Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ANKARA257
2007-02-06 16:30:00
SECRET
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:
STRENGTHENING NONPROLIFERATION COOPERATION WITH
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S E C R E T ANKARA 000257
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T - TIM KATSAPIS AND EUR/SE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2027
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL TU
SUBJECT: STRENGTHENING NONPROLIFERATION COOPERATION WITH
TURKEY: U/S ROBERT JOSEPH'S VISIT TO ANKARA, FEBRUARY
11-13, 2007
REF: ANKARA 0183
Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 b/d.
Summary
-------
S E C R E T ANKARA 000257
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T - TIM KATSAPIS AND EUR/SE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2027
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL TU
SUBJECT: STRENGTHENING NONPROLIFERATION COOPERATION WITH
TURKEY: U/S ROBERT JOSEPH'S VISIT TO ANKARA, FEBRUARY
11-13, 2007
REF: ANKARA 0183
Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 b/d.
Summary
--------------
1. (C) Turkey has embraced the objectives of the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GI). A participant
in every major non-proliferation regime and a strong
supporter of the Proliferation Security Initiative, Turkey
has acted against proliferators and blocked shipments of
concern to Iran. The Turkish parliament's January 24
ratification of our bilateral Nonproliferation Cooperation
(aka EXBS) Agreement will enable us to provide concrete
assistance. Your visit also provides an opportunity to
engage the Turks bilaterally on ways we can work together to
confront Iran's nuclear ambitions. A critical element you
might address is the proliferation risk posed by Iran's
nuclear program and how Turkey can organize a more coherent
approach to securing its border with Iran. The Turks may
express frustration about the delay in U.S. ratification of
the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Agreement. End summary.
Leadership Against Nuclear Terrorism
--------------
2. (C) The GOT has embraced the objectives and workplan of
the Global Initiative. By hosting the second GI meeting in
Ankara, Turkey hopes to show leadership on this issue.
Toward that end, the MFA has orchestrated an unprecedented
intergovernmental review and discussion on nuclear terrorism
with six Turkish government agencies. You will want to
express appreciation to U/S Ertugrul Apakan for Turkey's
initiative to host this event and urge the GOT to contribute
more of its experience and expertise as the GI expands its
membership after the Ankara meeting.
Engaging on Iran
--------------
3. (S) As outlined reftel, we believe that it is time to
initiate in-depth consultations with Turkey on the defense
and security implications of a nuclear-armed and
missile-equipped Iran and we hope you can move this forward
in bilateral meetings during your visit. Turkey is
implementing UNSCR 1737 sanctions, but strongly favors a
sustained diplomatic effort to contain the Iranian nuclear
program. The GOT is alarmed by growing Iranian influence in
the region and does not want a nuclear-armed neighbor. At
the same time, Turkey does not wish to jeopardize trade and
energy relations or Iranian cooperation on countering PKK
terrorism emanating from Iraq. Iran is also the major
conduit for Turkey's growing trade with Central Asia. The
result is Turkish inertia.
4. (S) To counter this, we need to engage the government on
specifics. One element you might address is the regional
proliferation risk posed by an Iranian nuclear program.
Turkey is a participant in every major non-proliferation
regime, supports the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),
and has had important successes in stopping the export of
dual-use items to Iran. Finding ways to tie together these
and other efforts, including the GI and our newly ratified NP
Agreement (see para 10),would help Turkey organize an
overall approach to Iran-related proliferation concerns.
Such a discussion could also identify potential gaps and
address Turkish reluctance to monitor and interdict suspected
Iranian arms transshipments across Turkish territory to
Syria.
5. (C) You may also wish again to raise the need for laws
targeting the financial dealings of proliferators. The GOT
has not taken significant actions in support of Executive
Order 12282 on the freezing of proliferators' assets since
you raised this issue with Finance Minister Unakitan in
September 2005.
Status of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Agreement
-------------- --------------
6. (S) Turkish officials have inquired repeatedly since your
2005 visit about the status of U.S. ratification of the
agreement and have expressed frustration with the delay.
Lack of a ratified agreement will hinder our ability to work
with Turkey on development of a reliable and safe nuclear
power program. Officials here tell us that they have begun
to focus on countries that face no such limits, including
Russia, France, South Korea, and Canada, all of whom have
reportedly met with Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK)
officials recently and are said to have offered assistance
proposals. You should be prepared to provide Turkish
officials an update on the status of the ratification of this
agreement.
Taking Action Against Proliferators
--------------
7. (C) Prosecution continues against the 10 individuals
charged with smuggling and export documentation forgery for
their alleged role in the export of nuclear equipment to
Libya and the AQ Khan network in 2003. The authorities are
monitoring the two Turkish firms that were implicated. Other
important actions since your September 2005 visit include
Turkish Customs' seizure of trucks attempting to transport
Italian-made heavy aluminum alloy into Iran in December 2005
and the uncovering of an effort to re-export dual-use missile
guidance parts to Iran in April 2006. Turkish Customs has
worked closely with U.S., Italian, British and other customs
authorities to determine how these activities were conducted
and to prevent them from occurring in the future. You may
wish to praise Turkey's efforts in these cases and urge
continued cooperation.
Active in PSI
--------------
8. (SBU) Turkey has continued to be an active participant
in PSI. In May 2006, Turkey hosted one of the largest PSI
exercises, Anatolian Sun, that included the U.S., France, and
Portugal as well as observers from Kazakhstan, Iraq and the
Gulf states. Turkey sent a delegation to the PSI-supported
Proliferation Finance Workshop that began in Washington
January 29.
EXBS: New Opportunities for NP Cooperation
--------------
9. (C) Parliamentary approval in January of our bilateral NP
Cooperation Agreement reaffirms Turkey's intent to accept our
assistance to enhance its border security capabilities. The
Agreement will allow us to provide to Turkish Customs nuclear
detection kits, a mobile x-ray unit, and a full upgrade of
Department of Energy second line of defense equipment. It
will facilitate bilateral coordination in this area. You
will want to congratulate U/S Apakan and Deputy U/S Akgunay
for the MFA's success in getting the NP Agreement ratified by
Parliament, despite strident complaints from the opposition
that the Agreement's end-use monitoring provisions violate
Turkish sovereignty.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/
WILSON
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T - TIM KATSAPIS AND EUR/SE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2027
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL TU
SUBJECT: STRENGTHENING NONPROLIFERATION COOPERATION WITH
TURKEY: U/S ROBERT JOSEPH'S VISIT TO ANKARA, FEBRUARY
11-13, 2007
REF: ANKARA 0183
Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 b/d.
Summary
--------------
1. (C) Turkey has embraced the objectives of the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GI). A participant
in every major non-proliferation regime and a strong
supporter of the Proliferation Security Initiative, Turkey
has acted against proliferators and blocked shipments of
concern to Iran. The Turkish parliament's January 24
ratification of our bilateral Nonproliferation Cooperation
(aka EXBS) Agreement will enable us to provide concrete
assistance. Your visit also provides an opportunity to
engage the Turks bilaterally on ways we can work together to
confront Iran's nuclear ambitions. A critical element you
might address is the proliferation risk posed by Iran's
nuclear program and how Turkey can organize a more coherent
approach to securing its border with Iran. The Turks may
express frustration about the delay in U.S. ratification of
the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Agreement. End summary.
Leadership Against Nuclear Terrorism
--------------
2. (C) The GOT has embraced the objectives and workplan of
the Global Initiative. By hosting the second GI meeting in
Ankara, Turkey hopes to show leadership on this issue.
Toward that end, the MFA has orchestrated an unprecedented
intergovernmental review and discussion on nuclear terrorism
with six Turkish government agencies. You will want to
express appreciation to U/S Ertugrul Apakan for Turkey's
initiative to host this event and urge the GOT to contribute
more of its experience and expertise as the GI expands its
membership after the Ankara meeting.
Engaging on Iran
--------------
3. (S) As outlined reftel, we believe that it is time to
initiate in-depth consultations with Turkey on the defense
and security implications of a nuclear-armed and
missile-equipped Iran and we hope you can move this forward
in bilateral meetings during your visit. Turkey is
implementing UNSCR 1737 sanctions, but strongly favors a
sustained diplomatic effort to contain the Iranian nuclear
program. The GOT is alarmed by growing Iranian influence in
the region and does not want a nuclear-armed neighbor. At
the same time, Turkey does not wish to jeopardize trade and
energy relations or Iranian cooperation on countering PKK
terrorism emanating from Iraq. Iran is also the major
conduit for Turkey's growing trade with Central Asia. The
result is Turkish inertia.
4. (S) To counter this, we need to engage the government on
specifics. One element you might address is the regional
proliferation risk posed by an Iranian nuclear program.
Turkey is a participant in every major non-proliferation
regime, supports the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),
and has had important successes in stopping the export of
dual-use items to Iran. Finding ways to tie together these
and other efforts, including the GI and our newly ratified NP
Agreement (see para 10),would help Turkey organize an
overall approach to Iran-related proliferation concerns.
Such a discussion could also identify potential gaps and
address Turkish reluctance to monitor and interdict suspected
Iranian arms transshipments across Turkish territory to
Syria.
5. (C) You may also wish again to raise the need for laws
targeting the financial dealings of proliferators. The GOT
has not taken significant actions in support of Executive
Order 12282 on the freezing of proliferators' assets since
you raised this issue with Finance Minister Unakitan in
September 2005.
Status of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Agreement
-------------- --------------
6. (S) Turkish officials have inquired repeatedly since your
2005 visit about the status of U.S. ratification of the
agreement and have expressed frustration with the delay.
Lack of a ratified agreement will hinder our ability to work
with Turkey on development of a reliable and safe nuclear
power program. Officials here tell us that they have begun
to focus on countries that face no such limits, including
Russia, France, South Korea, and Canada, all of whom have
reportedly met with Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK)
officials recently and are said to have offered assistance
proposals. You should be prepared to provide Turkish
officials an update on the status of the ratification of this
agreement.
Taking Action Against Proliferators
--------------
7. (C) Prosecution continues against the 10 individuals
charged with smuggling and export documentation forgery for
their alleged role in the export of nuclear equipment to
Libya and the AQ Khan network in 2003. The authorities are
monitoring the two Turkish firms that were implicated. Other
important actions since your September 2005 visit include
Turkish Customs' seizure of trucks attempting to transport
Italian-made heavy aluminum alloy into Iran in December 2005
and the uncovering of an effort to re-export dual-use missile
guidance parts to Iran in April 2006. Turkish Customs has
worked closely with U.S., Italian, British and other customs
authorities to determine how these activities were conducted
and to prevent them from occurring in the future. You may
wish to praise Turkey's efforts in these cases and urge
continued cooperation.
Active in PSI
--------------
8. (SBU) Turkey has continued to be an active participant
in PSI. In May 2006, Turkey hosted one of the largest PSI
exercises, Anatolian Sun, that included the U.S., France, and
Portugal as well as observers from Kazakhstan, Iraq and the
Gulf states. Turkey sent a delegation to the PSI-supported
Proliferation Finance Workshop that began in Washington
January 29.
EXBS: New Opportunities for NP Cooperation
--------------
9. (C) Parliamentary approval in January of our bilateral NP
Cooperation Agreement reaffirms Turkey's intent to accept our
assistance to enhance its border security capabilities. The
Agreement will allow us to provide to Turkish Customs nuclear
detection kits, a mobile x-ray unit, and a full upgrade of
Department of Energy second line of defense equipment. It
will facilitate bilateral coordination in this area. You
will want to congratulate U/S Apakan and Deputy U/S Akgunay
for the MFA's success in getting the NP Agreement ratified by
Parliament, despite strident complaints from the opposition
that the Agreement's end-use monitoring provisions violate
Turkish sovereignty.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/
WILSON