Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ANKARA1577
2007-06-21 06:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

ONE VIEW ON TURKEY'S IRANIAN DIASPORA (C-TN7-00225)

Tags:  PINR PREL SCUL AJ IR TU 
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DE RUEHAK #1577/01 1720654
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 210654Z JUN 07 ZDK DUE NUM SVCS
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2675
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 001577 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2017
TAGS: PINR PREL SCUL AJ IR TU
SUBJECT: ONE VIEW ON TURKEY'S IRANIAN DIASPORA (C-TN7-00225)

REF: STATE 31486

ANKARA 00001577 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Polcouns Janice G. Weiner, reasons 1.4 (b) (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 001577

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2017
TAGS: PINR PREL SCUL AJ IR TU
SUBJECT: ONE VIEW ON TURKEY'S IRANIAN DIASPORA (C-TN7-00225)

REF: STATE 31486

ANKARA 00001577 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Polcouns Janice G. Weiner, reasons 1.4 (b) (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. According to one expert at a leading
Turkish think tank, the Iranian population in Turkey numbers
no more than fifty thousand, most of whom are students or
other short-term economic migrants. Due to a fear of Iran's
intelligence services, the Iranian community in Turkey
maintains a low profile and purposefully weak ties to the
Iranian state. A small but active group of Azeri
nationalists is, however, based in Turkey. Although Turkish
speaking, the Azeri-Iranians' perceived ties to the United
States, as well as Turkish concerns for the stability and
territorial integrity of its large neighbor, help limit
Turkish support for the "South Azerbaijan" cause. Despite
having only a limited presence in Turkey, this expert
believes ethnic nationalism is the principal threat to the
Iranian regime. Tehran, however, exploits ethnic divisions
in the country to divide and weaken the opposition to
perpetuate its rule. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) We met with Arif Keskin (PROTECT),Middle East
Specialist at the Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies
(ASAM),in Ankara, to discuss the Iranian Diaspora in Turkey.
Keskin is a regular analyst on Middle East affairs. He is
an Azeri-Iranian who has lived in Ankara since 1997. He has
been affiliated with ASAM since then and maintains strong
ties to the Iranian expatriate community in Turkey, often
personally assisting Iranian refugees or other Iranians in
need. In addition to providing useful insights to the
Iranian community in Turkey and its relations with both the
Turkish and Iranian states, Keskin offered interesting
perspectives on the sharpening ethnic divides in Iran and
their impact on the current regime.


3. (C) Keskin emphasizes that that the Iranian population in
Turkey numbers only in the tens of thousands, but taking an
accurate count is difficult. (Turkish newspaper Radikal, in
April 2007, said only six thousand Iranians were living in
Turkey -- a low figure which does not appear to include

students, illegal migrants or Turkish citizens of Iranian
descent. Other estimates number the Iranian population in
the hundreds of thousands.) Most Iranians in Turkey are
transitory, planning to stay for only a few years before
returning to Iran or moving on to Europe or North America.
In addition, because Iranians are not a recognized, legal
minority in Turkey, census data does not count them.
Moreover, many Iranians who do choose to settle in Turkey are
ethnic Turks, and can quickly assimilate into Turkish
society.

IRANIANS IN TURKEY
--------------


4. (C) According to Keskin, since the founding of the modern
Turkish state, Turkey has been important to Iran as a gateway
to Western culture. This role for Turkey became more
prominent following the Iranian revolution when numerous
Iranians, of all ethnic backgrounds, moved to Turkey.
Turkish immigration law precluded most Iranians from
remaining in Turkey, so many moved on to Europe and the
United States, though a small community remained. Due to the
aggressive, revolutionary posture of the Iranian regime, and
fear of its intelligence services, this community became
politically introverted. Many eventually assimilated within
Turkey and, through inter-marriage, assumed Turkish
citizenship. During the Khatami period, Tehran sought to
become closer to this community, but the group's introversion
persisted.


5. (C) Keskin defines a second group of Iranians in Turkey
as economic migrants. It is a small percentage of the
overall Diaspora, but is composed of Iranians who chose to
settle in Turkey for economic opportunity. Many of these
Iranians are in the professional and commercial classes,
notably the carpet and shoe trade. This group is found
mostly in Istanbul and Izmir and is also politically
inactive. Many have become Turkish citizens.


6. (C) While the first two groups of Iranians in Turkey are
settled and integrated, the largest group, numbering in the
tens of thousands, is transitory and politically diverse.
This group includes part-time economic migrants, laborers,
students and business people. Many have strong social and
economic ties to Iran and return regularly, though Keskin
believes their political ties to the Iranian regime are weak.
Keskin said many temporary economic migrants are in Turkey
illegally and they are menaced by Iranian intelligence.
Likewise, Iranian students, according to Keskin, avoid their

ANKARA 00001577 002 OF 004


own embassy for fear of falling under sway of the
intelligence services. Keskin gave an example of the Iranian
Embassy's attempt to create a student association. Despite
strong embassy efforts and a large number of Iranian students
in Ankara, only eight students joined. There is a Government
of Iran (GOI)-sponsored cultural association in Ankara,
affiliated with the GOI's Islamic Cultural Relations
Organization, called the Iran Culture House, as well as a
FARSI Language Education Center (www.irankulturevi.com). Few
expatriate Iranians associate with them.


7. (C) Keskin told us that a majority of this final group of
Iranians are ethnic (Azeri) Turks, but not necessarily
Turkish nationalists. He said that this group is affected by
U.S.-Iran tension, and that their Iranian nationalist
feelings often rise outside of Iran, despite an almost
universal dislike for the regime. A minority, however, are
Turkish nationalists and politically active. They recently
held a small demonstration in front of the Iranian Embassy to
mark the May anniversary of last year's protests by Azeris in
Iran, which were violently broken up by the government. This
politically active group maintains internet websites and
blogs, and publishes newspapers and journals. One community
newspaper is Tebriz'in Sesi (www.tebrizinsesi.com). Keskin
also mentioned the website millishura.com. Members of this
small, politically active group are usually unable to return
to Iran and seek political asylum in Turkey (where it is
usually denied) and abroad.

GROWING ETHNIC NATIONALISM CHALLENGING THE REGIME, YET
DIVIDING THE OPPOSITION
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Having provided an overview of the Diaspora in
Turkey, Keskin shared his views on the Azeri population in
Iran, their attachment to the regime, and their role in
shaping it. Keskin estimates that 25-30 million Iranians are
Azeri, and that the (Sunni) Turkmen population is about 1.5-2
million. According to Keskin, Iranian Azeris freely express
their cultural identity in Iran. Their Turkic language is
widely spoken, even in local government offices, though it is
written in FARSI script. The basic concern of Azeris is
their inability to express themselves politically. The
regime accuses those who aspire to of being separatist or
pan-Turkic.


9. (C) Keskin explained that the Iranian revolution was not
imposed upon the Azeris. On the contrary, he said that
Azeris were instrumental in bringing Shiism to Iran and that
many were leaders of the revolution. Today's older
generation still maintains its links to the regime and to
religion. For the new generation of Azeris, however, secular
Turkishness has supplanted religion as their primary source
of identity. In this regard, Turkey is a major influence.
This new generation, however, finds Turkey surprisingly
conservative. Young Turks, according to Keskin, are more
comfortable with religion than their counterparts in Iran,
where religion is considered bankrupt.


10. (C) While throughout Iran the state depends on an aging
generation for legitimacy, Keskin said it is difficult to
speculate on the regime's endurance. He believes the regime
will need to evolve to accommodate social and, more
importantly, ethnic demands. In its current form, Iran can
neither create the political space nor suppress the
aspirations of ethnic groups; "they are too vast." Ethnic
division, he said, is what Iran most fears, and it's not just
the Azeris.


11. (C) Paradoxically, according to Keskin, ethnic
nationalism is also extending the life of the regime by
cutting the links between the center and periphery of the
country. Despite all hating the regime, Azeri, Kurd, Arab,
Persian and other opposition groups do not come together.
Moreover, he added, ethnic nationalists strongly oppose
pro-Shah, Mujahadeen and leftist anti-regime groups. For
example, unlike Arab students in the Middle East who graduate
as either leftists or fundamentalists, Iranian Arabs almost
always graduate as Arab nationalists. According to Keskin,
student protesters who took to the streets in Tehran in
recent years were Persian nationalists, who were not allowing
other groups to join. He did not see Baluchis, Kurds or
Arabs protesting in Tehran. The regime exploits these
divisions, helping it to control the country. Keskin would
not say that the country would split apart if the government
did fall, but he did say that the current administrative
regime would have to change quickly.

TURKEY FEARS A DE-STABILIZED IRAN; SEES U.S. DRIVING
IRANIAN-TURKISH NATIONALISM

ANKARA 00001577 003 OF 004


-------------- --------------


12. (C) Keskin said divisions within government and
nationalist circles prevent Turkey from taking a more
supportive position. Noting that the Turkish-Iranian border
is one of the oldest in history, Keskin argued that Iran's
territorial integrity is critical to Turkey defending its
own. As a result, and despite a pan-Turkic world view among
many Turkish nationalists inside and outside of government,
Azeris in Iran are often not viewed as Turks (as opposed to
those in Azerbaijan). In addition, Keskin believes that
rising anti-American sentiment in Turkey affects Turkey's
relations with Iran's Azeris. Dissident groups in Turkey are
viewed as being controlled by the United States. Citing a
recent example, he said a nationalist paper in Turkey covered
last year's demonstration in Iran of Azeris with the
following headline: "Bush Pushes Button and Azeris
Activate." The public widely views Azeri-Iranian nationalist
publications as being supported by the United States and
local sponsors are therefore unwilling to contribute funds.
Indeed, local Azeri-Iranian publications are low quality and
appear to be financed on a shoestring.


13. (C) Keskin said he constantly argues against this view,
but growing paranoia of the United States in Turkey is
obstructing a healthy relationship with Azeri-Iranians. Many
Azeri-Iranians, he said, have left Turkey because they cannot
achieve dialogue here. Political asylum is not frequently
granted to politically active Iranians in Turkey, though
local authorities usually treat Azeri nationalists well, and
a support network in the country does exist to assist them.
Keskin himself often takes refugees into his own home.
Keskin said that Azeri broadcasting is not generally
restricted in Turkey, but he did note that one large
satellite provider, Turk-Sat, recently stopped carrying the
Chicago-based GunAz TV. (COMMENT: Despite relatively weak
ties to Azeri-Iranians, whenever Turkey is confronted by
Iranian policies or activities perceived as hostile,
nationalist media invoke Iran's supposed Turkishness as a
lever that Turkey can pull to destabilize Iran, if it so
chose. END COMMENT.)

TURKISH UNIVERSITIES: NOT A FORUM FOR DISSENT
-------------- -


14. (C) Students constitute a large portion of the Iranian
population in Turkey, though Keskin had no figure on the
total number of Iranian students. The Turkish economy's
ability to absorb top graduates remains limited, so most will
return or go further abroad. Iranian student associations
exist, but have no ties to the Iranian state. One Azeri
nationalist group is the Federation of South Azerbaijan
Students-Turkey, which produces a bulletin as well as a
quarterly academic journal called South Azerbaijan (contact:
gunaz(underscore)of(at)yahoo.com). Keskin said Persian
students do not organize themselves in Turkey, while also
remaining distant from the Iranian embassy. A small number
of Iranian scholarships send students to English language
universities, and about one thousand Turkish scholarships to
Turkish language programs. In general, Iranian students only
attend Turkey's top public universities. In Ankara, the most
popular universities for Iranians are: Middle East Technical
University (METU) (English language),Ankara University
(Turkish),Hacettepe (Turkish),and Gazi University
(Turkish). In Istanbul, the leading universities for
Iranians are Bogazici (English) and Marmara University
(Turkish). In Izmir, it is Ege University (Turkish). Keskin
said it would be difficult for the U.S. Embassy to speak with
Iranian students, believing that we could endanger them. In
the same manner, he declined to provide names of local,
Turkey-based Azeri-Iranian leaders.

IRANIAN ROOTS IN TURKEY ARE NOT SO DEEP
--------------


15. (C) Poloff asked Keskin to compare the situation of
Turkey's Iranians to those of Dubai, who recently turned out
in large numbers to listen to an address by President
Ahmadinejad. Apart from their larger population, Keskin said
Iranians in Dubai are different in two ways: first, they
have solid, organic business links with Iran, so they
naturally listen to what its leaders have to say, and,
second, they have been living in Dubai for a long time and
miss Iran. They are naturally curious. In Turkey, Iranian
roots are not so deep, and there is less nostalgia for Iran.
He would not expect crowds for an Ahmadinejad rally, even if
the GOT allowed it.


16. (C) COMMENT: The Iranian population in Turkey keeps a
low profile. Identifying sources through which to gain

ANKARA 00001577 004 OF 004


additional perspectives will be a challenge. We appreciate,
therefore, Keskin's sharing his views with us. While clearly
an opponent of the Iranian regime, he is primarily an analyst
and academic, and his opinions strike us as both
dispassionate and well-informed. We will maintain contact
with him and continue to identify other opportunities to gain
insights to Turkey's Iranian Diaspora. END COMMENT.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON