FORMER COMORAN PRESIDENT AZALI ON SAMBI'S MISCUES

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 001215

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E AND AF/FO
PARIS FOR D'ELIA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON CN
SUBJECT: FORMER COMORAN PRESIDENT AZALI ON SAMBI'S MISCUES


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Former President Azali told the Ambassador the
Union should negotiate with Anjouan's Colonel Bacar for the sole
purpose of organizing elections on the island. Azali said President
Sambi and the African Union had miscalculated in dealing with Bacar,
but thought a solution was still possible. He believed Bacar was
tired and looking for a way out. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) In the quiet setting of his wooded backyard in Moroni,
former Comoran President Azali Assoumani spoke candidly on the
Anjouan impasse with the Ambassador. In a history of 19 successful
and attempted coups d'etat, Azali is in a tiny club of Comoran
presidents who survived to retirement. Having taking power in a
coup himself in 1999 following Anjouan's attempted secession two
years earlier, Azali restored the Union and held fair elections in
2002; where he was elected. When he handed power to current
President Ahmed Sambi in May 2006, it was the first peaceful and
democratic transition since independence in 1975.


3. (SBU) The Ambassador commended Azali on his service to the
Comoros, not only ceding power peacefully after the 2006 election,
but also establishing the first university in the Comoros,
maintaining stability, and improving security. The Ambassador noted
that we have not forgotten his expulsion of the el-Haramein islamist
NGO which has ties to terrorist organizations. Azali, still popular
among Comorans for these successes (and his corrupt government
forgotten),maintains a low profile. Despite Azali's unique
position as one-time reconciler, it appears the Sambi government has
not sought his counsel.

Anjouan Impasse: Talks Needed
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4. (SBU) The former president mentioned his credentials as unifier
in the Comoros: after his coup d'etat he negotiated a
reconciliation agreement to return Anjouan to the Union; passed a
new Constitution by referendum; and held fair elections. With the
exception of his coup, which he acknowledged several times neither
apologetically nor defensively, Azali emphasized dialogue and
compromise. He said the Comoros will not develop without
reconciliation; Sambi's grave error, he said, was to have assumed
Anjouan was no longer a problem. He agreed that Sambi, as an
Anjouan native, initially was perceived to have an advantage dealing
with the island and with Colonel Bacar. Many were proved wrong as
the 2007 island elections approached and Sambi failed to reach a
deal with Bacar to hold elections in Anjouan. In short, Sambi
thought the reconciliation was "done", concentrated on development
instead of reconciliation, and thus missed an opportunity to
continue the healing process after his landslide victory in 2006,
Azali lamented.


5. (SBU) Moving to the problems of Comoros' federalist
("competences") arrangements, Azali defended his decision near the
end of his tenure not to promulgate a law on Union and island
security forces. Handing this hot potato to his successor, Azali
said he advised Sambi to go back to parliament and ask for an
improved law. Sambi did not do so; rather he promulgated the law
Azali saw as defective. As a result, Anjouan still maintains a
standing army which Colonel Bacar refuses to give up, posing a
constant threat to any Union President. Sambi also was unable to
apply its provisions for division of powers between police and
military. The former president identified this to be Sambi's key
early mistake, hoping for the best and demonstrating weakness.


6. (SBU) Turning to the current impasse, Azali said it must be
accepted that Colonel Bacar is the de facto authority in Anjouan.
Azali said unequivocally that negotiations between the Union and
Bacar must be held; solely for the purpose of organizing Anjouan's
election. He assessed Anjouan's population as not/not supporting
separatism, unlike the 1997 secession crisis. Azali further said
Bacar was tired, fragile, and looking for an exit.


7. (SBU) Given these circumstances, Azali hinted that the Union
government had some leverage. However, he said Sambi and the
African Union made a "stupid mistake" by postponing only the Anjouan
election last June, given that the constitution requires all Island
elections to be held simultaneously; he said this error now allows
Bacar to accuse Sambi of having acted unconstitutionally, and
therefore to call for new elections on all three islands, not just
Anjouan. Azali's other sharp criticism against the AU was directed
at the recent public suggestion by AU Negotiator Madeira that the
mandate of the AU's MAES forces - 200 Tanzanian soldiers sent last
June to oversee elections, who are still in Moroni - could be
changed, as circumstances warrant, to include participation in an

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invasion force. He said Madeira's comment significantly stirred up
hopes among Comorans that the AU was prepared to resolve the current
Anjouan problem by force. Azali was categorical in denouncing any
military action against Anjouan as "unnecessary, insufficient, and
undesirable." As a former soldier, he also said a military assault
by sea would fail.

Beyond Anjouan: Mayotte
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8. (SBU) Azali also raised the key nationalist issue for all
Comorans, French Mayotte, declaring, "the Comoros will never be
stable until Mayotte is returned to the country." He noted the
people of Anjouan live with insufficient land, no opportunity, on
one dollar a day - a mere 30 KM from Mayotte's wealthy, if
"artificial," economy. Like most Comoran leaders, Azali emphasized
the economic disparity between the Comoros and Mayotte and alleged
France's authority over that island was unfair. He said that
Mayotte is the root cause of the current Anjouan crisis as it
prevents Comorans from seeing themselves as one nation: "if Mayotte
is not necessarily Comoran, then what island is?" He offered little
on how the Comorans could negotiate Mayotte's return, or why France
would ever consider it.


9. (SBU) Comment: While much of what Azali is saying now is
interesting Monday morning quarterbacking, his comments were tinged
throughout with genuine disappointment over the Sambi government's
current difficulties. Looking forward, his perception of remaining
room for negotiation with Bacar over Anjouan is hopeful. His
outright dismissal of military action as a potential solution is
perhaps indicative of what current military leadership also thinks -
but of course cannot say - about popular demands to end the crisis
by force. End Comment.

MARQUARDT