DEALING WITH TURKISH SUSPICIONS REGARDING US ARMS

S E C R E T ANKARA 002695

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2027
TAGS: PREL MARR PTER MOPS ETTC KOMC MG UP CY IZ TU
SUBJECT: DEALING WITH TURKISH SUSPICIONS REGARDING US ARMS
SHIPMENTS TO IRAQ

REF: A. STATE 108929

B. ANKARA 2247 AND PREVIOUS

C. ANKARA 1913

D. ANKARA 1976

E. ANKARA 1464

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROSS WILSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Rising PKK violence and the leakage of potentially
thousands of US-procured weapons from Iraq have heightened
Turkish government and public sensitivities about the
transfer of weapons to Iraq. Delays and confusion as we
attempted to provide the GOT with information on the origin
and destination of Iraq-bound military equipment aboard the
MV Slavyanin (later MV Oniks) raised GOT suspicions to the
point where Turkey threatened to interfere with the vessels
and requested high-level, written assurances from us. This
could easily happen again. While asserting our right to
provide military equipment to Iraq, we must be prepared to
address reasonable Turkish concerns quickly and accurately.
We must also keep the Turks apprised of controls and
safeguards being put into place to prevent the diversion of
weapons provided to Iraqi forces to the PKK or other
terrorist groups. This will also be key to gaining Turkish
cooperation in monitoring and even stopping arms shipments
involving Iran, Syria, and regional terrorist groups. End
Summary.

Concern Over Arms Leakage from Iraq
--------------


2. (C) Continued PKK attacks against Turkish military and
civilian targets in the southeast as well as urban areas, and
the routine discovery by Turkish security forces of weapons
originating from US-provided stocks in Iraq in the hands of
PKK terrorists, feed a popular perception here that the US is
either directly or indirectly arming PKK terrorists. Turkish
officials strongly believe that Kurdish authorities in
northern Iraq are complicit in supplying arms and equipment
to the PKK and believe many of these weapons come from
US-procured stocks in Iraq (ref b). Open source reporting on
accountability problems with US materiel supplied to Iraq
since 2003 (including tens of thousands of small arms) have
led to grave concerns here about our ability to control
leakage of weapons to Turkey, where they have already been
used in several high-profile attacks.


3. (C) As a result, Turkey is scrutinizing tenders for
supplying the Iraqi military as well as actual shipments of
materiel to Iraq that come through the Bosphorus or eastern
Mediterranean. D/CHOD GEN Ergin Saygun questioned us June 6
about a proposed FMS sale of large quantities of weapons,
ammunition, and explosives to Iraq (ref e),expressing
skepticism that the Iraqi government could control such
materiel. At the same time, he expressed concern about a
Danish firm working with a US company to provide bullet-proof
vests and large amounts of ammunition directly to the
"Kurdistan Security Forces."


4. (C) Turkish authorities have demonstrated a willingness to
intervene in suspect shipments. Foreign Ministry officials
told us their intervention compelled a ship carrying
Albanian-origin arms for Armenia to turn back this summer.

Late Assurances for the Slavyanin and Onyx
--------------


5. (C) In the case of the Slavyanin/Onyx, the Turks
identified the cargo of BMPs and AT-4 mounts as the Slavyanin
transited the Bosphorus. They were particularly concerned
about the AT-4 weapons systems and feared that the actual
anti-tank missiles and warheads were included. Delays in our
ability to confirm to the Turks that the cargo was US-owned
and did not contain missiles or ammunition increased GOT
unease and caused the Slavyanin to be listed as a suspect
vessel by NATO/Operation Active Endeavor for a period of
time. The Turks watched with growing concern as the ship

broke down, headed to Limassol (in problematic Cyprus) for
repairs, and ultimately transferred its cargo to the
Mongolian-flagged Oniks. Turkish authorities expressed
particular concern over the apparent lack of knowledge on the
part of senior Iraqi officials concerning this shipment. In
fact, the MFA claimed, Iraqi authorities at first denied all
knowledge of the vessel and its cargo and recommended the
Turks simply seize it.


6. (C) Confusion over the Slavyanin, as well as delays in
confirming to the Turks that Slavyanin's cargo was
subsequently transferred to the MV Oniks in Limassol, raised
Turkish suspicions to the point where both MFA U/S Apakan and
D/CHOD GEN Saygun convoked the Ambassador several times and
called late at night to express concerns on this subject.
They requested written assurances from Washington officials
not only of the origin and ownership of the cargo, but its
end use and safeguards in place to prevent its diversion to
terrorists (ref d). Our inability to provide the GOT with
straight answers to its legitimate questions in light of arms
diversion issues that have affected Turkey and US-Turkish
relations has further eroded our credibility here, especially
as we subject Turkey to extensive end use monitoring and
other statutory restrictions on use of US military equipment
that it procures.


7. (S) Turkish suspicions were not allayed by our support of
an October 3 French request that Turkey inspect cargo aboard
the MV Neptune. Turkish officials told us later that the
French information, and by association ours, lacked
credibility in that case. (Note: It may be useful to brief
the GOT on our findings from the inspection of cargo aboard
the MV Neptune in Greece, if it turns out to be illicit. End
Note). If we expect Turkish cooperation on monitoring and
stopping arms transfers between Iran, Syria, and terrorist
groups in the area, we must take Turkish concerns seriously.

8. (C) While protecting our right to arm and equip Iraqi
forces as we and the Iraqis see fit, we must be prepared to
address reasonable Turkish concerns. The Slavyanin/Onyx
experience indicates that we need to be ready to provide a
quick and convincing answer to the Turks on particular
shipments. Iraqi authorities should be prepared to do the
same to the extent they have visibility over such transfers.
Over the longer term, keeping the Turks informed about the
safeguards and controls we are establishing over the use and
transfer of lethal US-origin equipment in Iraq will help ease
their concerns. The Turks must also realize that the GOI, as
a sovereign nation, has the right to procure military
equipment from non-US sources and that we have no control
over the GOI's use or disposition of that equipment.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON