Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ANTANANARIVO128
2007-02-08 14:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Antananarivo
Cable title:  

BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMOROS

Tags:  EAID PTER PREL IR CN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0009
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAN #0128/01 0391409
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081409Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4271
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000128 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR F, AF/FO, NEA/FO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2017
TAGS: EAID PTER PREL IR CN
SUBJECT: BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMOROS

REF: 05 PORT LOUIS 743

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES D. MCGEE FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000128

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR F, AF/FO, NEA/FO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2017
TAGS: EAID PTER PREL IR CN
SUBJECT: BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMOROS

REF: 05 PORT LOUIS 743

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES D. MCGEE FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.


1. (C) SUMMARY: The U.S. Government is missing the
opportunity to build a strong relationship with the Union of
the Comoros. In light of the recently-completed Operational
Plan process for the Comoros, Post considers that USD 100,000
in security assistance is inadequate to seriously advance
transformational diplomacy goals. A modest investment of USD
two million annually in basic health and education programs
would have a real impact in this country of 700,000 people;
although even that is barely half of the average per capita
assistance that the U.S. provides in sub-Saharan Africa as a
whole. Comoros has in large part been unrewarded for
consistent support for American interests, including former
President Azali expelling the Islamic NGO al-Haramain for
suspected ties to extremists and the Government's cooperation
in the Rewards for Justice Program in search of Comoran-born
terrorist Harun Fazul. Young Comorans, finding few
opportunities at home, flee to Madagascar, Mayotte, or France
- those who stay behind, bored and unemployed, are offered
scant hope in schools funded by Iran and Saudi Arabia. END
SUMMARY.

The Status Quo Scenario
- - - - - - - - - - - -


2. (C) Under the just-completed Operational Plan, current
U.S. assistance is limited to USD 100,000 for military
training. This is dwarfed by contributions from Iran, Libya,
Saudi Arabia, and China, who steadily gain influence in the
Comoros. Iran, in particular, has long courted and funded
the cleric, and now Union President, Ahmed Abdallah Sambi.
The pragmatic President, who insists no "conditions" would be
accepted in exchange for Iran's financial assistance, quickly
saw Western donor pledges of over USD 200 million evaporate
after his election last year (Reftel). A devout Muslim,
though not radical, Sambi is quickly emerging as an Iranian
ally in the Indian Ocean region. Foreign-funded "madrasa"
schools function throughout Comoros, although reportedly they
are not allowed to teach extremism. Comoran Muslim elders,

unanimously peaceful, frequently express concern about these
schools, and about Comorans who return from Islamic education
abroad. Terrorist suspect Harun Fazul became radical after
he left Comoros for Sudan and the Afghan War; the next Fazul,
among thousands of bored and unemployed Comorans, could be
home grown.

A Minimal Funding Scenario
- - - - - - - - - - - - -


3. (C) Post believes Sambi's efforts to improve the health
and education of his desperately impoverished people are
sincere. In governing justly, promoting economic freedom,
and investing in people, Sambi is making efforts to move in
the right direction, although slowly given that his
government is bankrupt. Post is already convinced, based on
Sambi's policies, that Comoros deserves a fair hearing from
Washington policymakers for consideration for AGOA and MCC
eligibility. From virtually zero assistance, U.S. aid to
Comoros should immediately be increased to USD two million
annually, representing modest per capita funding of USD 2.86
for about 700,000 Comorans. As such, this is still barely
half of the sub-Saharan African average for the U.S. (USD
5.51 in 2005 according to OECD figures).


4. (C) To date, Comoros has earned at least this level of
support for its commitment to supporting U.S. interests.
Former President Azali expelled the extremist-connected
al-Haramain NGO at the request of the USG. The Comoros
cooperates fully in the Rewards for Justice Program in the
hunt for Harun Fazul. Western rhetoric promised that
assistance would come when Comoros was stable and free and
Sambi's May 2006 inauguration marked the first peaceful and
democratic transition since independence in 1975. Those
promises, so eloquently articulated, remain empty.


5. (C) In December 2005, at the Port Louis donor's
conference, the United States pledged USD 2.6 million in
assistance to Comoros for dispersal in 2006 (Reftel). A
subsequent diversion to Lebanon in 2006 broke the promise.
Iran has quickly filled the void, signing an agreement to
provide training exchanges, vessels and other materials to
Comoros. To further solidify their influence, we have heard
that Iran is in the advanced stages of planning to relocate
their Madagascar Embassy to the Comoran capital of Moroni.

The Risk: Comoros Returns to Chaos
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

6. (C) Sambi faces enormous challenges. He inherited an
empty treasury and a substantial backlog of salary debt to
teachers and civil servants. Taxi drivers have gone on
strike because the roads are not being repaired; hospital
employees are currently on strike because basic supplies,
such as oxygen, are unavailable; full payment of teacher
salaries - a promise Sambi made on entering office - remains
a future goal. In addition, there is considerable tension
between the Union government and the authorities on each
individual island with the issue of their relative
competencies still unresolved. The Comoros is emerging from
a period of political and economic chaos and, for all the
hopeful signs, there is no guarantee that it will not slip
back into that maelstrom. It is clearly in the U.S. interest

to make an effort to prevent that outcome.

The Reward: A Foreign Policy Success
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


7. (C) Comorans enthusiastically welcomed the modest USD
280,000 education program launched last week (from FY 2005
ESF resources). This program to create distance learning
materials for teachers could easily be quadrupled to provide
much-needed professional development for educators. Basic
materials and facilities are needed. In health, malaria is
the scourge of Comoros, on average affecting every person
twice a year. A simple program in cooperation with UN
agencies to provide treated nets, training for their
installation, and spraying the tiny land area of the
archipelago nation would greatly reduce and could potentially
eradicate malaria in the Comoros. Capacity is readily
available to scale assistance up dramatically.


8. (C) Comoros is a neglected pro-American poor Islamic
democracy, led by a devout Muslim in conservative dress and
turban who repeatedly asks for American friendship, a renewed
Peace Corps presence, and economic opportunity for his
people. Sambi appears to be irritated by the control his
Iranian friends seek to exert, but at present he has few
alternatives. Sambi speaks passionately of the positive
values of Islam. He rails against extremists who disgrace
Islam with violence and hate; the tiny minority who put
forward a "false face of Islam."


9. (C) At a bargain price of USD two million per year, the
United States will gain a Muslim democratic ally in the
Comoros. The Comoros proximity to the Horn of Africa, its
past history of having spawned a notorious al-Qaeda
terrorist, and Iran's clear effort to gain a political
toe-hold in the island, only increases the value of this
simple investment.

McGEE