Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ANKARA1866
2007-07-20 15:05:00
SECRET
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF DOD GENERAL COUNSEL

Tags:  PGOV PREL MARR PTER IZ TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0999
RUEUITH/AFOSI DET 521 ANKARA TU PRIORITY
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RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
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S E C R E T ANKARA 001866 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

OSD FOR GENERAL COUNSEL HAYNES FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2022
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR PTER IZ TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF DOD GENERAL COUNSEL
HAYNES TO ANKARA

REF: A. ANKARA 1464

B. 06 ANKARA 6720

C. 06 ANKARA 3433 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

S E C R E T ANKARA 001866

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

OSD FOR GENERAL COUNSEL HAYNES FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2022
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR PTER IZ TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF DOD GENERAL COUNSEL
HAYNES TO ANKARA

REF: A. ANKARA 1464

B. 06 ANKARA 6720

C. 06 ANKARA 3433 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (S) Summary: Your July 25 visit will come right after
Sunday's parliamentary elections here. Allegations regarding
U.S. arms in Iraq going to the Kurdish PKK terrorist
organization have featured prominently during the campaign to
portray the AKP government as soft on terrorism. PM Erdogan
and FM Gul have been vague in their public statements,
thereby perpetuating press interest in the story. Your visit
will provide some transparency to the Turks about the issue
and steps we are taking to address it. In your meetings with
MFA Undersecretary Apakan and Deputy Chief of Defense Gen
Saygun, I recommend you provide a broad overview of the facts
and our remedial steps. Your meeting with Turkish National
Police (TNP) Director General Koksal provides an opportunity
for a more thorough review with Turkey's law enforcement
officials. End Summary


2. (S) Since early 2006, the Turkish government has expressed
to us concern over weapons delivered by the U.S. to Iraqi
security forces being diverted to Turkey. Such weapons have
been used in high profile murders, including that of an
Italian priest in Trabzon in February 2006, a senior court
judge in May 2006, and a police officer in Izmir. The GOT
provided serial numbers of over 600 Glock pistols which they
seized, which correspond to weapons provided by the U.S. to
Iraq in 2003-2004. Subsequently, the Foreign Ministry and
police authorities provided information on other small arms
and rocket launchers seized in Turkey and believed to be of
U.S.-origin. Most recently, military and government
officials have inquired about planned U.S. sales to Iraq of
large quantities of weapons, ammunition, and plastic
explosives. While focused on the criminal use of these
weapons, Turkish authorities have told us they believe the
PKK terrorist organization is deeply involved in trafficking

them.


3. (C) The media paid little attention to the issue until
recently. However, in early July, newspapers reported the
"confession" of three captured PKK terrorists, who claimed
that U.S. military officials delivered arms directly to PKK
redoubts in the Kandil mountains of northern Iraq. We have
denied the allegation, both publicly and in our private
discussions with Turkish officials. On July 11, Turkey's
ambassador to the U.S., Nabi Sensoy, briefed the Washington
press that the PKK was obtaining U.S.-origin weapons from
Kurdish authorities in northern Iraq. Other press reports
have us providing arms secretly to the Kurdish Free Life
Party (PJAK),the PKK's arm that operates against Iran, which
then get transferred to the mothership. We have also denied
contact with PJAK.


4. (C) A related set of stories asserts that U.S. military
personnel, including "deserters" from Iraq, are engaged in
providing weapons either directly to the PKK or indirectly
through Kurdish authorities in northern Iraq. Other reports
focus on U.S. procurement malfeasance in providing weapons to
Iraq, resulting in inadvertent leakage to PKK and criminal
elements.


5. (C) While senior officials have downplayed these
extravagant allegations in private talks with us, PM Erdogan
and FM Gul have been less than helpful in their public
statements in the midst of an election campaign. Erdogan
publicly termed our denials of responsibility for U.S.
weapons in PKK hands as "unconvincing." While stating that
he does not believe the U.S. deliberately gives weapons to
the PKK, FM Gul has said that if we did, it would be very
damaging. He asserted that the Iraqi army is unreliable,
that corruption on the part of some U.S. military personnel
has contributed to weapons ending up in PKK hands, and that
the Pentagon is investigating the matter. Gul has reportedly
claimed that Turkey has found 1260 suspected U.S.-origin
weapons in the possession of PKK terrorists.


6. (C) Senior military officers also downplay these stories

in private conversations with us. However, we see evidence
that, behind the scenes, the military is tolerating or even
encouraging public suspicions of U.S. collusion with the PKK
as a way to embarrass the government and to maintain pressure
on the U.S. to take action against the PKK in northern Iraq.


7. (C) We hope, but cannot guarantee, that the political
environment following July 22 elections will be more
conducive to a rational discussion of the issue of U.S. arms
in PKK hands, as well as their use by criminal elements in
Turkey. Greater transparency regarding the facts will be
helpful. We must also convince the Turks that we are
instituting measures and controls that will minimize the
possibility that the military equipment we are now providing
to Iraq will find its way into Turkey.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON