Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ANKARA2962
2007-12-14 11:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:
EXBS: TURKISH ATOMIC ENERGY AUTHORITY REQUESTS
how-toVZCZCXYZ0019 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHAK #2962 3481126 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 141126Z DEC 07 FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4655 RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC INFO RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/ISA:EUR/ISA:NESA/DSCA//
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002962
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NP/ECC- YWONG, ACHURCH, BGOLDEN
DOE/NNSA- TPERRY, LPARKER, EDESCHLER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2017
TAGS: ETTC KNNP KSTC MNUC PARM PREL TU
SUBJECT: EXBS: TURKISH ATOMIC ENERGY AUTHORITY REQUESTS
JOINT NONPROLIFERATION THREAT ASSESSMENT
REF: ANKARA 02527
Classified By: Political-Military Counselor Carl Siebentritt for reason
s 1.4(b,d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002962
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NP/ECC- YWONG, ACHURCH, BGOLDEN
DOE/NNSA- TPERRY, LPARKER, EDESCHLER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2017
TAGS: ETTC KNNP KSTC MNUC PARM PREL TU
SUBJECT: EXBS: TURKISH ATOMIC ENERGY AUTHORITY REQUESTS
JOINT NONPROLIFERATION THREAT ASSESSMENT
REF: ANKARA 02527
Classified By: Political-Military Counselor Carl Siebentritt for reason
s 1.4(b,d).
1. (U) Action request at para 5.
2.(C) Summary: The Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK)
has requested that the USG send a team of experts to conduct
a joint nuclear smuggling threat assessment with TAEK to
obtain a better understanding of the threat to Turkey of
proliferation of nuclear materials. We believe this
assessment would be useful in encouraging TAEK buy-in to
future EXBS and SLD initiatives, and request ISN/ECC
investigate the feasibility of sending a team of U.S. experts
to Turkey for such an assessment. End summary.
3. (C) We met with TAEK President Okay Cakiroglu and his
staff to discuss EXBS and SLD program initiatives for Turkey.
It was clear that TAEK is not in favor of accepting DOE,s
Second Line of Defense equipment plan as currently conceived
and desires maximum control of other radiation detection
equipment which may be provided to Turkish agencies (reftel).
He asserted the new Turkish-developed radiation detection
monitors and hand-held equipment would provide a more secure
system for Turkey and reduce the risk of "backdoor" access by
"other" entities. He noted TAEK has already built over 100
monitors to date and has begun installation of these units at
border points of entry where U.S. built portal monitors
currently operate.
4. (C) Cakiroglu stated that TAEK desires a joint U.S.-Turkey
"Nonproliferation Threat Assessment" to identify specific
nonproliferation risks for Turkey and to better help them
understand the concerns the U.S. has in those regards. TAEK
might then be willing to work cooperatively with the U.S. to
develop a suitable radiation detection equipment program for
implementation in Turkey. Visiting EXBS Program Officer
agreed to look into the possibility of sending a team of U.S.
experts to conduct a joint threat assessment in the near
term.
5. (C) COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST: TAEK is a key GOT actor on
issues related to non-proliferation. Turkish Customs and
Turkish National Police have told us privately that TAEK's
reluctance to accept U.S. assistance and equipment is an
obstacle to more active bilateral cooperation on improving
Turkey's export control and border security capabilities.
Post believes a positive response to TAEK,s request for a
joint nuclear smuggling threat assessment will encourage
TAEK's buy-in to our efforts to equip and train relevant
Turkish agencies. We therefore request that ISN/ECC
coordinate with DOE INECP, SLD, and other relevant agencies
to determine feasibility, scope, and possible dates for a
joint threat assessment with TAEK and other GOT entities in
the near future. EXBS Advisor Robert Cieslinski and Pol-Mil
Officer Robert Lee will serve as post POCs for this
initiative.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/
WILSON
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NP/ECC- YWONG, ACHURCH, BGOLDEN
DOE/NNSA- TPERRY, LPARKER, EDESCHLER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2017
TAGS: ETTC KNNP KSTC MNUC PARM PREL TU
SUBJECT: EXBS: TURKISH ATOMIC ENERGY AUTHORITY REQUESTS
JOINT NONPROLIFERATION THREAT ASSESSMENT
REF: ANKARA 02527
Classified By: Political-Military Counselor Carl Siebentritt for reason
s 1.4(b,d).
1. (U) Action request at para 5.
2.(C) Summary: The Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK)
has requested that the USG send a team of experts to conduct
a joint nuclear smuggling threat assessment with TAEK to
obtain a better understanding of the threat to Turkey of
proliferation of nuclear materials. We believe this
assessment would be useful in encouraging TAEK buy-in to
future EXBS and SLD initiatives, and request ISN/ECC
investigate the feasibility of sending a team of U.S. experts
to Turkey for such an assessment. End summary.
3. (C) We met with TAEK President Okay Cakiroglu and his
staff to discuss EXBS and SLD program initiatives for Turkey.
It was clear that TAEK is not in favor of accepting DOE,s
Second Line of Defense equipment plan as currently conceived
and desires maximum control of other radiation detection
equipment which may be provided to Turkish agencies (reftel).
He asserted the new Turkish-developed radiation detection
monitors and hand-held equipment would provide a more secure
system for Turkey and reduce the risk of "backdoor" access by
"other" entities. He noted TAEK has already built over 100
monitors to date and has begun installation of these units at
border points of entry where U.S. built portal monitors
currently operate.
4. (C) Cakiroglu stated that TAEK desires a joint U.S.-Turkey
"Nonproliferation Threat Assessment" to identify specific
nonproliferation risks for Turkey and to better help them
understand the concerns the U.S. has in those regards. TAEK
might then be willing to work cooperatively with the U.S. to
develop a suitable radiation detection equipment program for
implementation in Turkey. Visiting EXBS Program Officer
agreed to look into the possibility of sending a team of U.S.
experts to conduct a joint threat assessment in the near
term.
5. (C) COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST: TAEK is a key GOT actor on
issues related to non-proliferation. Turkish Customs and
Turkish National Police have told us privately that TAEK's
reluctance to accept U.S. assistance and equipment is an
obstacle to more active bilateral cooperation on improving
Turkey's export control and border security capabilities.
Post believes a positive response to TAEK,s request for a
joint nuclear smuggling threat assessment will encourage
TAEK's buy-in to our efforts to equip and train relevant
Turkish agencies. We therefore request that ISN/ECC
coordinate with DOE INECP, SLD, and other relevant agencies
to determine feasibility, scope, and possible dates for a
joint threat assessment with TAEK and other GOT entities in
the near future. EXBS Advisor Robert Cieslinski and Pol-Mil
Officer Robert Lee will serve as post POCs for this
initiative.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/
WILSON