TURKEY: GUL PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY OPENS A NEW ERA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002145

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: GUL PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY OPENS A NEW ERA

REF: A. ANKARA 2118


B. ANKARA 2133

Classified By: Charge Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary. Turkey's long tradition of tumultuous
politics has entered a new phase with FM Gul's renomination
for president. The once all-powerful military, who tried to
derail Gul's earlier bid with dire warnings of Islamic
fundamentalism, have been knocked down a notch, and the
"bedrock" party of the secular elite, the Kemalist Republican
People's Party (CHP),is in total disarray. Parliament's two
new players, the right-wing Nationalist Action Party (MHP)
and the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP),have made
self-interested procedural concessions that will virtually
ensure Gul's election. While the ruling Justice and
Development Party's (AKP) landslide has positioned it for a
rare second term of single-party rule, debate continues over
whether a vote for AKP was also a vote for "President" Gul.
With not so distant memories of violent political crisis and
economic collapse still raw for many, Gul's challenge as
president will be to prove his independence from political
pressures and his ability to represent all Turks as the
country moves toward greater democracy, economic prosperity
and religious tolerance. End Summary.

Gul for President: Then and Now
--------------

2. (C) Last April, Gul's candidacy -- a partial compromise
from PM Erdogan's widely expected (or dreaded) bid -- was the
focal point of actions by the opposition, military,
Constitutional Court, and NGOs to agitate the public, prevent
the presidential election, and force early general elections.
Instead of the expected embarrassing defeat for the ruling
Justice and Development Party (AKP),the opposition's
strategy backfired with a resounding AKP win in the July 22
elections. Of the many explanations for the result,
including economic stability and a reaction against military
interference in politics, voters clearly showed they are not
afraid of AKP's agenda or intentions. AKP supporters
maintain that the party's defiant refusal to appease the
military was an important reason for AKP's success at the
polls. Gul's renewed candidacy has done little to ease
tensions, but most of our contacts -- even Gul opponents --
now expect Gul will become president.


3. (C) Some of the old tactics are brewing. Opposition CHP
intends to boycott the presidential vote again. Legal
complications may also emerge; former Speaker Husamettin
Cindoruk (CHP) argues that CHP can halt the election process
by going to the Constitutional Court. Former Chief
Prosecutor Sabih Kanadoglu dismisses this possibility, but
stated that if Gul becomes president, he will likely be
indicted for allegedly defrauding the Treasury during his
time as a Welfare (Refah) Party official in 1998. Several
colleagues, including former party chairman Necmettin
Erbakan, were convicted of criminal charges in April, but Gul
was protected by his parliamentary immunity (which he would
not have as president). In a related civil suit, the court
ruled that Gul was not responsible for Treasury losses.


4. (C) Important changes since April will make such tactics
less effective, if not obsolete, this time. The July
election obviates the argument that an end-of-term parliament
should not elect the president. The election, with its
higher rate of voter participation (over 80 percent) and more
parties entering parliament, also moots the earlier claim
that an unrepresentative parliament would be choosing the
president. While pundits spilled a tremendous amount of ink
earlier this year speculating that Erdogan would seek the
presidency, on July 22, the public supported AKP knowing Gul
was a presidential hopeful. All of these factors increase
AKP's -- and Gul's -- claim to legitimacy. CHP, meanwhile,
can no longer claim to represent all AKP opponents:
nationalist MHP and center-left Democratic Left Party (DSP)
oppose Gul but will not obstruct the democratic process.
Even if Gul opponents pursue an obstructionist policy,
perhaps through the judiciary, the failure to elect a
president would lead to new elections at a time when
confidence in AKP is demonstrably high.


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A New Era in the Presidency
--------------

5. (C) As foreign minister, Gul forged warm relations with
leaders around the world; his presidency is likely to be a
cosmopolitan and statesmanlike departure from that of Ahmet
Necdet Sezer, who rarely left the presidential palace, let
alone the country. Gul's broader view will provide
opportunities for more effective advancement of Turkey's
foreign policy agenda, particularly with regard to the EU and
regional leadership. In turn, as president, his
international attention may circumscribe anti-democratic
shenanigans by keeping the spotlight on Turkey.


6. (C) Where President Sezer has refused to sign off on
thousands of AKP appointments, resulting in a bureaucracy
peppered with "acting directors," a Gul presidency would
loosen the stranglehold. Sezer's blanket approach almost
certainly barred qualified candidates, as well as those
perceived to be unqualified, "ideological" appointments.
Gul's reputation for presidential impartiality will be at
stake, with each approval or rejection potentially assessed
as a sign of his fealty to or independence from Erdogan.
Educational appointments in particular will be carefully
scrutinized for religious bias. Hurriyet columnist Sukru
Kucuksahin also notes that Gul, who criticized President
Sezer for ignoring academics, should heed academics in
appointing university rectors.


7. (C) As Commander in Chief, Gul plans to be much more
forward-leaning than his predecessor, undoubtedly in an
effort to win the respect of a hostile military institution.
Nuray Basaran of Star TV said Gul had told her that one of
his first efforts as Commander in Chief will be to meet with
the troops in Sirnak, one of the hardest hit areas in the
battle against the terrorist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).
He and his wife will also plan to meet with the mothers of
the martyrs (fallen soldiers). Gul will walk a tricky line
on issues like the High Military's Council's expulsion of
officers for religious activity, to which he had objected as
Deputy Prime Minister.


8. (C) In his August 14 nomination speech, Gul set a high bar
with many references to remaining faithful to the core
attributes of the republic and the constitution. His
emphasis on this document signals his sensitivity to some
institutions' reservations. Given his campaign promises to
rewrite the constitution, however, he will have a delicate
balancing act to keep both pledges.

Mrs. Gul's Abbreviated Social Calendar
--------------

9. (C) Many secularist or establishment Turks complain that
"a headscarf in the presidential palace" will convey a
radical Islamic impression and that it would violate the
secular sanctity of Ataturk's house. They worry that a
covered First Lady would encourage young covered women and
impose moral pressure on all Turkish women. Although some
contacts describe her as "rigid," Hayrunisa Gul has shown
herself to be flexible when necessary; she withdrew her
application to the European Court of Human Rights on the
university headscarf ban when her husband became Foreign
Minister (many Turks have not forgiven her for filing of the
case, which they cite as evidence she cannot truly represent
the Republic as First Lady). At an August 15 meeting with
Chambers of Commerce (TOBB),Gul reportedly said that his
wife had offered to "disappear" for a while to ease tensions.
Press reports claim that she has even consulted a fashion
designer to "modernize" her headscarf. While receptions will
likely be an ongoing source of irritation on all sides --
President Sezer refused to invite the covered wives of MPs --
Mrs. Gul seems unlikely to rush to throw down a gauntlet.

COMMENT: Fasten Your Seatbelts
--------------

9. (C) Gul's opponents may no longer feel they have the
public backing to prevent his presidency, but they seem
prepared to make the new president's life difficult and will
watch him closely for any missteps. Once President, however,
assaults on Gul himself will be difficult to disentangle from
assaults on his office.


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10. (C) Former CHOD Gen. (ret.) Hilmi Ozkok's recent
statement -- and assertion that CHOD Buyukanit agrees -- that
it would be wrong for a person whose wife wears a headscarf
to become president, signals that overt opposition to Gul's
candidacy is no longer a realistic possibility, despite
intense military disapproval. President Sezer's August 16
refusal to look at Erdogan's cabinet list (ref B) and Gen.
Buyukanit's defensive response to media questioning on the
same day contribute to the sense that state establishment
forces are on their heels. Gul is still the presidential
candidate, but the context has fundamentally changed
following the July 22 election. How irrevocable that change
is depends largely on Gul's ability to justify the people's
democratic response to this spring's undemocratic
presidential showdown. END COMMENT.

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MCELDOWNEY