Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ARAJEVO753
2007-04-06 07:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - BOSNIAK POLITICAL LEADERS WARY OF

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR KAWC KJUS BK 
pdf how-to read a cable
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OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #0753/01 0960752
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 060752Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDATE 5830
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINTON DC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEO
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ARAJEVO 000753 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS); NSC FOR
BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KAWC KJUS BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - BOSNIAK POLITICAL LEADERS WARY OF
CROSSING SILAJDZIC ON SREBRENICA

REF: SARAJEVO 706 AND PRIOR

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reason 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ARAJEVO 000753

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS); NSC FOR
BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KAWC KJUS BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - BOSNIAK POLITICAL LEADERS WARY OF
CROSSING SILAJDZIC ON SREBRENICA

REF: SARAJEVO 706 AND PRIOR

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reason 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: On March 29 and April 2, we met separately
with Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency Haris Silajdzic,
President of the Party for Democratic Action (SDA) Sulejman
Tihic, and President of the Social Democratic Party (SDP)
Zlatko Lagumdzija to discuss the situation in Srebrenica and
urge them to refrain from making an already tense situation
worse by supporting the secession movement. We encouraged
all three to focus on practical measures designed to improve
socio-economic conditions in Srebrenica. Silajdzic argued
that Bosniaks could not ignore the International Court of
Justice's verdict that genocide had occurred in Srebrenica
and that the verdict must have "consequences on the ground."
Tihic and Lagumdzija accepted that Srebenica's secession from
Republika Srpska was unrealistic and agreed that Silajdzic
was leading Bosniaks in the wrong direction. Nonetheless,
they both said they were unwilling to challenge him given
their own political weaknesses. END SUMMARY

Silajdzic: Integrate Us or We Will Radicalize
--------------


2. (C) Silajdzic warned that Bosniaks cannot ignore the
International Criminal Court's (ICJ) verdict that genocide
was committed in Srebrenica. He accused the international
community of putting undue pressure on Bosniaks to "let it
go" and focus on the future, but there would be no positive
future for Bosnia unless it dealt with its past. His support
for Srebenica's secession from Republika Srpska (RS) simply
reflected the will of its residents. Instead OHR was
attacking the victims of genocide and "siding with the
Serbs." As a consequence, Bosniaks felt more abandoned,
isolated, and insecure than at any time since the 1992-1995
war. Bosniaks want to integrate into European society, but
if they are "ghettoized," they will become radicalized,
Silajdzic warned.


3. (C) Ambassador encouraged Silajdzic to offer constructive
suggestions for addressing post-ICJ concerns among Bosniaks,
but warned that nationalist rhetoric would only make the
situation worse. Silajdzic suggested that U.S. and Bosnian
experts sit down to discuss the ICJ verdict and its
implications, but added that the verdict must have concrete
consequences "on the ground." The RS goal has been and
remains the annihilation of the Bosniaks, he said. Bosnian
Serb politicians were striving to keep the RS as autonomous
as possible in order to maintain the ethnic cleansing they
carried out during the war, and then finally, to secure the
RS's annexation to Serbia, Silajdzic continued. Given these
goals, Bosniaks will never feel secure in a country so
sharply divided along ethnic lines, he concluded.

Tihic: It's Not My Fault
--------------


4. (C) Tihic opened the meeting by stressing that Bosniak
political leaders were united in their view that Srebrenica
should receive special status outside the Republika Srpska.
He understood warnings from the international community that
it would not tolerate unilateral changes to the Dayton
territorial settlement and realized Srebenica's secession
from the RS was unlikely. Nonetheless, Bosniaks would go
ahead with their parliamentary motion to change the
constitution and create a special district. Bosniaks "had
the right" to pursue special status because the ICJ had ruled
that genocide had occurred in Srebrenica, and the U.S. had an
obligation to support the proposal. Tihic cited the
Srebrenica 10th anniversary resolution passed by the U.S.
Congress (2005) to justify the second assertion. Tihic
claimed that he had tried to calm emotions in and over
Srebrenica, but had failed. He blamed Lagumdzija for
stirring up SDP councilors in Srebrenica.


5. (C) When pressed by the Ambassador over the politically
destructive course upon which he and his fellow Bosniak
leaders were embarking, Tihic shrugged. He explained that
Bosniaks would label him a traitor if he compromised over
Srebrenica. Tihic conceded that Silajdzic was setting the
Bosniak political agenda and that much of what Silajdzic was


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