TURKEY: CURRENT THINKING ON THE IRAN NUCLEAR THREAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002973

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2017
TAGS: PREL KNUC OREP TU IR
SUBJECT: TURKEY: CURRENT THINKING ON THE IRAN NUCLEAR THREAT

REF: A. STATE 160872

B. ANKARA 2907

Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary: Conversations with Turkish officials,
parliamentarians, academics, and opinion-makers following
publication of the latest National Intelligence Estimate
(NIE) on Iran, reveal the following:

-- While the GOT remains opposed to and very concerned about
a nuclear-armed Iran, it focuses on the growing regional
influence Iran would have rather than Iran becoming an
existential threat to Turkey.

-- Many Turks perceive a U.S. or Israeli attack on Iran, and
the potential instability that such an attack would portend,
as more dangerous for Turkey than a nuclear-armed Iran.

-- Turkey's fear of further instability on its borders, and
need for energy and access to Central Asia, limit the
government's willingness to take a tougher stance against
Iran.

-- Most opinion-makers see Turkish pursuit of its own
nuclear weapon as extremely unlikely, but that view could
change if Turkey becomes completely disillusioned with its EU
prospects and its strategic relationship with the U.S.

-- The broad Turkish public views the new NIE as weakening
the case for sanctions against Iran.

End Summary.

Turkey's Assessment of the Iranian Threat
--------------


2. (C) Our contacts agree that civilian and military leaders
are suspicious of Iranian intentions. Araman Kuloglu, a
retired major general and analyst at the Global Strategic
Institute said the suspicion results from the historic
rivalry between the Persian and Ottoman empires, as well as
more recent Iranian efforts to export the Islamic revolution
to Turkey and Iran's earlier support for the PKK terrorist
organization. There is general agreement among our
interlocutors that a nuclear-armed Iran would dramatically
alter the balance of power that has existed between Iran and
Turkey since the seventeenth century. Ahmet Celik, Iran
expert at the Prime Ministry, said such a paradigm shift in
regional geopolitics would lead to an even more assertive and
emboldened Iran, extending its influence through militant
Shi'a populations to form a "Shi'a Crescent" from Central
Asia to the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea,
dominating energy corridors.


3. (C) Despite concerns about a nuclear Iran taking a more
aggressive posture in the region, there is wide agreement
that Turkey would not be a primary target for an Iranian
nuclear weapon, and that concerns about Iran's nuclear
program should be addressed diplomatically, not militarily.
Mustafa Kibaroglu, an expert on the Iran nuclear issue at
Bilkent University, noted Turkey's preference for a
diplomatic solution is in part due to the GOT's assessment
that Iran is still "many years" away from developing a
nuclear weapons capability -- a view that he believes is
supported by the NIE on Iran. More importantly, according to
Ibrahim Kalin, director of an Ankara-based think tank
considered close to the ruling Justice and Development Party
(AKP),Turkey fears that a military strike against Iran could
trigger greater instability in its neighborhood and lead to
consequences even more dangerous for Turkey than a nuclear
Iran.

What Would Turkey Do If Iran Goes Nuclear?
--------------


4. (C) If Iran were to obtain a nuclear weapon, it is
extremely unlikely that Turkey would follow suit, according
to most of our interlocutors. Even with increasingly
negative public attitudes toward the U.S., EU, and NATO, most
analysts and officials with whom we've spoken, including
MFA's Deputy Director General for Non-Proliferation and

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Disarmament Ahmet Gun, consider it unimaginable for Turkey to
develop its own nuclear weapons program since Turkey will
have much more to lose than to gain. Pursuit of a nuclear
weapons program would not only be inconsistent with Turkey's
approach in international affairs, but would jeopardize
Turkey's bid for EU membership and its relationship with the
U.S., according to Sadi Cayci, a retired military judge and
expert on international law at the Center for Eurasian
Strategic Studies (ASAM). Furthermore, Turkey's leadership
does not question the reliability of the NATO nuclear
umbrella, according to Ali Sarikaya, an advisor to the Prime
Minister. However, Kursat Atilgan, a retired general and
current MP in the NATO Affairs Committee, notes that NATO
credibility has been tarnished in Turkey because most Turks
believe many NATO Allies, including the U.S., have not helped
Turkey sufficiently in its struggle against PKK terrorism.
Atilgan and others also recall NATO's hesitation in
responding to Turkey,s February 2003 request for missile
defense assets in anticipation of Operation Iraqi Freedom.


5. (C) Turkey might pursue a nuclear weapons program,
according to parliament's NATO Affairs Committee Chair Vahit
Erdem, but only if the U.S. actively encourages Turkey to do
so in response to an Iranian nuclear weapon. Others, such as
ASAM's Bahadir Koc (a researcher on Turkey's relations with
Europe and the U.S.) and retired general Atilgan, warn that
if Turkey,s prospect for EU membership diminishes further,
and Turkey's strategic relationship with the U.S. is damaged
by bilateral irritants and regional developments (PKK
violence, Kurdish independence, and House passage of an
Armenia genocide resolution),Turkey might consider an
indigenous nuclear weapons program in response to Iran's.

Iran is Tomorrow's Problem, the PKK is Today's
-------------- -


6. (C) Iraq, and the PKK's presence there, remains Turkey's
highest diplomatic and military priority. Civilian and
military leaders in their public statements have indicated
that the PKK, combined with the prospect of an independent
Iraqi Kurdistan, as the preeminent threats to Turkey's
security. This view has led the Turkish military to engage
in tactical cooperation with the Iranian military against
PKK/PJAK forces in northern Iraq, according to Ali Nihat
Ozcan, an instructor for the Turkish jandarma and an analyst
on Middle East terrorism and at TEPEV, a thinktank connected
with TOBB University in Ankara. Turkey's growing energy
needs, increasing investments in Iran's energy sector, as
well as Iran's ability to restrict Turkey's access to its
Central Asian trading partners, are also reasons for Turkey's
reluctance to take a tougher line against Iran, according to
Faruk Demir, an advisor to Energy Minister Guler.


7. (C) Several contacts, including Sedat Laciner, head of
another Ankara-based thinktank, stressed that the GOT sees
U.S. support for Iraqi Kurds, including the Kurdish Regional
Government (KRG),as a serious impediment to closer
U.S.-Turkish cooperation on Iran. Many believe this
collaboration comes at Turkey,s expense. In this context,
how oil-rich Kirkuk,s status is resolved is widely seen as a
litmus test of USG intentions. If Kirkuk comes under KRG
control despite Turkish objections, Turkey will consider this
a signal that the USG favors an independent Kurdistan over
Turkey, according to both Laciner and Bilkent's Kibaroglu.

NIE Reaction
--------------


8. (C) Many of our interlocutors are puzzled by the timing of
the NIE on Iran (ref b). They believe the NIE undercuts the
case for any military action or a third round of UNSC
sanctions. They assume Beijing and Moscow will use the NIE
to argue against further sanctions. They also speculate that
the NIE may be a signal of the U.S. backing away from
promoting regime change in Iran, and possibly seeking a
"grand bargain" with Iran -- with the U.S. normalizing ties
with Iran in exchange for Tehran providing assurances on its
nuclear program and ending support for terrorist groups.
ASAM's Iran analyst Arif Keskin, an Iranian-born Azeri who
visits Iran regularly, said Iranian politicians across the
ideological spectrum are trying to take credit for the NIE.
He assessed that the NIE will likely benefit President

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Ahmedinejad the most. While agreeing that the NIE might
create an opening for the U.S. to engage Iran, he predicted
such talks may be more difficult since Tehran now believes it
has the upper hand against the U.S.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON