Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ANKARA965
2007-04-25 15:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY: PRO-KURDISH DTP EXPECTS ELECTORAL SUCCESS

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL OSCE TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1846
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
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RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU
RUEHAK/TSR ANKARA TU
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000965 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL OSCE TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: PRO-KURDISH DTP EXPECTS ELECTORAL SUCCESS
DESPITE CAMPAIGN OF PRESSURE

REF: A. ANKARA 574


B. ANKARA 559

C. ANKARA 653

Classified By: Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner, reasons 1.4(b)(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000965

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL OSCE TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: PRO-KURDISH DTP EXPECTS ELECTORAL SUCCESS
DESPITE CAMPAIGN OF PRESSURE

REF: A. ANKARA 574


B. ANKARA 559

C. ANKARA 653

Classified By: Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner, reasons 1.4(b)(d)

1.(C) Summary: A not-so-subtle campaign of arrests,
detentions, and harassment against pro-Kurdish Democratic
Society Party (DTP) suspiciously coincided with the party's
decision to consider running its candidates as independents
in this year's parliamentary elections. Both the ruling
Justice and Development Party (AKP) and traditional state
establishment stand to gain from such tactics; neither relish
the prospect of DTP gains, and both want to show they are
"doing something" to address continued PKK activity in
Northern Iraq. A number of DTPers pro-PKK statements have
facilitated this campaign. Although AKP is expected to make
inroads in Turkey's southeast, DTP remains strong in the
region, as its success in 2004 local elections demonstrated.
If DTP can organize its base to vote for DTP candidates
running as independents, it has a shot at winning some seats
in parliament. The current pressure campaign will not make
that task easy. End summary.

--------------
Pressure Against DTP Continues
--------------

2.(C) Pressure against DTP has continued unabated since the
party decided at its February 28 convention to consider
running its parliamentary candidates as independents to
circumvent the 10 percent electoral threshold. According to
Orhan Miroglu, DTP's Vice Chair for Foreign Relations, the
series of arrests, detentions, and prosecutions against DTP
leaders peaked near the March 21 Nevruz holiday, when
security forces detained DTP provincial chairmen in Mardin,
Van, Izmir, Siirt, and Batman, as well as scores of
subprovincial chairmen (reftels). Amid rising tension, DTP
urged restraint. As a result, Nevruz passed relatively
peacefully and Turkish Kurds efforts to express their
cultural peacefully attracted the desired international
attention.

3.(C) Miroglu told us DTP believed AKP bears most
responsibility for the increased pressure, though the state

establishment also played a role. AKP and high-level
officials in the Ministries of Interior and Justice, the
military, police, and jandarma all viewed DTP's strategy of
running independents as increasing the party's chances of
winning more than the 20 seats necessary to form a party
group in parliament, he explained.

4.(C) DTP believes that recent elections demonstrate it can
win 25-30 seats with an "independent" strategy, according to
Miroglu. In the 2002 parliamentary elections, DTP's
forerunner party DEHAP won over 50 percent of the vote in
many southeastern provinces. In the 2004 local elections,
the party won overwhelming majorities of approximately 60-75
percent in Hakkari, Diyarbakir, and Batman. A recent AKP
poll gave DTP members reason for optimism. When asked if
they would vote for DTP, only 2.7 percent said yes. The
number jumped to 7.8 percent, however, when asked if they
would vote for a DTP candidate running as an independent.
Though DTP "as an institution" had not formally decided to
run its candidates as independents, Miroglu said the party is
leaning toward that strategy. DTP is courting members of
civil society and academia who support solving the "Kurdish
problem" democratically to run as independents under one
umbrella.

--------------
AKP's Possible Electoral Gains in Southeast
--------------

5.(C) Several Kurdish contacts unaffiliated with DTP expect
DTP to lose votes to AKP in the Southeast. Hasim Hasimi, a
former ANAP MP and Mayor of Cizre, said DTP's link to the PKK
has led to a decline in its popularity, as evidenced by the
lower than expected turnouts at this year's Nevruz events
(ref B). Internal friction has also weakened DTP, according
to Hakkari Kurdish lawyer Rojbin Tugan. The "moderate" wing

ANKARA 00000965 002 OF 002


of the party achieved a victory over the "radical" wing at
the party's February 28 convention by re-electing moderate
Chairman Ahmet Turk, who supports distancing the party from
the PKK, Tugan said (ref A).

6.(C) AKP's popularity in the Southeast has increased,
according to these contacts. Hasimi told us a common
perception is that DTP mayors in the Southeast have failed to
deliver on promises, while AKP has produced concrete results
that have improved lives, such as paved roads and running
water in villages.

7.(C) AKP MP and party co-chair Dengir Mir Firat told us he
expects AKP's increased popularity in the Southeast to
translate into success at the polls in the upcoming
elections. AKP, through its KOYDES program, had brought
basic services such as running water and paved roads to over
600 southeast villages since coming to power in 2002. While
problems obviously still exist in southeastern Turkey, voters
are likely to acknowledge the tangible results AKP brought to
them. The only face of government to which they are
accustomed is the military; suddenly government is providing
services. Firat expected AKP to expand on its 2004 electoral
results in the region, when it won mayorships and strong
majorities in several southeast provinces, such as Van,
Siirt, and Gaziantep.

8.(C) In contrast, Miroglu downplayed AKP's popularity in the
Southeast. He told us AKP had not initiated a comprehensive
development plan for the Southeast, as reflected by high
unemployment -- in Diyarbakir, for example, unemployment is
40 times the national average. AKP has benefited because the
public does not blame AKP for past problems during the GOT's
1990's counterinsurgency against the PKK, and because it does
not pursue a "racist, chauvinistic" program.

9.(C) Comment: Several factors are contributing to the
growing pressure on the DTP: neither AKP nor the state
establishment relishes the prospect of DTP gains in this
year's elections and prosecutions neutralize key DTP leaders
and discredit them in the public's eyes. A number of more
radical DTPers have made this job easier by making pro-PKK
and pro-Ocalan statements. In addition, all GOT and state
elements are disturbed by continued PKK activity in Northern
Iraq and the growing assertiveness of northern Iraqi
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) over Kirkuk. Striking at
those they perceive to be the PKK's allies inside Turkey is a
means for government and state to demonstrate they are "doing
something" without incurring the military and diplomatic
costs of an incursion across the Iraqi border.

10.(C) Comment continued: Although AKP is likely to make
inroads in the Southeast in the elections, our contacts'
predictions of a significant voter shift in the region is
probably overstated. DTP's success in 2004 local elections
makes it the favorite in the region, provided it can organize
its base to vote for independents. It is their only viable
alternative. As the polling numbers indicate, many would not
want to "waste" their votes if DTP ran as a party. The
current campaign of not-so-subtle pressure will not make that
task easy. End comment.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON