TURKEY: DAS BRYZA REVIEWS SOUTH CAUCASUS ISSUES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002698

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2017
TAGS: PREL PBTS AJ AM GG TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: DAS BRYZA REVIEWS SOUTH CAUCASUS ISSUES
WITH GOT

REF: ANKARA 2596

Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney, reasons 1.4 b, d


1. (SBU) EUR DAS Bryza and the DCM met with Turkish MFA
Deputy U/S for South Caucasus and Central Asian Affairs Unal
Cevikoz on October 24 in Ankara, on the margins of the Black
Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) Foreign Ministers meeting.
Cevikoz and Bryza exchanged views on developments in
Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations, Georgia's NATO accession, and
opportunities to improve Turkish-Armenian bilateral
relations.

GEORGIA: GO SLOW ON MAP
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2. (C) Cevikoz stressed that Turkey supports Georgia's
transatlantic integration. The GOT does not want Russia to
have a veto over NATO enlargement, and will support the
consensus on Georgia's Membership Action Plan (MAP).
However, the GOT is concerned that, if Georgia attains MAP
before making progress in resolving its territorial
conflicts, particularly in Abkhazia, confrontation with
Russia will follow. Cevikoz recounted how Georgian FM
Bezhuashvili had told him that Georgia hoped to use NATO
membership as a means to leverage settlements in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia on Tbilisi's terms. But NATO accession was not
the means to solve these conflicts, and the GOT is frustrated
that Tbilisi has, in the meantime, been unwilling even to
explore developing a dialogue with Sukhumi.


3. (C) Cevikoz noted that Abkhaz diaspora groups in Turkey
were scheduled to host Abkhaz "President" Bagapsh last week.
The GOG, however, at the last minute, asked Cevikoz to
intervene and ensure the meeting was canceled (reftel).
Cevikoz emphasized that the visit was unofficial, but told
Bryza that Turkey is prepared to be a facilitator. It had
offered to convey messages from Tbilisi to Bagapsh. Before
it got cold feet, the GOG had asked Cevikoz to request the
Abkhaz to resume talks. Cevikoz noted that the Abkhaz
diaspora is gaining political clout in Ankara and that he is
under considerable pressure to help ease Abkhazia's isolation.


4. (C) Bryza told Cevikoz that the USG had reached different
conclusions about Georgia. Tension over Abkhazia had
moderated somewhat, as evidenced by passage of the UNOMIG
renewal resolution. He noted that the seven Abkhaz prisoners
held by Georgia since their September 20 altercation with
Georgian troops were expected to be released on Saturday. In
principle, the U.S. believed Georgia would further moderate
its behavior as it felt more certain that its path toward
NATO would remain clear and as it fulfilled NATO membership
criteria. The U.S. strongly supported MAP for Georgia, but
wishes to get through deliberations on Kosovo before
launching a major push. Bryza submitted that perhaps Cevikoz
had misinterpreted Bezhuashivli's comments on the
relationship between MAP and resolution of the Abkhazia and
South Ossetia conflicts; in his conversations with DAS Bryza,
Bezhuashvili had always maintained that MAP and NATO
membership would help deter Russian adventurism in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia by demonstrating that a lack of political
settlements would not obstruct Georgia's path to NATO.
(Comment: Bezhuashvili affirmed his interpretation to Bryza
during a conversation later that day. End Comment.)
Georgia, Bryza said, is outmaneuvering Russia and separatists
in South Ossetia by making reintegration with Georgia appear
increasingly attractive. This will be even more the case as
Georgia moves toward NATO membership. This would be
acceptable, Cevikoz responded, but there is no process in
Abkhazia that parallels the dynamic in South Ossetia.
Georgia, right now, is repelling the Abkhaz, not making
itself attractive. Bryza said we would encourage the
Georgians to take advantage of channels with the Abkhaz
diaspora, and had been encouraging President Saakashvili to
permit direct maritime transit between Trabzon and Sukhumi.
Cevikoz emphasized that Turkey has businesses ready to make
investments in Abkhazia and open channels of commerce and
transportation.

AZERBAIJAN: PESSIMISTIC ON N-K
--------------


5. (C) Cevikoz told Bryza that Azerbaijan is also concerned
that Russia could become more confrontational in the
Caucasus. He noted that personnel and equipment that Russia
withdraws from Georgia is transferred to Armenia. This is of
concern to Baku, and even to Ankara. The GOT believes that
Baku is taking a fresh look at "regional balances," and may

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be opening the door slightly to NATO. He noted encouraging
statements from Azerbaijan's NATO parliamentary delegation.
Cevikoz said that Azerbaijani Deputy FM Azimov had reported
he saw no prospect for agreement on the Minsk Group Co-Chairs
basic principles for a settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K)
this year or next. Bryza noted that Azimov is overly
pessimistic on N-K, and was conveying only part of the real
story to Cevikoz. Bryza expected to get a better sense of
where the GOAJ is when he met with President Aliyev on
October 26. While President Aliyev had lost confidence in
Armenian President Kocharian, Armenian FM Oskanian and
Kocharian indicated a desire to move forward the previous
day. Armenian PM Sargsyan told DAS Bryza earlier in the week
that he did not wish to start N-K negotiations from scratch
should he be elected President in February; the only logical
framework for a settlement is what was on the table now, and
that there was no military solution to the N-K problem (as
even a victorious military assault by Azerbaijan would
generate 150,000 new refugees, and thereby continue the
conflict indefinitely). Cevikoz wondered why Aliyev makes
bellicose statements when he knows he will win election
anyway. Bryza said Aliyev had agreed to his request to cut
back such rhetoric; even Kocharian recognized this to be the
case.

ARMENIA: WINDS BLOWING IN THE WRONG DIRECTION
-------------- -


6. (C) Bryza asked Cevikoz if it was possible for Turkey to
take advantage of a possibly extended pause in the Armenian
"genocide" resolution (AGR) effort in the Congress to pursue
improved relations with Armenia. Cevikoz said that he had
done his very best to convince his political leadership to
resume the Vienna negotiations and prepare for an opening to
Armenia. That was in August. Now, the House Foreign Affairs
Committee (HFAC) vote had ruined everything. The GOT viewed
Oskanian's letter to Speaker Pelosi as serious evidence of
Yerevan's incitement, even as Cevikoz himself said he
recognized the political nuances of that letter. Referring
to Deputy FM Kirakossian, Armenia's BSEC delegate, Cevikoz
recounted that Oskanian had dismissed any possibility of
talks between Kirakossian and Cevikoz, arguing that if
Ministers cannot agree, neither can deputies. These factors
underscored for the GOT that genocide recognition is the
GOAM's highest priority. Cevikoz said that to convince his
political leadership to pursue an opening with Armenia, it
will be necessary to convince them that AGR is, once and for
all, off the table.


7. (C) The DCM explained that a definitive removal simply
would not happen in our Congressional system, but we will
seek to obtain clarity on when the measure might re-surface.
The key now is that the GOT has some room to operate and
Turkey must seize the opportunity to make progress toward
normalization with Armenia. In doing so, the GOT can prevent
the resolution from rising again in the future. Cevikoz
responded that the U.S. will have to deliver this message to
PM Erdogan and FM Babacan directly. Bryza offered his
assessment that neither FM Oskanian nor other top GOAM
officials were lobbying for AGR's passage. Their main
concerns, like those of Armenian voters, were normalized
relations and open borders with Turkey. Armenia would remain
wary of Turkey's call to convene an historical commission,
fearing it is a mere tactical ploy to prevent passage of AGR.
But FM Oskanian and PM Sargsyan had assured Bryza that if
Turkey moved toward normalizing diplomatic relations and
establishing rail and/or electricity links with Armenia,
Yerevan would reciprocate by agreeing to participate in the
historical commission. Under these conditions, there would
be a genuine Turkey-Armenia reconciliation process that would
be damaged if AGR proceeded. This was the only way to reduce
the danger of AGR's return year after year. Cevikoz replied
that, right now, the winds were blowing the other way, with
the GOT considering restrictions on the number of flights
between Yerevan and Istanbul. Cevikoz urged the U.S. to
deliver the above messages to PM Erdogan and FM Babacan
directly, especially that the GOAM was not pressing for
passage of AGR in the U.S. Congress.


8. (C) During the Ministerial, DAS Bryza conveyed to
President Gul and to FM Babacan the USG assessment that the
GOAM is not pressing for passage of AGR. Both Gul and
Babacan were dubious, citing Oskanian's letter. Bryza
countered that Oskanian was only protesting the U.S.
Secretaries of State letter, which referred to a

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reconciliation process, and arguing that no such process
existed. Asked about whether Turkey could make a move on
electricity and/or rail links, Babacan smiled and said,

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"We'll talk about it." Bryza also suggested to Kirakossian
that he reinforce these points when he greeted Gul and
Babacan. Later at lunch, MFA U/S Apakan appeared to take the
point that AGR could not be permanently blocked absent
normalized relations and opened borders between Turkey and
Armenia, and that the GOT should take advantage of an
extended pause in the AGR process. Apakan rejected
Oskanian's claim that no reconciliation process existed,
citing Turkey's expressed readiness to meet. Looking ahead,
Apakan suggested we work with Cevikoz on electricity
connections and/or the railroad when we have an extended
pause in AGR.


9. (U) DAS Bryza cleared this cable.

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