Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ANKARA2469
2007-10-04 12:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY/IRAQ: DEFENSE AND STATE INSPECTORS GENERAL

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER MOPS KCRM IZ AF TU 
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RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
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RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002469 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DOD FOR IG KICKLIGHTER, STATE/OIG FOR IG KRONGARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER MOPS KCRM IZ AF TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY/IRAQ: DEFENSE AND STATE INSPECTORS GENERAL
BRIEF TURKISH OFFICIALS ON EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN CONTROLS
OVER U.S. WEAPONS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

REF: A. ANKARA 1866

B. ANKARA 2247

C. ANKARA 2437

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002469

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DOD FOR IG KICKLIGHTER, STATE/OIG FOR IG KRONGARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER MOPS KCRM IZ AF TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY/IRAQ: DEFENSE AND STATE INSPECTORS GENERAL
BRIEF TURKISH OFFICIALS ON EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN CONTROLS
OVER U.S. WEAPONS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

REF: A. ANKARA 1866

B. ANKARA 2247

C. ANKARA 2437

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: During their September 28 visit to Ankara,
DOD IG Kicklighter and DOS IG Krongard outlined for senior
Turkish officials their mission to establish more effective
controls and accountability for U.S. arms being provided to
the security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan. They
underscored that their direct, personal involvement in this
process reflects the seriousness with which the USG takes
Turkish concerns about U.S. weapons ending up in the hands of
PKK terrorists and criminal elements. While expressing
appreciation for their visit, Turkish officials reiterated
complaints that the U.S. has been slow to address the issue,
and stressed U.S. weapons continue to be found on PKK
operatives. They urged the Inspectors General to take
concrete action to end this phenomenon. Kicklighter offered
to provide periodic updates on USG investigations on weapons
that ended up in Turkey, and to look into the allegation of
refurbished German arms shipped to Iraq by a Polish firm that
had ended up in the hands of the PKK. End Summary.


2. (C) In response to ongoing GOT complaints about
U.S.-purchased weapons ending up in the hands of terrorist
and criminal elements (refs a and b),U.S. Department of
Defense Inspector General LTG (ret) Claude Kicklighter and
DOS Inspector General Howard Krongard met on September 28
with senior Turkish MFA, General Staff, and national police
officials to explain their effort to establish more effective
controls over the weapons that the USG is providing to the
security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan. The Inspectors
General noted that their joint mission indicated the
seriousness with which the U.S. is taking the issue, and

stressed that their mandate came directly from the
Secretaries of State and Defense, as well as the Chairman of

SIPDIS
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and has the support of Generals
Petraeus and Dubik in Iraq. Inspector General Kicklighter
stressed that his goal is not just to write a report. He
said he plans to make sure that the procedures recommended
following his investigations are implemented. Those who
break the law will continue to be investigated.


3. (C) Turkish General Staff Intelligence Chief (J2)
Lieutenant General Ismail Hakki Pekin stressed to the
Inspectors General that the use of US-purchased weapons by
terrorists and criminals has taken on a political dimension.
&It is impossible to explain to our people why Turkish
soldiers are being killed by terrorists using the weapons of
our allies.8 While welcoming the inspectors general,s
efforts, LTG Pekin urged quick action to place firm controls
on US weapons being distributed to the government of Iraq.


4. (C) In a separate meeting, Turkish National Police Chief
of Smuggling and Organized Crime Department Ahmet Pek
complained of the slow response by the USG to Turkish
concerns. &This is not a new issue,8 Pek stressed,
&We,ve been telling you about this problem since 2003.
Yet, to this day, we are continuing to find US weapons in the
hands of terrorists and criminals.8 Pek provided the
inspectors general numerous photographs of US-purchased
weapons seized during recent police operations. Criticizing
USG failures to respond to information that the TNP had


provided on specific cases, Pek asked rhetorically whether
there are communication problems within the USG in
coordinating these investigations. Kicklighter stated that
the Defense Criminal Investigation Service
(DCIS) in his office is leading investigations into these
cases, and pledged to resolve any communication barriers that
may exist among various USG agencies. He offered to look
into the issue and provide the TNP with an update, but
reminded Pek that U.S. information that can be shared about
ongoing investigations is often severely limited. Pek also
made reference to the publicity surrounding Blackwater and,
particularly, allegations that some Blackwater employees had
engaged in weapons smuggling. He wanted to know if that
investigation was continuing and whether Blackwater weapons
could be finding their way to PKK. Mr. Krongard indicated
that his office was involved in that investigation and he was
alert to that possibility.


5. (C) Pek drew attention to recent cases involving German
guns refurbished by a Polish firm called &Bomar.8
According to TNP information, thousands of weapons of this
type were shipped to Iraq by Poland. A number of these
weapons have been found recently during Turkish police
operations, and Pek asked the delegation what is being done
to address the shipment of weapons from third countries to
Iraq. While offering to obtain information related to these
weapons, Kicklighter explained that part of USG goals is to
help ensure that Iraqi security forces, both military and
police, apply good controls over the weapons in their
inventory, irrespective of their origin. Kicklighter stated
that the Iraqis are putting into place a system of controls,
are eager to learn, and understand the importance of these
procedures.


6. (C) During the meeting with the TNP, a Turkish National
Intelligence Organization (TNIO) representative highlighted
Turkish intelligence information that the PKK is stockpiling
C3 and C4 explosives in a secret depot in the Kandil
Mountains of Northern Iraq. Although available intelligence
suggests that the PKK is not currently planning any
operations with these explosives, the TNIO rep said the
discovery of a van loaded with explosives in downtown Ankara
last month underscored the danger of a potential PKK
operation using plastic explosives. The TNIO rep was not
able to respond to Kicklighter,s request for the coordinates
of the depot.


7. (C) MFA Undersecretary Ertugrul Apakan, during a separate
meeting with the Inspectors General, cited Turkey,s
time-tested friendship and strategic partnership with the US
that permitted frank communication on this sensitive issue.
He expressed deep appreciation for the visit, and welcomed
senior level USG engagement.


8. (C) Apakan stated that 1,300 US-purchased weapons had been
confiscated by authorities in Turkey and noted that MFA had
provided several lists of serial numbers of these weapons to
the USG. Not all of the weapons had been recovered from the
PKK; some had been associated with criminals and organized
crime groups. Highlighting the serious public perception
dimension of the problem, he noted that several high-profile
murders had been committed with US-purchased weapons,
including the assassination of a priest in Trabzon and the
killing of several judges.



9. (C) Kicklighter thanked Apakan for the important
information on recovered arms provided by Turkey. He assured
Apakan that Turkish concerns were being taken extremely
seriously and were shared by US forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The scope of the current assessment was wide
and because the team was in the process of reviewing
voluminous records from national arms depots to local
military units and police stations, it would take time. He
pledged to work together with Turkish authorities and to
share information. There was both an opportunity and a
willingness to make improvements in weapons accountability in
Iraq, Kicklighter emphasized.


10. (C) Apakan briefed the Inspectors General and Ambassador
on the agreement concluded September 28 between the Turkish
and Iraqi ministers
of interior regarding counterterrorism (ref c),and expressed
hope that this agreement will pave the way for better
Turkish-Iraqi bilateral cooperation in countering
the PKK.

Comment:


11. (C) The visit of the Inspectors General sent an
important signal to the GOT that their concern over the
leakage of US weapons into the hands of the PKK and other
criminal elements is being taken seriously, and was a
significant help. It will be important to follow-up the
visit by providing the GOT with periodic updates and, to the
extent possible, details and specifics with regard to ongoing
investigations and actions taken to establish more effective
accountability over U.S.- purchased arms.

This cable has been cleared by Inspectors General Kicklighter
and Krongard.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON