TURKEY: WILL CIVIL-MILITARY TENSIONS PLAY OUT IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002365

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2022
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: WILL CIVIL-MILITARY TENSIONS PLAY OUT IN
FOREIGN POLICY?

REF: A. ANKARA 0563

B. ANKARA 1244

C. ANKARA 1349

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Since Abdullah Gul's elevation to the presidency on
August 28, Turks have been parsing every interaction between
him and the military to discern the future of
military-government relations. Despite a peaceful, uneasy
coexistence, military leaders are clearly alarmed by the
AKP's overwhelming victory in July 22 elections and Gul's
move to Cankaya. The Turkish General Staff (TGS) will
scrutinize the AKP government's agenda for any sign of
attempts to erode secularism or to reduce the role of the
military. Through public statements and quiet pressure via
allies in the secular opposition, media, and other
institutions, the generals have, and may well continue to:

-- discourage the government from engaging the Iraqi Kurdish
leadership on PKK terror,
-- resist initiatives on Cyprus important to Turkey's EU
accession chances,
-- oppose any compromise on the NATO-EU deadlock, where
unfulfilled Turkish demands for a seat at the ESDP table risk
NATO-EU cooperation in Afghanistan and Kosovo.
-- oppose initiatives aimed at reconciliation with Armenia.

What is not so clear is the extent to which PM Erdogan's
government is prepared to buck TGS pressure to pursue its
goals. End Summary

Iraq -- No Talking to the Kurds
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2. (C) Earlier this year, Defense Chief GEN Yasar Buyukanit
and other officers effectively turned off low-key talks
between GOT officials and Iraqi Kurdish leaders, including
Nechirvan Barzani, by publicly asserting that Kurdish leaders
directly supported PKK terrorism (ref a). Buyukanit singled
out KRG President Masoud Barzani as a possible Turkish
target. A well-placed MFA contact also told us that the
military has torpedoed any discussion of a UN role in the
resolution of the Kirkuk issue (ref b). All of this has made
it historically difficult and risky for the GOT to approach
KRG officials at any level.

Cyprus -- Perpetual Apple of Discord
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3. (C) In October 2006, Buyukanit questioned a compromise
formula on the opening of Turkish and Greek Cypriot ports
that Erdogan proposed during EU consultations on the one-year
anniversary of the start of Turkey's EU accession process.
An embarrassed government was forced to withdraw the
proposal. The military also opposed "TRNC President" Talat's
decision to dismantle the Lokmaci bridge and subsequent
efforts to open the Ledra Street crossing. Relations between
the TGS and Talat's government continue to be poor. Military
leaders have made no secret of their disdain for the Annan
Plan and have given no sign of relaxing their tough line on
Cyprus.

Cyprus and NATO -- Turkey Falling on Its Sword
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4. (C) Cyprus continues to bedevil Ankara's policy on NATO-EU
relations. Alone among the Allies, Turkey has insisted on
defining civilian ESDP missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo as
Berlin-Plus operations, which would effectively give it veto
power over how these operations are planned and executed.
Turkey has taken this action to force the EU to include
Turkey in ESDP planning, override Cypriot objections to
Turkish participation in the European Defense Agency, and
prevent Cyprus from participating in these missions with
Turkey. The military is clearly driving this troubling
attempt to hold hostage EU missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan
over Cyprus. In this instance, the Cyprus-indoctrinated

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Foreign Ministry seems to be a willing handmaiden; even if
the diplomats felt otherwise, they would have no room to
maneuver.

EU Relations -- Why Bother
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5. (C) Military leaders here are among the more vocal critics
of the EU accession process, seen by an increasing number of
Turks as less a negotiation than the humiliating initiation
rite of a club which does not really want them. Turkish
generals believe the AKP government has made too many
concessions to the EU on Cyprus, for little in return. They
see the Europeans as having failed to reciprocate with direct
trade, commercial flights to the north, or other measures to
ease northern Cypriot isolation. Buyukanit and others have
excoriated EU and NATO allies for their tolerance of pro-PKK
television, radio, newspapers, front organizations and
fundraising in their countries. They have noted that PKK
activists arrested in Belgium, Germany and elsewhere have
often been released. The TGS is convinced that the Europeans
are not doing nearly enough to combat PKK terrorism despite
pledges to do so, thereby revealing not-so-secret sympathies
for PKK terrorists and a parallel desire to weaken and divide
Turkey.


6. (C) European and Canadian attitudes on Armenian genocide
allegations also rankle the uniforms. As the government
urged calm after the French Assembly's passage of legislation
criminalizing denial of an Armenian genocide last autumn, TGS
Land Forces commander GEN Basbug stepped forward to announce
the suspension of bilateral military relations with France
and dis-invited French officials to Turkey's biennial defense
industry fair. Some European allies and Canada have seen
overflight clearances for operations in Afghanistan suddenly
revoked and other military cooperation stalled over the
Armenian genocide issue. Recently, French diplomats and
military attaches were not invited to August 30 Victory Day
celebrations.

Resisting an Opening to Armenia
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7. (C) Quiet pressure from the military forced the government
to back away from a plan to temporarily open the border to
permit Armenian travel to Van for the March opening of a
restored Akdamar Armenian Orthodox church there. The TGS has
also resisted government initiatives to normalize relations
with Armenia.

Comment
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8. (C) Civil-military tensions may just remain a kind of
"cold war." The influence of the General Staff is not
consistent across the geopolitical spectrum; less of a
military hand is seen in Turkey's Caucasus and Balkans
foreign policy. In several areas of importance to us,
including northern Iraq and Armenia, military assertiveness
can harden government positions, foreclose options, and
reduce flexibility. We will seek ways to use our bilateral
military contacts to encourage military moderation in this
regard. End Comment

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON