TURKEY: THE GOT ON LEDRA STREET BRIDGE REMOVAL:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000057

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP MOPS TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKEY: THE GOT ON LEDRA STREET BRIDGE REMOVAL:
IT'S TALAT'S DECISION TO MAKE

REF: NICOSIA 000021

Classified By: Political Counselor Janice Weiner for reasons 1.4(b) and
(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Although GOT officials were not supportive of
"TRNC President" Mehmet Ali Talat's decision to dismantle the
Ledra Street footbridge at the Green Line in Nicosia, they
nonetheless stated in the end it was Talat's decision to
make. While Talat had broached the subject in late
November/early December with Ankara, GOT officials here
apparently believed they had agreed to push off a decision on
the matter until early in the new year. Thus, Talat's
December 28 announcement of his intent to move forward with
the demolition caught them off-guard. Although senior
Turkish General Staff (TGS) officials in particular opposed
Talat's decision, in the end, Talat's vehement defense of his
prerogative to make such a decision won the day. However, PM
Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) may pay the
price for Talat's insistence. Opposition parties are taking
full opportunity to paint Erdogan and the AKP as being "soft"
on key national security issues as election season gets
underway. END SUMMARY

TALAT CONFERRED...AND DIDN'T LIKE THE ANSWER
--------------


2. (C) MFA First Secretary for Cyprus Affairs Can Oztas
described to us January 10 the circumstances surrounding
"TRNC President" Talat's decision to dismantle the Ledra
Street footbridge in Nicosia and Talat's interaction with GOT
officials in making that decision. According to Oztas, Talat
had initially broached his idea of taking down the bridge in
late November/early December. At that time, MFA and the
Turkish General Staff (TGS) counseled against a unilateral
concession from the Turkish side because, from the GOT
perspective, such concessions have not been reciprocated in
the past. Oztas added that, in the Turks' view, the memory
of the international community has been lamentably short in
recognizing steps the Turks have taken in recent years in
support of a comprehensive settlement and has been equally
short-sighted in its failure to put adequate pressure on the
Greek Cypriots to reciprocate.


3. (C) Oztas intimated that following the initial exchange
between Talat and the GOT on the issue, GOT officials were
expecting to continue the discussion of Talat's proposal
after the holidays. This would be part of a broader
discussion on how to move forward on an overall settlement in
light of a new UNSYG and the transition to the German EU
presidency. Although Oztas did not admit it explicitly,
Talat's December 28 announcement that he was moving forward
with the removal of the footbridge appears to have caught
everyone off-guard.


4. (C) Turkish media reports indicate the local Turkish force
commander, Lieutenant General Hayri Kivrikoglu, remained
steadfast in his opposition to Talat's proposal and pressed
for support from Ankara. Oztas noted that although the
troops patrolling along Ermou/Hermes Street perpendicular to
Ledra are actually Turkish Cypriot security forces,
Kivrikoglu maintains overall command of the security presence
in northern Cyprus. Talat traveled to Istanbul and to Ankara
January 4-5 to press his case with PM Erdogan, FM Gul, and
TGS CHOD General Yasar Buyukanit. According to media
reports, and as noted in reftel, Talat reportedly threatened
to resign if the Turkish Army maintained its opposition to
his decision.

GOT DECIDES IT'S NOT WORTH THE FIGHT...
--------------


5. (C) Oztas declined to confirm the media accounts
concerning Talat's threat. Rather, he emphasized the GOT
view that the issue was one for Talat to decide. Oztas
admitted that GOT officials believed the bridge held no
significance from a security perspective. Adding that to the
fact that even after the demolition the opening of a new
crossing at Ledra Street anytime soon is highly unlikely made
going along with Talat's decision somewhat more palatable. A
mid-level officer at the TGS who recently served in Cyprus
confirmed to us that the bridge itself was of little
importance but suggested the manner in which Talat handled
the affair had raised hackles. He said the TGS now considers
the issue closed.


...THOUGH SOME BELIEVE TALAT JUST DOESN'T GET IT
-------------- ---


6. (C) Retired General Kuloglu at the Global Strategy
Institute think tank described TGS' concerns with the

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destruction of the bridge as three-fold:

- Without the bridge, the separation between the military and
civilians will be lost;
- Since the purpose of the bridge was to separate the
civilians and military, Talat should have consulted the
military first; and
- Most importantly, after already destroying the wall on the
Turkish side, and now taking down the bridge, TGS believes
the Greek Cypriots will continue to demand more unilateral
concessions from the Turkish Cypriots such as removal of the
Turkish flag and withdrawal of Turkish troops. They believe
that the demolition of the bridge should have been done in
conjunction with the destruction of the wall on the Greek
Cypriot side.


7. (C) Retired General Kucukoglu (protect) of the Center for
Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM) said that Talat was not a
military person and did not understand the strategic,
historical, and emotional importance of Cyprus to Turkey. He
views Cyprus from a Cypriot point of view, assuming that
Turkish and Greek Cypriots should work together towards a
solution. However, Turkey views itself as the "mother
country" of Cyprus and expects Talat to consult with all
elements of the Turkish government before taking such a
decision.


8. (C) Despite those concerns, Talat could perhaps be
forgiven for thinking he could move forward on removal of the
bridge without encountering too much resistance from Ankara.
According to an Ankara University professor and former
advisor to the Turkish parliament with close ties to the TGS,
Talat had raised this issue earlier in 2006 with former TGS
CHOD Ozkok, who had signaled his support.

THE DAY OF "TRNC INDEPENDENCE," AND BASHING ERDOGAN
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Following the January 9 removal of the footbridge,
Turkish media proclaimed it as the day when the "TRNC" proved
its independence. PM Erdogan was quoted as saying that
although he believed Talat had perhaps moved in haste in
taking down the bridge unilaterally, "he had to be honored as
president of the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'." The
political opposition, meanwhile, seized upon the confusion
surrounding Talat's declaration as well as Erdogan's eventual
decision to give in to Talat. Republican People's Party
(CHP) leader Deniz Baykal said the developments in Cyprus
reflected a lack of coordination among national institutions
and characterized the demolition of the bridge as "a
challenge." True Path Party (DYP) deputy chairman Nuzhet
Kandemir charged Erdogan's government with "declining to
undertake responsibility in Cyprus," while National People's
Party (MHP) deputy chairman Mehmet Sandir stated the MHP
fears the next step would be the demolition of the Turkish
Cypriot "state" and the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the
island. Motherland Party (ANAP) leader Erkan Mumcu said he
is disturbed by Erdogan's conclusion that Turkey must respect
Talat's decision, adding that he views this as Erdogan
"distancing himself from developments in Cyprus."


10. (C) COMMENT: It is less than convenient for Erdogan's AKP
that Talat pressed forward with unilateral concessions as AKP
enters an election campaign in which it is likely to come
under the most pressure from nationalists who characterize
the AKP's record on Cyprus (and the PKK) as "soft."
Nevertheless, neither AKP nor the TGS was willing to create
the political crisis in northern Cyprus that would have
ensued had Talat made good on his threat to resign. The TGS
did, however, lay down a marker that it will continue to
insist upon its role as the ultimate protector of Turkish
national interests, one of which remains, certainly, the
Cyprus issue.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eu/ankara/

WILSON