to create stability
in Afghanistan for it. We are ready to expand our gas sales
to Iran. We have never been against a Trans-Caspian
Pipeline. We sell our resources at our border -- but we are
ready to welcome others who can help us produce more for our
own benefit.


8. (C) Lechervy said Solana noted European energy companies
are interested only in long-term investment from which they
can profit fairly for themselves and their shareholders.
Thus, they need firm guarantees on availability of resources
(i.e., independently verified statistics) as well as reformed
economic policies and a stable, international-standard
investment climate.


9. (C) Berdimuhamedov reportedly riposted, "What guarantees
do you need? We have the reserves. I myself am your
guarantee. Turkmenistan has been peaceful and stable for 16
years. What more could you want?"


10. (C) The president reportedly offered an anecdote. "We
can afford to wait for better prices. I recently told
(Russian President Vladimir) Putin it is unacceptable for
Russia to sell Turkmenistan's gas to Europe at $350 (sic) per
thousand cubic meters when you pay us only $100. By
contrast, we are pleased with the 'Chinese Mechanism' where
we set a price but renegotiate it every year according to
prevailing market prices. We hope Russia and the West will
learn from that!"


11. (C) Berdimuhamedov reportedly added that Turkmenistan
does not need five-littoral-state agreement to build a
Trans-Caspian Pipeline. The only necessity is an
Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan delimitation agreement. Then,
according to Lechervy, Berdimuhamedov became vague and said
simply the Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan dialog continues at the
Deputy Foreign Minister level.


12. (C) Lechervy said the Nabucco Pipeline and its Central
Asian gas needs was not raised in any Solana conversation
with the Turkmenistani authorities. He added that the EU
will go into much greater detail on this issue when
Berdimuhamedov visits Brussels at the end of the first week
of November.


13. (C) Lechervy said during the working lunch with Meredov
Solana had tried to be "pedagogical" to explain what the West
means by "guarantees of resources and investment climate."

ASHGABAT 00001106 003 OF 003


Meredov "listened closely but made no comment," often
directing his note-taker to mark a detail.

REGIONAL ISSUES: IRAN


14. (C) According to Lechervy, Berdimuhamedov told Solana,
"We are neutral and have no desire to interfere in the
internal politics of neighbors who represent great historical
civilizations. We focus on developing our trade and economic
relations. Our national interests are commercial, nothing
more. Iran is our economic friend, not our political friend.
For special economic friends we offer special economic
considerations, and we intend to increase our natural gas
exports to Iran (NFI)."


15. (C) Lechervy said Solana offered a long "pedagogical"
briefing to Meredov during their working lunch, providing
"unusually detailed evidence" in the case against Iran and
the status of international negotiations about Iran's nuclear
program. Meredov remained in an "attentive listening mode."

COUNTER-NARCOTICS


16. (C) When Solana and Berdimuhamedov discussed
Afghanistan, Lechervy said the overwhelming Turkmenistani
response was its fear of drug trafficking from Afghanistan
that has the potential to destabilize Turkmenistan.
Berdimuhamedov reportedly told Solana Turkmenistan has
identified 24 heroin laboratories across Turkmenistan's
border in Afghanistan, and daily interdicts 2-5 kilos of
heroin in Turkmenistan. Berdimuhamedov reportedly waxed
eloquent on the value of the EU's BOMCA/CADAP border-security
program and also went into great detail about the value of
the U.S. EXBS program, both designed to protect Turkmenistan.

CIS SUMMIT IN DUSHANBE: HO-HUM


17. (C) Lechervy said Berdimuhamedov responded briefly to
Solana's request for a read-out of the October 5 CIS Summit
in Dushanbe. The president reportedly said Turkmenistan was
not especially interested in the CIS Summit agenda, because
it was mostly irrelevant for Turkmenistan. More important,
according to Berdimuhamedov, were the Turkmenistan-Tajikistan
bilateral meetings, in which Turkmenistan and Tajikistan
signed an agreement for electricity provision to Tajikistan
-- if Uzbekistan does not block it -- "because that will be
an economic advantage for both countries."


18. (C) COMMENT: Lechervy's detailed briefing tracks
closely with what we hear from the government of
Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan is determined to keep its
political -- and, to the extent possible, economic --
distance from Russia. Turkmenistan is truly looking for new
openings to the world, especially in energy, but barely
understands what will be required in the end. Turkmenistan's
energy policies are in flux. Berdimuhamedov is increasingly
concerned about the potential for Afghan narcotics to
destabilize Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan firmly asserts its
current policies, but is open to enhanced expert-level idalog
on a range of issues. Finally, and based on other recent
evidence, we continue to believe FM Meredov is a crucial
adviser to President Berdimuhamedov. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND