Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ANKARA1859
2007-07-20 10:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY AND US-TURKISH RELATIONS AFTER THE ELECTIONS

Tags:  PGOV PREL US TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8089
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #1859/01 2011052
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201052Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3064
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001859 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL US TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY AND US-TURKISH RELATIONS AFTER THE ELECTIONS

REF: ANKARA 1803

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROSS WILSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001859

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL US TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY AND US-TURKISH RELATIONS AFTER THE ELECTIONS

REF: ANKARA 1803

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROSS WILSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: Turkey's July 22 election will not quell,
and may aggravate, the polarizing battles here over
secularism, fundamentalism, nationalism, and minority
(Kurdish) rights, and between the old elite and a rising new
one. Ditto civil-military tensions, which will continue to
express themselves loudly as Turkey heads toward the
presidential election and in Ankara's confrontation with the
PKK and northern Iraq. Turks still want to work with us, but
US-Turkish relations have been a casualty of the electoral
campaign -- reflecting and worsening our low public standing
here. We should not play into efforts to pull us into
Turkish battles. Post-election, we should take a deep
breath, work on restoring momentum to US-Turkish relations,
manage our problems and keep an eye on the long term. We
will need to push the new government to meet us half way, and
we both need to not allow problems to crowd out our common
goals and objectives. End Summary.


2. (C) The likely, though not foreordained outcome of
Sunday's voting is a single-party AKP government returned to
office. (See reftel for details.) PM Erdogan's more slender
majority may temper his mercurial instincts. A strong
combined showing of the CHP and MHP opposition parties will
embolden their assaults on him -- and a CHP/MHP led
government cannot be precluded. The military will be right
behind them. CHP, MHP and Kurdish nationalist voices will
make parliament more strident, polarizing, and difficult to
work with on issues of interest to us. The next key step is
presidential voting that is expected within a month.
Optimists point to Erdogan's remarks about a consensus
candidate as suggesting a more cooperative process this time.
Nothing is easy in Turkey, and compromise will be hard.
Failure that leads to another general election in the autumn
cannot be ruled out.


3. (C) Nothing in the campaigning or voting results will
dampen the ideological and social divides here.

-- The secular-fundalmentalist challenge will persist. It is
the main calling card of the CHP, which gets little traction

on economic or social issues beyond its core constituency.
It is the main weakness of the AKP, which otherwise gets good
marks for effective governance and economic management, even
from many opponents.

-- The likely presence Kurdish MPs who have ties with the PKK
will stoke nationalism among Turks and provoke the MHP and
others. Parliamentary debate among them will be lively; it
could be violent, too.

-- The broader conflict will continue unabated between a
rising, socially conservative middle and lower middle class
versus the old elites who have ruled Turkey for 80 years and
are determined to use Ataturk to hold on to power.


4. (C) Nor will civil-military tension ease any time soon.
Perhaps the opposite. After intervening in April, the
military resumed its place as a back seat driver of Turkish
democracy. As politics focuses on the presidential election
in August, the military will overtly or covertly grab the
wheel again to help the opposition in haggling over an
appropriate consensus candidate. If the prospects for such a
candidate fail, the military will probably intervene again,
either through the judiciary or other state institutions, to
prevent the election of an AKP president.


5. (C) As happens around the world, the US became a punching
bag in this year's politicking. The media and politicians
have outdone themselves in recent weeks complaining, in order
of outrageousness, about our: inaction on the PKK,
unwillingness to pressure Barzani to act against the PKK,
support for the PKK, meetings with PKK leaders,
responsibility for arms that the PKK uses, overt supply of
arms to the PKK, senior US military involvement in all of the
above, and worse. Turkey's MOU with Iran on gas cooperation
was hailed, even by government critics, as "standing up" to
the Americans and refusing to accept US domination of
Turkey's energy supplies and foreign policy.


6. (C) The PKK flames are being vigorously fanned by the
Turkish military. In late May, the TGS alerted the media
here to a brief violation of Turkish airspace by US F-16s
flying along the Turkey-Iraq border. Following that, TGS
pumped out stories about a confrontation between Turkish and
Peshmerga forces in Suleymaniyah, an alleged cross-border
invasion, and the US arms to the PKK story. The military's
effort is designed to embarrass the government and portray it
as incompetent in protecting Turkey's security interests. It
also stokes public paranoia about threats to the republic.

ANKARA 00001859 002 OF 002


The damage to US-Turkish relations, a perhaps regretable
by-product for the military, serves to strengthen the charges
of government mismanagement.


7. (C) The AKP has risen to the bait. During this electoral
campaign period, PM Erdogan and FM Gul have been unwilling to
defend the US or US-Turkish relations. In between rubbish,
their least damaging (to us) line has been, "if the US has
done x, then it will be bad for our relations." Their
behavior ensured there would be wilder and more damaging
speculation in the media, rather than killing the story.


8. (C) Will this pass? Some of it will, and we need to
encourage more -- as we did in the context of an improving
relationship here after Erdogan's June 2005 visit to
Washington. Early outreach to the new government leadership
will be essential: a congratulatory message after the new
government's formation, an early Secretary Rice conversation
with the foreign minister (who may not be Gul),and the
earliest possible face-to-face meetings among key ministers.
We need especially to consult on Iraq -- not just on the PKK
element, but also on the larger problems and the US posture
there -- so as to keep Turkey with us on our top foreign
policy priority.


9. (C) We and the new Turkish government also need to manage
looming issues that have the potential for damaging our
relations much more. Atop the list are the PKK and the
Armenia genocide resolution (AGR).


10. (C) Turkey's July 22 election date may be a bad
milestone for the PKK problem. Violence has been down for
several weeks. The PKK apparently held back to help the
Kurdish nationalist candidates and perhaps also the AKP.
Despite public and private warnings, the government evidently
decided not to alienate the same Kurdish voters or to cede
control of Turkish Iraq policy to the military via a cross
border operation (CBO),and the military opted not to insist
on a CBO that would have burnished AKP nationalist
credentials. As of July 23, all those constraints are off.
Violence may increase. It may also be that the military's
preoccupation with annual promotions in early August, a
hoped-for visit by PM Maliki in coming weeks, and ongoing US
work with Turkey on the PKK problem will be enough to see us
to September -- when a post-election government could take
some new initiatives, including with the KRG. That is the
best we can hope for.


11. (C) If the latest Pew poll puts support for the US at 9
percent, an AGR will move us to 0.9 percent (at best) and
cripple prospects for constructive relations with Turkey's
new government at the outset. Constraints on a CBO will be
further undone. Positive help on Iraq, Iran, the Middle
East, Afghanistan, Caspian energy, terrorism, Black Sea
security, and other issues will, for a time at least, become
the coincidental exception. If the French are a guide, this
mission will find itself frozen out. Unlike the French, we
can expect anti-Americanism here to boil over into
demonstrations and possibly violence. These will feed mutual
estrangement. Our hope remains to defer the Congressional
confrontation over the AGR long enough so that the next
government has a chance to take an initiative vis-a-vis
Armenia that could change the US political calculus. A
number of key, senior Turks are thinking the same way.


12. (C) The perfect storm in US-Turkish relations is not
inevitable. On Iraq, Iran, terrorism, energy and many other
topics, US and Turkish goals will remain the same. Turkey's
elections, their results and the rhetoric that accompanied
them will complicate an already fractious US-Turkish
relationship. We need to let matters play out here and not,
in our responses to ill-conceived words or actions, allow
ourselves to transition from punching bag to pawn. After the
voting, after all the bad things that have been said, and
despite all the problems looming, we have to take a deep
breath, put the rhetoric behind us (and insist Turkish
authorities do too),and resume the efforts we made over the
past two years to work together effectively where we can.
This is the way, among other things, to further liberal
democracy here. US interests in this country and in the
region require as much.



Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON