Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ANKARA252
2007-02-06 15:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

FORMER TURKISH PRESIDENT DEMIREL ON ARMENIA

Tags:  PREL TU UZ AM IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
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P 061527Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0861
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RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000252 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017
TAGS: PREL TU UZ AM IZ
SUBJECT: FORMER TURKISH PRESIDENT DEMIREL ON ARMENIA
RESOLUTION

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000252

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017
TAGS: PREL TU UZ AM IZ
SUBJECT: FORMER TURKISH PRESIDENT DEMIREL ON ARMENIA
RESOLUTION

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Former Turkish President Demirel is worried
about the "extremely negative" impact of an Armenian genocide
resolution on the Turkish public and on US-Turkish relations.
In a private lunch with Ambassador and Demirel advisor
Mehmet Ali Bayar on February 5, the former president
predicted wide-scale, probably violent protests against the
United States and a boost to extreme nationalist/chauvinism
that will be destructive of our relationship and of
democratic development in Turkey. He urged a full-court
Administration effort to defeat/prevent passage of a
resolution to protect US interests here and in the region,
and he noted that such an effort should lessen the negative
impact should a resolution pass. Demirel also said that a
resolution will compromise Turkey's relations with Israel and
will certainly set back prospects for normalization of
relations with Armenia for years, if not decades. He remarks
on Armenia resolution issue in the context of an appeal for
strong US leadership in the region and success in Iraq,
without which that country will become "hell." End Summary


2. (C) Demirel said that passage of an Armenia resolution
will have an extremely negative impact on US-Turkish
relations. It will seriously undermine Turkey's ability to
work with the US on Iraq, Iran, the Middle East, the Caucasus
and energy issues, and Afghanistan. At a time of great risk
in the Middle East and strain on the US, our one democratic
ally in the region will be alienated, and the costs will be
immense. Relations with Israel would be affected. Whatever
we have planned regarding Iran will be far more complicated
without Turkey. The government may want to modulate the
response to passage, but as a practical matter will not be
able to -- especially in light of presidential and
parliamentary elections this year.


3. (C) Iraq was a particular concern for Demirel. Tensions
are already very high with Turkey over the PKK, Kirkuk and
the general perception that the war has weakened Iraq and
fostered instability on Turkey's border. Demirel said he
supports the President's new Iraq strategy and sees no real

alternative, but also believes sectarian violence is getting
out of control. US failure there would be "hell," and he
worried that a dramatically worsened US-Turkish relationship
would further undermine prospects in Iraq for success. The
right course, Demirel argued, is for the US to exercise the
leadership expected of it and protect its interests and
allies in the region. While acknowledging the negatives
associated with the March 2003 parliamentary vote against a
US invasion of Iraq from Turkey, Demirel said that the US
gets strong cooperation from Turkey and will certainly need
it as Iraq remains a giant problem and Iran looms as a bigger
and bigger headache in the years to come. The US should not
put that help at risk.


4. (C) Harkening back to what he said were his own
discussions in the early 1990s with then-Armenian president
Ter-Petrossian, Demirel wondered what the Armenia resolution
advocates want to achieve. If it is prosperity for Armenia
based on an integrated region and open borders, or
reconciliation among Turks and Armenians here and elsewhere,
passage of a resolution is one sure way to prevent it.
Demirel also worried about the fate of Turkish-Armenians in
this country, who could become the target of reprisal attacks
from the nationalist fringe that killed Dink. Such violence
will set back tolerance, liberalization and democracy in
Turkey for years, to the detriment of US interests here and
in the region.


5. (C) Violent protests against the US and US interests will
likely follow passage of an Armenia resolution, Demirel
predicted. The sense of "outrage and betrayal" will be
greater and far different from when such countries as France
or Germany adopted resolutions on the issue. Public anger
will target official USG establishments as well as US
businesses; a 2004 McDonalds bombing in Trabzon carried out
by an associate of the murderer of Hrant Dink is an example.
Though the government will try to prevent such violence, it
will be unable to do so and will find its own responses
driven by public anger, especially in light of the upcoming
elections here. He and Bayar predicted that access to
Incirlik Air Base might be reduced or eliminated, harming our
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cooperation across the
board would be affected, and members of Congress should
understand the dire consequences they would be voting for if
they pass this resolution.


6. (C) Demirel urged a vigorous Administration effort against
the resolution. He said that "not too many" officials should
be speaking to Turkey for the Administration on the matter;
the message should be targeted and conveyed at a high level.

ANKARA 00000252 002 OF 002


A dual message to Congress by the US Secretaries of State and
Defense in 2000 had a positive impact in Turkey in 2000 and
would do so again. He urged a Presidential statement on the
matter as soon as possible. When the Ambassador noted that
legislative advisors are likely to want to save presidential
intervention for the optimal moment, probably relatively late
in the process, Demirel demurred. If we think there is a
high likelihood the resolution will pass anyway, then it is
better to use presidential ammunition early -- for its
effects on Turkish public opinion. In the event of passage,
a visible and high-level Administration campaign against the
resolution should blunt public anger and give Turkey's US
friends ammunition to use in counseling against
over-reaction.


7. (C) Bayar, who was serving as a counselor at Turkey's
Washington embassy during the last Armenia resolution debate
in 2000, said that an appeal against the resolution at that
time signed by a large number of former Secretaries of State
and Defense and retired military officers also had impact.
Though not in itself decisive, it helped create the context
in which President Clinton's appeal, made to Speaker Hastert,
to shelve the resolution after the USS Cole bombing was
positively received among Congressional leaders and members.
He agreed that even if Administration efforts fail, having
tried hard should lessen somewhat the negative impact that
passage will bring.


8. (C) Regarding steps that Turkey could take toward
normalizing relations with Armenia, Demirel was dismissive.
The government will not be able to do anything serious now
given the rise of nationalism/chauvinism in Turkey and the
2007 elections here. Whereas Ter-Petrossian seemed willing
to explore normalization with Turkey as a first priority,
President Kocharian had been blunt with Demirel that Turkey
must first recognize genocide -- without which nothing would
be possible. Bayar commented that Turkey's 2005 initiative
to establish a government-to-government commission was a good
opening not utilized by Armenia. Ambassador expressed the
view that neither side had really negotiated on this
effectively, but that some progress had been made in the days
following Dink's funeral. He added that if the government of
Armenia thought that a real normalization, opening of the
border, etc., were doable in the near term, it might be more
flexible, but that Turkey had not tested this proposition.


9. (C) Comment: Demirel and Bayar have baggage from their
work in the early 1990s with post-independence Armenia and in
the 2000 resolution derby that ended surprisingly
successfully from Turkey's point of view. As the doyen of
the Turkish political establishment, Demirel has for decades
been a leader of denial that anything whatsoever occurred at
the end of World War I. But he is also a voice here for
tolerance, democracy and the US-Turkey relationship. Both
Demirel and Bayar are strong and longtime friends and
defenders of the US-Turkey relationship, and they are deeply
concerned about the negative impact of a resolution on that
relationship and on Turkey itself. End Comment.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON