VISIT OF U/S BURNS TO TURKEY SEPTEMBER 18-20

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002336

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR P AND EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ECON ENRG MARR KNNP TU
SUBJECT: VISIT OF U/S BURNS TO TURKEY SEPTEMBER 18-20


Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Everything has changed since your January visit. A
new electoral mandate for PM Erdogan; a new, activist
President Gul; a victory for democracy; positive statements
on US-Turkey relations and the imperative to push forward on
EU accession-related reforms -- real opportunity for progress
on a variety of issues that matter to us. And you can help.
We still face challenges. Our approval rating has sunk to
7%. Turkey shares our goal of a stable, unitary, democratic
Iraq, but is still frustrated about the PKK. A Congressional
Armenian genocide resolution looms again. Iran's nuclear
ambitions remain of concern, but energy needs are causing
Ankara to warm up to Tehran. But the silver lining is a
re-invigorated GOT with a fresh mandate is well-positioned to
take bold steps. We have to make our relationship with it
work. Your visit and those by PM Erdogan and FM Babacan to
the UNGA is are key.

How We Can Use Your Visit
--------------


2. (C) Turkey's elections this year solidified democracy
here. Enormous challenges and tensions remain. Your visit
is an opportunity early on to underscore our continued
support for Turkey's democratic institutions. Post-election,
Erdogan made clear his intention to continue to work hard on
US-Turkey relations. Scanning the list of complex issues in
Turkey's neighborhood -- Iraq, Iran, Syria and the Middle
East, terrorism, Afghanistan, the Caucasus, and regional
energy/European energy security -- it is clear we will need
Turkey's involvement and support. Whatever our problems and
disagreements, on the big issues, our countries share the
same interests and goals.


3. (C) In January, you had the first comprehensive review of
our relations under the Shared Vision framework. We have
held bilateral policy planning talks, consultations on
Central Asia and the Caucasus, and our first-ever exchange
about China; continued our Pol-Mil talks through the High
Level Defense Group; held a successful meeting of the
bilateral Economic Partnership Commission and developed an
action plan to guide joint work in this area; and maintained
close coordination on Iraq policy, including through
consultations involving Amb. Satterfield. Continuing to
listen, consult, and support Ankara when possible, including
on combating the PKK, will provide essential reassurance that
we take Turkey seriously. Your visit, together with
high-level meetings on the margins of UNGA, are important
early opportunities to accomplish this.

Key Issues
--------------


4. (C) Iraq: Iraq continues to be the biggest thing going.
Turks worry that Iraq may splinter along sectarian and ethnic
lines, leaving it open to Iranian domination. Turkey --
particularly then-FM Gul -- has been instrumental in getting
the Iraq Neighbors Process up and running. The GOT, despite
doubts about PM Maliki, has ratcheted up support for him and
encouraged continued Sunni participation in his coalition.
President Gul is likely to reach out to Iraqi President
Talabani in the coming weeks -- an important first step in
establishing direct senior-level contact between the GOT and
Iraqi Kurds. The Turks will be keen to hear how USG strategy
may evolve in the wake of Amb. Crocker and Gen. Petraeus'
congressional testimony. They will also want to work closely
with us to ensure that the next ministerial meeting of the
Expanded Neighbors, scheduled for October 31-November 1 in
Istanbul, is a success and achieves concrete results,
especially on political reconciliation.


5. (C) PKK: The US has been Turkey's closest ally in the
fight against the PKK, but Turks see only a lack of concrete,
visible action against the PKK in northern Iraq. While
PKK-related violence has been lower this year than last,
still nearly 90 Turkish security forces have been killed. A
major explosion in the heart of Ankara in May killed nine
civilians and wounded 100, and another was averted on
September 11 when police defused a massive car bomb that the
national police chief told us is almost certainly the work of
the PKK.


6. (C) Kurds: Erdogan's new mandate is also an opportunity
to work on underlying issues that have produced support for
the PKK. We believe this is high on his list of priorities,
but it will take political courage and creativity. Two key
points: President Gul's first trip is to five cities in the
southeast, where he has been touting diversity; and Erdogan
just appointed the savvy governor of Diyarbakir to run his
Prime Ministry. You should reiterate our continued
commitment to helping combat the PKK; note that we continue
to urge the Iraqis, including KRG President Massoud Barzani,
to end the PKK presence in northern Iraq; and ask what
measures the Turks plan to take at home to achieve an overall
solution to the Kurdish problem. Direct engagement between
the GOT and the KRG must also happen in the near-term.


7. (C) Iran: Iran is both a neighbor and a rival. On the one
hand, GOT officials claim they regularly convey tough
messages to the Iranians on Tehran's nuclear program. On the
other, Turkey continues to be receptive to Iranian advances,
hopeful that greater mutual dependence will eventually
moderate Tehran's behavior. Turkey has warmed to a dialogue
on gas development for three reasons: huge increases in
domestic energy demand on the horizon; EU desire for
alternate gas supplies; and Turkey,s strategic transit
location. Iranian military action against PKK-affiliated
targets in northern Iraq further bolsters relations. You
should tell the Turks what we see as next steps in
international efforts to bring Iran into compliance with UNSC
resolutions. You should also urge that Turkey remain firm in
pressing the Iranians to do the same and not send mixed
messages.


8. (C) Middle East: Turks have a vested interest in
developments throughout the region and believe they should
have a role to play. Turkey maintains its contingent of 900
troops in UNIFIL, PM Olmert visited Ankara in February and
the Israelis reached out to the Turks in an attempt to
establish dialogue with the Syrians earlier in the year. The
Turkish offer to host a Middle East peace conference stands,
and they will want to hear both how the USG envisages
bringing the President's plan to fruition, as well as what,
if any, role they may be able to play. The GOT continues to
increase its engagement with Syria in the belief that Assad
is seeking an alternative to dependence on Iran. You should
urge the Turks to continue to press Assad to cease Syrian
support for insurgents transiting into Iraq, and to increase
efforts to bolster President Abbas and the Palestinian
Authority.


9. (C) Armenian genocide resolution: The possible Armenian
genocide resolution (AGR) hangs like a sword of Damocles over
our bilateral relations. We cannot be certain what
retaliatory steps might be taken should it pass, but public
opinion will demand action, with possible consequences for
support to our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. You
should reassure Turkish officials of the Administration's
continued opposition to the resolution, but urge realism and
action. You should press the Turks to take an early bold
step toward Armenia, but also urge that in the event of
passage, any response the Turks take not hinder our ability
to cooperate on key, common interests.


10. (C) Energy: We have continued to press Turkey to
support shipping natural gas from the Caspian to Europe
across Turkey as the antidote to Iran, a way to avoid
over-dependence on Russia, and to support the smaller, new
Caspian states. Azeri gas is available in the short-term.
Shipping it to Greece and then Italy via pipelines now
nearing completion would help to convince other supplier
countries, including Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, that
similar deals could be made. While the Turks have moved to
lessen their own dependence on Russian gas by possibly
engaging Iran to bring both Iranian and Turkmeni gas to
Turkey, they remain open to a trans-Caspian deal -- but want
to see concrete action. You should urge GOT officials to
complete a gas transit agreement with the Azeris, clearing
the way for a Turkey-Greece-Italy pipeline and follow-up on
PM Erdogan's stated readiness to convene a
Turkey-Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan summit on
trans-Caspian energy transit.


11. (C) Nuclear Energy Agreement: Your Turkish interlocutors
may inquire about the status of our efforts to ratify the
bilateral Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (123) Agreement,
which both sides signed in 2000 and which Turkey ratified in

2005. Turkish officials cite lack of U.S. ratification of
the PUNE as reasons for delays on several bilateral nuclear
cooperation projects, including DOE's Sister Labs Program,
LEU-HEU fuel conversion, and Turkey's final implementation of
our bilateral Nonproliferation Cooperation (EXBS) Agreement.
We understand the 123 Agreement package is nearing completion
for submission to Congress.


12. (C) Cyprus: The Turks remain frustrated with the lack of
progress on easing the northern Cypriots' economic isolation.
They are also loathe to provide ROC President Papadopoulos a
political boost by pressing ahead with a July 8 process which
they believe Nicosia wants to use to push off comprehensive
settlement talks indefinitely. The AKP will not expend
political capital on Cyprus, at least until the ROC
presidential election is completed early next year. However,
they listened to our entreaties not to allow Papadopoulos to
claim the moral high ground, and this may have contributed to
Talat's agreement to meet Papadopoulos on September 5. You
should urge GOT officials to continue to keep pressure on the
Greek Cypriots by giving Talat political space to engage and
consider additional steps, such as opening a port to Greek
Cypriot shipping that would give moral stature to the case
for de-isolating the north. Further bold GOT steps on
EU-related reforms -- a priority for both Erdogan and Gul --
can help further. You may want to sound out officials on
prospects for resuming talks on a "package" deal that would
allow EU acquis chapters to be unfrozen.


13. (C) ESDP: The Turks remain frustrated over EU
unwillingness to offer Turkey decision-shaping consultation
in ESDP missions, wrap up administrative arrangements between
Turkey and the European Defense Agency, and conclude a
Security Agreement with Turkey. Until the EU addresses
Turkey's demands, Ankara will likely continue to impede NATO
support of those ESDP missions. The GOT is turning to the
U.S. for help in pressuring the EU to act on Turkish demands.
Prime Minister Erdogan,s July 13 letter to POTUS
underscores the high-level attention this issue continues to
receive here. We should express our sympathy for Turkey's
desires vis-a-vis the EU while cautioning Ankara against
jeopardizing EU and NATO efforts in Afghanistan and Kosovo.


14. (C) Afghanistan: Turkey has twice successfully led ISAF
and currently commands ISAF-Central in Kabul. The Turks lead
one PRT, in Wardak Province, and have pledged $100 million in
assistance over five years. You should thank GOT officials
for Turkey's continued strong commitment to Afghanistan's
rehabilitation and reconstruction, but press for a reduction
to the caveats on the use of its forces there and more help
to ISAF, especially helicopters.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON