TURKISH AMBIVALENCE ON IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001816

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM IR TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH AMBIVALENCE ON IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

REF: A. ANKARA 1520

B. 06 ANKARA 6526

Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b and d).


1. (C) Summary: Two Embassy-organized videoconferences and a
recent Turkish roundtable reveal continued ambivalence about
Iran's nuclear program among Turkey's non-governmental policy
elites, including academics, think-tankers, and columnists.
Turkish opinion-makers do not want to see Iran, a neighbor
and historical rival, armed with nuclear weapons, though many
believe it is inevitable. Some view Iran's nuclear program
as defensive and designed to bolster and protect the regime,
while others fear it will strengthen Iran's quest for
regional hegemony. Some contrast Iran's support to Turkey
against PKK terrorism with perceived lack of support from the
West. Of most concern is the widespread perception that the
conflict is principally between the U.S. and Iran,
accompanied by the fear that the regional instability
following a military confrontation with Iran is more
dangerous than Iran's possession of nuclear weapons. End
Summary

Turkey, Iran...and Iraq
--------------


2. (C) Faruk Logoglu, President of Ankara's Center for
Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM) and former ambassador to
the United States, described Turkey's conflicting concerns at
a recent ASAM roundtable on Iran. While a long-time ally of
the West, Turkey remains Iran's neighbor and trade partner.
Echoing the views of most Turkish analysts we have spoken to,
Logoglu said Ankara does not want Iran to develop nuclear
weapons and supports Iran's compliance with IAEA safeguards,
but considers UN Security Council sanctions ultimately
ineffective and harmful to Turkey. While acknowledging that
Iran tried to export its Islamic revolution to Turkey in the
1980s, Logoglu claimed that Tehran has abandoned that
strategy and does not currently pose an ideological threat to
Turkey.


3. (C) Citing Iran's cooperation with Turkey against PKK
terrorism in the tri-border area, several analysts have asked
why Turkey should endanger support so important to its own
security, at a time when PKK terrorists operating from
northern Iraq attack Turkish military and civilians daily.
Turkish opinion-makers have told us it is difficult for Turks
to sympathize with U.S. and European requests for Turkey to
take a harder line on Iran while those same allies are
perceived as doing far less than Iran to help Turkey counter
PKK terrorism.

Views on Iran's Internal Dynamics
--------------


4. (C) Many Turkish analysts reject what they consider the
dominant Western view: that the Iranian leadership is
irrational, unreasonable, and stubbornly defiant.
International Relations professor Idris Bal cited Iran's
support for Armenia (as opposed to its Shiite neighbor
Azerbaijan) in the 1992 Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict as
evidence that Iranian policy is calculated and pragmatic.
Turkish observers are of two minds on the motivations for
Iran's nuclear program. Some say it is defensive and
designed to increase support for the current regime among the
population. ASAM Iran expert Arif Keskin maintains that Iran
keeps the nuclear issue on its agenda to maintain unity,
control internal pressure for reform, and divert
international criticism from its terrorism and human rights
records. Others, such as retired ambassadors Faruk Logoglu
and Resat Arim, posit that Iran intends to use a nuclear
weapons capability to enhance its efforts to obtain political
hegemony over the region. Even here, however, Turkish
analysts see Iran pursuing nuclear weapons less as a tool for
blackmail than as a demonstration of Iranian leadership,
designed to gain it broader support among Muslims as a
credible counterweight to Western influence in the Middle
East.

Israel's Nuclear Program
--------------


5. (C) Turkish observers frequently point to Israel's
undeclared nuclear weapons program as a threat to Iran and
motivation for Iran's nuclear ambitions. In this context,
some have noted that pious Turks remain uneasy about Israel's

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weight in the Middle East and therefore tend to sympathize
with Iran. As a result, Turks are more likely to ask why
Iran should trust the U.S. and Israel, rather than why the
West should trust Iran.

It's a U.S.-Iran Problem
--------------


6. (C) The most troublesome aspect of the Turkish analysis is
that it promotes the widespread belief that the Iran nuclear
issue is essentially a bilateral U.S.-Iran dispute. This
results in a passivity and fatalism as Turkey and other
nations are effectively relegated to the status of helpless
observers. Ambassador Logoglu's prescription for solving the
problem focuses entirely on U.S. actions, including:
abandoning the perceived U.S. goal of regime-change in favor
of changing Iranian "behavior," offering incentives that
ensure Iran's political and economic legitimacy, and
negotiating directly with Iran at the highest levels. While
paying lip service to the notion that it is Iran's
responsibility to convince the whole international community
of its peaceful intentions, most Turkish elites put the onus
on the U.S. to solve the problem.

Instability is the Greater Threat
--------------


7. (C) As a result of this attitude, most Turkish elites
would agree with Logoglu that a military intervention by the
U.S. and/or Israel is "not an option" and would lead to
"catastrophic regional consequences," far out of proportion
to the dangers posed by Iran's nuclear program. There is a
widespread belief that the U.S. and Israel are not capable of
mounting a "clean" and precise attack on Iran, nor managing
the regional consequences of such an attack, accompanied by a
persistent fear that planning for such an attack is already
underway.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON