TURKISH GENERAL STAFF VIEWS ON IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001957

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR PTER OREP IZ TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH GENERAL STAFF VIEWS ON IRAQ

Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney, reasons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) Summary: Turkish General Staff (TGS) J-3 Chief of
Plans and Operations MG Kenan Kocak told a visiting Senate
Appropriations Sucommittee on Foreign Operations (SACFO)
staff delegation led by Paul Grove on July 26 that TGS is not
optimistic about a decrease in the level of violence in Iraq
and that its most important concern is the freedom of
movement and logistic support allowed PKK terrorists in the
north. He stated TGS is prepared to mount cross-border
attacks against PKK terrorist camps in Iraq, but the decision
to do so is a political one. The TGS does not relish the
prospect of a cross-border operation. TGS hopes the U.S.
will maintain troop levels in Iraq until stability can be
achieved, but is against positioning more U.S. forces in the
north. End summary.

Turkish Military Goals for Iraq Clear
--------------


2. (C) In a joint meeting with MG Serdar Savas, J-5, at TGS,
MG Kocak told Staffdel Grove that the TGS views the current
overall situation in Iraq as "catastrophic," and said that
TGS was not optimistic about a decrease in violence in the
short term. Noting that it was easier to destroy than to
rebuild, Kocak explained TGS must base its planning on
long-term projections and believes that it might take as long
as 10 to 20 years to achieve the stabilization of Iraq.
While U.S. forces have made some progress in and around
Baghdad and in Anbar Province recently, he stated, the
positive results appear to TGS to be relatively limited in
scope and of questionable durability.


3. (C) Turkey has no hidden agenda regarding Iraq, Kocak
said. The notion that Ankara has neo-Ottoman ambitions on
Iraqi territory is baseless. From the TGS perspective,
Turkey has three main objectives for Iraq: that it remain an
integrated state, that stabilization be achieved, and that it
have full control of activities on its soil. Meanwhile, TGS
believes Turkey should strengthen it own border security, and
that activities within Iraq should be contained.

PKK the Main Concern
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4. (C) The most important immediate concern for TGS is the
safe haven being provided to PKK terrorists in northern Iraq.
The PKK has freedom of movement and the logistic support it
needs to be able to launch attacks on Turkey from camps
inside Iraq. Kocak complained that requests from the USG for
Turkey to engage the GOI on this problem constituted "fuzzy
thinking" since the GOI has little power over local groups in
northern Iraq. The U.S. appears to have adopted a double
standard on terrorism, he claimed. The trilateral process
involving GEN Ralston has resulted in no concrete steps or
tangible action taken against PKK terrorists, he complained.
Turkey long ago provided a detailed compilation of steps it
hoped could be taken, beginning with a declaration by the
government of Iraq that the PKK is a terrorist organization,
the arrest of PKK leaders living openly in northern Iraq, and
military action against PKK bases. To Turkey's frustration,
the U.S. does not seem to take these fundamental requests
seriously.


5. (C) On the possibility of cross-border attacks against PKK
terrorist targets within Iraq, Kocak told the Staffdel that
TGS does not prefer this tactic. While TGS is prepared to
mount strikes into northern Iraq, the decision to initiate a
cross-boder operation would be a political one. Turkish
public perception about the problem, and about the lack of
U.S. action against PKK terrorists in Iraq, is having a
critical effect on the political decision about whether to
launch an attack, Kocak argued. If there are going to be
changes in U.S. policy, they must be accompanied by actions,
and not just pronouncements, otherwise they will have a
negative effect. A sincere approach by the U.S. can change
the current dynamic, Kocak stressed. He acknowledged
appreciation for U.S. initiatives to combat PKK fund-raising

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and propaganda efforts in Europe, but cited the recent
decision by Austrian authorities to release from custody and
return to Iraq senior PKK leader Riza Altun as the latest
example of unhelpful actions taken by European governments.

Oppose U.S. Troops in Northern Iraq
--------------


6. (C) TGS is concerned about the effects of a U.S.
withdrawal from Iraq and would prefer to see U.S. forces
remain until more significant stabilization is achieved,
Kocak told the Staffdel. He outlined two perspectives on
U.S. withdrawal: one view is that civil war will intensify
when U.S. forces withdraw. The other view is that a U.S.
pull-back could result in a decrease in violence since many
of the attacks are directed at U.S. troops and facilities.
In either case, TGS is against any concomitant increase in
U.S. forces in northern Iraq. More U.S. troops in the north
would draw increased terrorist violence to that region, and,
in TGS's view, American forces could be exploited by local
groups in the north. Kocak stated that TGS has difficulty
assessing the loyalty of recently trained Iraqi security
forces, questioning whether they are more loyal to the state
or to militia or religious groups.


7. (U) Staffdel Grove did not have an opportunity to clear
this message.

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