TURKEY-IRAQ-PKK: POST-ELECTION POSSIBILITIES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001959

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2017
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV TU IZ
SUBJECT: TURKEY-IRAQ-PKK: POST-ELECTION POSSIBILITIES

REF: A. BAGHDAD 2474


B. ANKARA 1892

C. BAGHDAD 2422

D. BAGHDAD 2419

E. ANKARA 1055

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) SUMMARY: The danger of a Turkish cross-border
operation against the PKK in northern Iraq has receded
slightly following the parliamentary election. Several
factors will argue for Turkish caution, and key upcoming
events give us opportunities to reinforce this. The danger
remains of a large-scale terrorist attack blamed on the PKK
that would put the government in a box. END SUMMARY.

Electoral Result
--------------


2. (S) The ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP)
electoral victory offers an opening to improve dialogue
between the Turks and the Iraqis. It returns to power as a
single-party government with a strong mandate. Military
assertions of primacy are at least temporarily muted. The
AKP's strong showing in the southeast positions the party
well to push for reconciliation. Having 22 Kurdish
nationalist deputies in parliament, the Democratic Society
Party (DTP) figures who won election as independents, for
the first time since 1994 could allow political discourse
as an alternative to violence. However, their presence may
also be polarizing both to far-right National Action Party
(MHP)
deputies and on the Turkish airwaves.


3. (S) The PKK remains an armed force prepared to
terrorize Turkey. PKK leader Murat Karayilan made clear in
a July 22 AP interview that his fighters are ready for
battle if the Turks launch a CBO into northern Iraq. He
reiterated Massoud Barzani's claims that the PKK is not
attacking Turkey from its camps in northern Iraq, which he
called "political indoctrination centers." The AP reporter
noted that he saw PKK cadres in weapons training on his way
to the interview.

Engagement as a Further Constraint
--------------


4. (S) With a cooler political atmosphere, reduced CBO
threat, and a strengthened AKP government, we see several
near-term opportunities to encourage engagement between
Turks and Iraqis, including Iraqi Kurds.

-- Prospects look promising for an early August visit by
PM Maliki to Ankara.

-- Discussions have started on holding a second Expanded
Neighbors ministerial that will also bring Turks and Iraqis
together soon, whether in Istanbul (as the Turks would
like),elsewhere in the region, or in New York on the
margins of UNGA. Any of these, but especially a meeting in
Istanbul, could provide a forum for side meetings among
Turks, Iraqis, and Iraqi Kurds. While we recognize Iraqis
will determine the venue, Istanbul could be very useful in
addressing Turkish-Iraqi relations in the period after
political turmoil here has ended.

-- Iraqi State Minister Shirwan Wa'ili, counterpart to
special PKK envoys Gen. Ralston and Turkish MFA Deputy U/S
Akgunay, has recently proposed a trilateral meeting on the
PKK. Barzani's letter to President Bush also refers to
dialogue (ref A).

-- Press reports, including a July 30 Robert Novak op-ed,
that spin up a possible U.S. operation against the PKK.
Whether true or not, Turks will regard it as a sign the U.S.
really wants to be helpful.

-- Landing a UNSC seat is a top Turkish priority; the GOT

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may be more receptive to the Iraqis and the U.S. in order to
enhance their negotiating position on the UNSC seat.


5. (S) In discussions with Ambassador July 24 and 30,
Deputy U/S Akgunay agreed on the importance of engagement
with the Iraqi Government. He said the GOT looks forward
to Maliki's visit as well as to its continued involvement
in the neighbors and expanded neighbors processes.
However, he reiterated the GOT line that the Iraqis need to
take steps to demonstrate clearly Iraq's intent to end the
PKK's terrorist presence in northern Iraq.


6. (S) Asked about the Iraqis' proposal for a trilateral,
Akgunay said instructions had been sent to Turkey's Baghdad
Embassy. He predicted the response would be that Turkey
has expectations of the Iraqis, that it sets no
pre-conditions on a trilat meeting, but that a positive
atmosphere should be established to make the effort
productive. Akgunay's softer line was in notable contrast
to the tough stance Hayati Guven took in May (ref E).


7. (S) Ambassador recognized our countries' mutual
frustration with the PKK issue and observed that direct
talks with Iraq and the KRG authorities will eventually
have to occur in order to end the PKK threat in northern
Iraq. He counseled Akgunay not to close off prospects for
diplomacy by setting the bar so high for initial meetings
on the PKK issue that the opportunity for further
discussions is scuttled.


8. (S) COMMENT: The post-election dynamics in Turkey
create an opening we can capitalize on to build dialogue.
We should encourage meetings on the margins of multilateral
fora, such as the September Arab League meeting, UNGA, and
the Iraq Energy working group. Turkey shares our goal of a
stable, secure, unified Iraq; it is in our interest to break
down the distrust between Turks and Iraqis by pressing for
more engagement. END COMMENT


Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

MCELDOWNEY