Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ANKARA847
2007-04-12 09:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

LOOKING EAST: TURKEY'S MILITARY INVESTS IN THE

Tags:  PREL MASS MARR PINS ZJ ZK AJ GG TI RS TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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P 120958Z APR 07 ZDK CTG HCB 9755
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1686
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 1935
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0008
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 7973
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 1480
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 0361
RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 0978
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1638
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5535
RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 6652
RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 1140
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 0764
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 3095
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN 1278
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//JSJ3//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 5613
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU
RUEHKB/USDAO BAKU AJ
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000847 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2017
TAGS: PREL MASS MARR PINS ZJ ZK AJ GG TI RS TU
SUBJECT: LOOKING EAST: TURKEY'S MILITARY INVESTS IN THE
CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

REF: A. ANKARA 0489

B. ANKARA 0779

ANKARA 00000847 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Pol Mil Counselor Carl Siebentritt for
reasons 1.4 (b/d)

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000847

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2017
TAGS: PREL MASS MARR PINS ZJ ZK AJ GG TI RS TU
SUBJECT: LOOKING EAST: TURKEY'S MILITARY INVESTS IN THE
CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

REF: A. ANKARA 0489

B. ANKARA 0779

ANKARA 00000847 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Pol Mil Counselor Carl Siebentritt for
reasons 1.4 (b/d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Turkey has invested heavily in its security
relationships in the Caucasus and Central Asia, with the bulk
of its military assistance going to Azerbaijan. Turkey
provides security assistance funds and training to all the
countries in the region except Armenia and Uzbekistan.
Historical and cultural ties, expanding commercial interests,
strategic competition with Russia and Iran, and
disenchantment with Euro-Atlantic relations are the
traditional drivers of Turkey's interest in the east.
Increasingly, however, military officials justify intensified
security ties by citing threats to energy security from
perceived Russian conniving with Armenia and Iran to "breach"
U.S.-supported east-west routes for Caspian energy. Turkish
officials tell us they would welcome closer collaboration
with the U.S. in this region, but intend to move slowly to
avoid irritating Russia. End Summary.

-------------- -
Turkey-Azerbaijan: "One Nation but Two States"
-------------- -


2. (C) Turkey's military relations with Azerbaijan, which
Turkey perceives as its strategic bridge to Central Asia, are
the strongest in the region and the most extensive with any
country except the U.S. With close ethnic and cultural ties,
Turkey and Azerbaijan are "one nation, but two states,"
according to one Turkish general. The Turkish General Staff
tells us Turkey has provided approximately USD 600 million in
military assistance to Azerbaijan since 1998, focused on
training, improving force readiness, and adapting Azeri
equipment and doctrine to NATO standards. Azerbaijan
benefits particularly from the Partnership for Peace (PFP)

program, according to Turkish observers, who claim that
military training has boosted the confidence of Azeri
military forces. The Turkish military mission in Azerbaijan
currently includes 46 instructors and staff at the Turkish
designed and built military academy. Meanwhile, over 200
Azeri officers and cadets have been trained in Turkey,
including at Turkey's PFP Center.


3. (C) Turkey and Azerbaijan announced a joint high level
commission to coordinate military cooperation and mutual
security assistance in February 2007 during a visit to Baku
by Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff (DCHOD) GEN
Ergin Saygun. TGS officials say the commission, chaired by
Saygun and Azerbaijani Defense Minister Safar Aliyev, will
have logistics, political-military, and defense industry
components. Prior to Saygun's visit to Baku, Aliyev met with
Chief of the Turkish General Staff (CHOD) GEN Yasar Buyukanit
on February 5 in Ankara to discuss military cooperation. We
understand that a three-star billet has been created for a
Turkish general to become a senior advisor to Aliyev.


4. (C) The TGS has flagged the strategic importance to Turkey
of the east-west energy corridor from Azerbaijan, comprised
of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, which became
operational in May 2006, and a parallel new line that is
expected to pump Azeri gas to the Turkish grid at the eastern
Turkish city of Erzurum later this year. A new rail line has

ANKARA 00000847 002.2 OF 003


also been undertaken which will -- when complete -- link Baku
to the Turkish rail network at Kars (and completely bypass
Armenia). The TGS is very concerned that Russia is conniving
with Armenia and Iran to breach this east-west energy
corridor by pushing north-south alternatives (ref a),
including a Russia-Armenia-Iran pipeline and construction of
a refinery in Armenia near the Iranian border.

--------------
Isolating Armenia
--------------


5. (C) Accelerated Turkish military ties with Azerbaijan are
also intended to isolate Armenia. The Turkish-Armenian
border has been closed since the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
and the countries have no bilateral security cooperation.
Military officials note that Armenian officers have been
invited to training at Turkey's Partnership for Peace Center
and a senior Armenian officer attended the Silk Road flag
officer seminar hosted by Turkey. However, Armenia has never
reciprocated, they complain, and has used NATO and PFP fora
to push the for recognition of an Armenian genocide. Turkish
officers cite Armenia's close relations with Russia as a
major impediment to Turkish plans for greater engagement with
Central Asia (ref b).

--------------
Keeping the Georgians in Line
--------------


6. (C) While Turkey has sought closer relations with Georgia,
including military ties, it views Tbilisi's recent stance
toward Russia as unnecessarily and dangerously provocative,
and has urged Georgia to be more cautious. Turkish officials
have told us they support Georgia's NATO ambitions but are
not quite as optimistic as the U.S. that a Membership Action
Plan will temper Tbilisi's rhetoric towards Russia. An MFA
official told us that Turkey's security assistance to Georgia
is calibrated by Ankara's concerns for what it considers
"inexperienced and reckless leadership" vis-a-vis Russia.


7. (C) Turkish observers view Georgia's political environment
as the most fragile in the Caucasus. Nevertheless, the TGS
reports that Turkey has provided Georgia with over USD 70
million in bilateral military aid in recent years and has
trained 65 Georgian military personnel in Turkey, including
border guards, making Tbilisi the second largest recipient of
Turkish security assistance in the region after Azerbaijan.
Most of Turkey's aid to Georgia has focused on training,
including the establishment of a modern military academy with
some Turkish faculty and staff.

--------------
Assistance to Central Asia
--------------


8. (C) As in the Caucasus, Turkey's military aid to Central
Asia has focused on training from the outset. The five
post-Soviet Central Asian republics had a pressing need for
military training, ASAM Central Asia analyst Gokcen Ogan told
us, because the large number of mid-level military officers
and NCOs in those countries who chose to remain in the
Russian armed services created a void of trained middle
managers and action officers. And as with Azerbaijan,
Turkish ethnic affinity with the Central Asians has provided
an important psychological and strategic rationale for
Turkey's security relations in the region.


ANKARA 00000847 003.2 OF 003



9. (C) Of the five Central Asian republics, Turkmenistan has
received the most military assistance from Turkey, valued at
USD 30 million in recent years for logistics support and
training, according to the TGS. Turkey has trained 170
Turkmen officers. Officials tell us Turkey hopes to expand
its overall relationship with Turkmenistan and is seeking to
exploit the political opening created by the succession of
President Berdimuhammedov (reftel). As with Azerbaijan,
Turkmenistan's hydrocarbon resources are a critical factor
driving Turkey's interest.


10. (C) Other Central Asian countries receiving Turkish
military assistance according to the TGS are: Kazakhstan (USD
20 million),Kyrgyzstan (USD 16 million),and Tajikistan (USD
11 million).


11. (C) Uzbekistan is perhaps the most strategically
important Central Asian country for Turkey, according to
ASAM's Ogan, but has been the most problematic for the last
ten years. Although Turkey had provided over USD 6 million
in military assistance in the early 1990s, according to the
TGS, President Karimov cut off Turkish military and other
assistance after Turkey was charged with supporting his
political opposition beginning in 1996. Turkish training,
educational exchanges, and much investment have been halted.
According to Ogan, the bilateral discord continues, with
further suspicion in Tashkent about illicit Turkish aid to
the opposition in Uzbekistan's 2007 elections. Uzbekistan
remains Turkey's weakest military link in Central Asia.

--------------
Comment
--------------


12. (C) While Turkey's earlier and less than successful
forays into Central Asia in the 1990's were based on hopes of
a post-Cold War re-birth of Turkish culture and Turkic
consciousness in the region, today's push for security ties
focuses more on gas and oil, and Turkey's ambition to be the
region's energy hub. The Turkish military in particular
shares our concern over Russian attempts to monopolize
Caspian energy sources and transport, seeing Armenia and Iran
as Russia's allies in this effort. In that regard, the TGS
regards the millions Turkey spends on security assistance in
the region to be well worth the influence it buys. Turkish
officials tell us they would welcome closer consultation with
us on security issues in the region, but add that Turkey will
proceed cautiously to avoid provoking Russia.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON