Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ANKARA116
2007-01-22 11:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKISH DEFMIN GONUL'S VISIT: SECURITY COOPERATION

Tags:  MARR MOPS PREL PGOV TU IZ AR 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000116 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2026
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL PGOV TU IZ AR
SUBJECT: TURKISH DEFMIN GONUL'S VISIT: SECURITY COOPERATION
IN THE FACE OF POLITICAL CHALLENGES


Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000116

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2026
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL PGOV TU IZ AR
SUBJECT: TURKISH DEFMIN GONUL'S VISIT: SECURITY COOPERATION
IN THE FACE OF POLITICAL CHALLENGES


Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Minister of Defense Gonul's January 25-26
visit, preceding the February visits of Foreign Minister Gul
and Chief of the General Staff GEN Buyukanit, provides an
opportunity to reaffirm the US commitment on Iraq; urge a
measured Turkish response to a possible Congressional
Armenian genocide resolution that does not harm ongoing
operations; and reaffirm the value of the bilateral defense
procurement relationship. Gonul, whose name has been
mentioned as a possible Presidential candidate, will likely
deliver a tough message on Turkey's disappointment at the
lack of concrete action against the PKK following GEN (ret)
Ralston's appointment as Special Envoy and warn that an
Armenian genocide resolution would severely harm the
bilateral relationship, including defense cooperation. The
January 25 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) signing provides an
opportunity to highlight the mutual benefits of a strategic
defense cooperation partnership. END SUMMARY.

ELECTION-YEAR POLITICKING
--------------


2. (C) Election-year politicking in advance of May
Presidential and November parliamentary elections is in full
swing and government rhetoric on issues like Iraq, the PKK
and a Congressional Armenian genocide resolution is
sharpening. Infighting among secularists, Islamists and
nationalists is increasing and all regard the US both as a
convenient target and a source of support. PM Erdogan's
potential Presidential aspirations have heightened
civil-military tensions in recent months. Public statements
by CHOD Buyukanit, Land Forces Commander Basbug and others
criticizing EU officials who suggest the military is crossing
civilian red lines, announcing the break in bilateral
military relations with France in advance of a government
statement, and reminding the public and the government of the
military's responsibility to protect the country from

fundamentalist and separatist threats are interpreted by many
as a warning to the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in
general and PM Erdogan in specific. MND Gonul has been
suggested as a possible alternative AKP candidate given his
national stature, good working relationship with the military
and lack of significant political baggage, and (significantly
for the military) a wife who doesn't wear a head scarf

IRAQ AND THE PKK -- PRESSING FOR CONCRETE RESULTS
-------------- --------------


3. (C) There is one issue on which the military and
government speak with a single voice -- Iraq. Turkish press
have suggested that PM Erdogan is sending Gonul to Washington
to deliver a tough message on Iraq. Turkey is concerned
about what it sees as Iran's influence in Iraq and the
potential for the country to splinter along ethnic lines.
The prospect of a 2007 referendum on Kirkuk exacerbates the
Turkish fears of a Kurdish annexation of the oil-rich
province that will lead to massive inter-communal violence,
and ultimately the dissolution of the country. Additionally,
the brief honeymoon following Gen (ret) Ralston's August 2006
appointment as Special Envoy to Counter the PKK has ended
with the Government of Turkey (GOT) frustrated at what it
views as a glaring lack of concrete results.


4. (C) The potential for a cross-border operation is again
front page news, with press speculation that Ralston's
appointment was a delaying tactic to keep Turkey from
conducting an operation and public statements by PM Erdogan,
Turkish Special Envoy GEN Baser and others reasserting
Turkey's right to conduct a cross-border operation (CBO).
The opposition is calling for a parliamentary vote on a CBO.
There are indications that a large number of troops and
equipment remain stationed along the Iraq border where they
continue to conduct operations against the PKK. The December
and January arrests of Iranian terrorist suspects in Iraq
reconfirmed in Turkish minds the US ability to act decisively
when it is in our interest. Providing a brief respite from
the negative press was the January 17 search of Makhmour
Refugee Camp by Iraqi Security Forces, which has been
embraced by the GOT as potentially the first step of a
comprehensive strategy to combat the PKK in Iraq. In the
absence of additional measures however, this goodwill will be
short-lived.


SHAPING TURKEY'S RESPONSE TO A RESOLUTION
--------------


5. (C) Turkish military and civilian officials warn that the
passage of a Congressional Armenian genocide resolution would
result in devastating consequences to the bilateral
relationship, but decline to give specifics. If the TGS
response to the French parliamentary vote to criminalize
denial of an Armenian genocide is any indicator, military
visits, exercises, exchanges, training and $14 billion in
potential procurement could be at risk, including: Turkey's
Level III participation in JSF and its $5-$6 billion purchase
of 100 aircraft; the $1.65 billion purchase of 30 F-16s, the
$1.65 billion upgrade of Turkey's current F-16 fleet; a
$1.5-$2 billion FMS purchase of attack helicopters; a $1.3
billion Patriot/PAC III purchase; $800 million utility
helicopter buy; and a $500 million heavy-lift helicopter
purchase.


6. (C) Worse, however, would be a decision to reduce or
cancel general and cargo hub-related overflight clearances
and Incirlik cargo hub and Habur Gate Ground Line of
Communication (GLOC) transit authority. Together these
transit hubs facilitate the distribution of almost 60% of air
cargo destined for OIF, 25% of Coalition fuel and 50% of
humanitarian fuel for the Iraqi people, as well as
significant support for OEF in Afghanistan.


7. (C) At every opportunity we are emphasizing to Turkish
officials the administration's efforts to oppose such a
resolution and to press for the GOT's own constructive
efforts towards that end. We will continue to press for a
reasoned response to a resolution that does not jeopardize
the long-term relationship for short-term political gains.
The government's immediate condemnation of the January 19
murder of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in Istanbul
and the arrest of a suspect the next day is a positive sign.

TURNING AROUND THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY RELATIONSHIP
-------------- ---


8. (C) The military's increasing influence over defense
procurement decisions since GEN Buyukanit became CHOD in
August 2006 had been the subject of press and industry
speculation but difficult to demonstrate. However, we may be
seeing the first evidence with decisions by the Executive
Defense Committee (Prime Minister, Defense Minister, CHOD) in
December to exclusively purchase the Joint Strike Fighter
rather than a mix of JSF and the Eurofighter or just the
Eurofighter and to postpone the selection of a winner in the
attack helicopter tender (South Africa's Denel and Italy's
Agusta Westland are the finalists) and request price and
availability data for a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) purchase
of Boeing's Apache or Bell's Cobra helicopter for comparison.
(Note: Details on Boeing and Bell FMS alternatives for an
attack helicopter should be submitted to TGS in early
February.)


9. (C) Press articles criticizing the military's decision to
allow Lockheed Martin to do most of the F-16 upgrade work
and a possible purchase of 30 new F-16s with limited local
content suggest that the Defense Industry Undersecretariat
(SSM) is pushing back. SSM displeasure with Turkish Air
Force Commander Gen Comert's decision to send pilots to testQfly a Raytheon T-6 airplane trainer became newspaper fodder
when a letter from SSM U/S Bayer to Comert was leaked to the
press. The letter criticized Comert's decision to send
pilots to test the plane of a company that chose not to
participate in the trainer tender and to do so before testing
the planes of the Brazilian and South Korean companies which
did participate.


10. (C) To demonstrate to the military and to the United
States that it does not wish to exclude US firms from Turkish
defense tenders following the decision of US companies to
submit no bid or a non-compliant bid on three 2006 tenders
(attack helicopter, airplane trainer, utility helicopter),
SSM is negotiating with Sikorsky the parameters of a
"Strategic Partnership" which could include Sikorksy
production of utility helicopters for the military and
forestry service as well as purchase of an armed Black Hawk
in place of an attack helicopter and Turkish participation in

some aspect of International Black Hawk production. Such an
agreement, if realized, would signal a sea change in SSM's
attitude towards US defense companies.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON