MARE NOSTRUM? BLACK SEA MARITIME SECURITY AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000863

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE
OSD FOR COL ALBERT ZACCOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2022
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS GG RO RS UP BU TU
SUBJECT: MARE NOSTRUM? BLACK SEA MARITIME SECURITY AND
TURKISH LEADERSHIP AMBITIONS

REF: A. IIR 68980129 07

B. IIR 68980042 07

C. ANKARA 0804

D. SOFIA 224

Classified By: Pol Mil Counselor Carl Siebentritt, reasons 14. (b/d)

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Summary and Comment
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1. (C) Turkey seeks to maintain its leadership role in Black
Sea maritime security but remains frustrated that not all six
littoral countries are enthusiastic followers. Ankara
complains of Romanian foot-dragging as the GOT seeks to add
anti-WMD and anti-terrorism capabilities to BLACKSEAFOR.
Ankara continues to seek U.S. help to encourage Romanian and
Bulgarian participation in Operation Black Sea Harmony.
Turkey sees a security role for a revitalized Black Sea
Economic Cooperation (BSEC),is gearing up to take over the
BSEC chairmanship in May, and will host the organization's
15th anniversary summit in Istanbul in June. Turkish
officials appear satisfied with the current low U.S. profile
in the Black Sea, but many suspect the U.S. still wants to
use the new allies as the vanguard of a wider NATO presence
in the Black Sea in the future. End summary and comment.

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Turkey's Black Sea Security Vision
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2. (C) Turkey's leadership in Black Sea maritime security is
based on three principles: 1) the participation of all six
littoral states, 2) transparency in cooperation and
communication, and 3) regional ownership of security
initiatives and operations. Turkey wants to promote
interoperability between the navies of the Black Sea coast
states and increase the number of confidence building
exercises. In the absence of "visible" security threats to
Turkey's Black Sea coast, Turkish defense policy has been
reoriented to deter potential terrorist attack, fight WMD
proliferation, and counter weapons and drugs smuggling. Of
prime importance to Turkey is the security of the Turkish
Straits, with its high volume of commercial ship traffic,
along with the protection of the Montreaux Convention which
restricts access of non-littoral warships to the Black Sea.

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Transforming BLACKSEAFOR
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3. (C) Turkey is proud of its role in organizing the first
operational multinational security force in the region and
now seeks to transform BLACKSEAFOR to make it more effective
and operational in character. Turkish experts are updating
BLACKSEAFOR's Terms of Reference and developing a new MOU on
information sharing among participants, with a view to
expanding BLACKSEAFOR activities. According to the MFA, one
concept paper proposes that BLACKSEAFOR take on additional
capabilities to deter potential illicit WMD transit and
terrorist threats in the Black Sea. Foreign Ministry
officials assure us, however, that Turkey does not intend to
transform BLACKSEAFOR into a standing force.


4. (C) Although all six Black Sea littorals currently

participate in BLACKSEAFOR, not all share Turkey's enthusiasm
for expanding its role. While the MFA believes that Russian
participation has been "satisfactory," and even Georgian
buy-in has been acceptable, given Georgia's limited naval
capabilities, Turkish officials cite Romania in particular as
slow to accept Ankara's vision. After a "reflection period"
delay last year, Turkey has been waiting since January for
Romania to announce the next experts meeting, while seeking
to dispel any Romanian "confusion" about what Ankara is
proposing.


5. (U) An on-call naval force created by Turkey in 2001,
BLACKSEAFOR has been activated eight times with a minimum of
four to six ships for periods of approximately one month for
each Black Sea deployment. Since 2004, it has been called up
twice annually. It is currently conducting exercises
scheduled for April 6-24 in which ships will call on the
Bulgarian port of Burgaz, the Romanian port of Constanta and
on Istanbul. According to a statement from Turkish Naval
Command, the current BLACKSEAFOR deployment includes the
participation of one Turkish frigate.

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Black Sea Dis-Harmony?
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6. (C) Turkey is having difficulty convincing all the
littorals to join in its second Black Sea security
initiative, Operation Black Sea Harmony. Russia joined in
December 2006 and Ukraine signed up in January 2007. Romania
has indicated its intention to join but Turkish officials
complain there has been no response yet from Bulgaria or
Georgia. The MFA is cautiously optimistic that Sofia can be
coaxed to follow Bucharest into OBSH this year, but says it
is disappointed with Georgia's complete lack of response. It
is not clear to Turkish officials whether Georgia's silence
is based on political or technical reasons. Turkish military
and Foreign Ministry officials have asked what the U.S. could
do to encourage Romania and Bulgaria in particular to become
active OBSH participants.


7. (C) Unlike BLACKSEAFOR, Black Sea Harmony is a
continuously operating patrol force in the Black Sea.
Founded by Turkey in March 2004, OBSH's objectives are to
show a naval presence along the main merchant traffic routes,
carry out surveillance and reconnaissance and shadow select
ships or suspicious activity. OBSH warships hail merchant
vessels and obtain information regarding their ports of
origin and destination as well as cargo. Air space
surveillance is also conducted in selected areas. According
to Turkish Navy figures, the highest percentage of
"suspicious" vessels depart from Ukrainian, Romanian, and
Russian ports, which are also the destinations of over 80
percent of "suspicious" maritime traffic in the Black Sea
tracked since 2004.


8. (C) Turkish officials describe OBSH as the Black Sea
affiliate operation of NATO's Active Endeavor in the
Mediterranean. Data collected by OBSH on merchant shipping
in the Black Sea, officials emphasize, is shared with NATO on
a daily basis through the OBSH Permanent Coordination Center
of Eregli, a Turkish Naval Station about 100 kms east of
Istanbul. In response to our questions about how OBSH
information sharing works now that Russian vessels are
participating in operations, MFA officials acknowledge that

Turkey respects Russian caveats on sharing information with
NATO.

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Reviving BSEC
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9. (C) While principally an economic organization founded
under Turkish leadership in 1991 in the wake of the collapse
of the Soviet Union, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
(BSEC) has an important security dimension today, according
to the MFA. Ministry officials have told us that Turkey
hopes to use its upcoming chairmanship of the BSEC to take
advantage of the unique platform for dialogue between
regional members as diverse as Albania and Armenia. Of the
12 members of BSEC, they note, three are NATO Allies and four
are members of the EU. Officials claim that Turkey would
welcome more EU involvement in Black Sea economic issues to
help create "a new synergy." Turkey will attempt to breath
new life into BSEC when it takes over the rotational
chairmanship for six months in May and host the 15th
anniversary summit in Istanbul on June 25 (ref c).


10. (C) Sources outside government are skeptical that Turkey
can revitalize what is widely seen as a moribund
organization. BSEC needs to be rescued, according to ASAM's
Hasan Kanbolat, but he and others are not sure that Ankara's
six-month chairmanship will be enough to do it. Although the
organization has a permanent secretariat in Istanbul, it is a
hollow structure. Turkey has never gotten much out of BSEC
and will be hard-pressed to realize the lofty ambitions
summit papers are expected to present, Kanbolat said.
Regarding its potential to address regional security
problems, TOBB University Professor Mustafa Aydin thinks BSEC
does provide a platform for dialogue on security, but
dampened expectations the GOT might have for serious progress
at BSEC.

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WILSON