Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ALGIERS9
2007-01-06 15:15:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Algiers
Cable title:
ALGERIA 2006 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM
how-toVZCZCXYZ0013 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHAS #0009/01 0061515 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 061515Z JAN 07 FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2652 INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1480 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2042 RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 1567 RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 6421 RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 2828
UNCLAS ALGIERS 000009
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/MAG
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER ASEC KPAO AEMR KCRM AG
SUBJECT: ALGERIA 2006 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM
REF: STATE 175925
(SBU) Embassy Algiers' submission in cable format for the
2006 Country Terrorism Report follows:
Begin Text
Algeria continued to provide positive counterterrorism
cooperation and is a very strong partner in the global war on
terror. Algeria has battled terrorism for over a decade and
its government has not supported terrorism financially,
diplomatically, or politically, nor has it provided sanctuary
to any terrorist groups. For the majority of the year, the
security situation in Algeria remained relatively unchanged,
marked by stability in the major urban areas and low-level
terrorist activities throughout the countryside. The last
quarter of 2006, however, witnessed four attacks in the
wilaya of Algiers, the first ones since 2004. One attack
targeted employees of a U.S. company. Until this recent
attack, terrorism in Algeria was generally not aimed at
foreign entities; the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
(GSPC) preferred to target Algerian interests. Following
the al-Qaida September announcement of the GSPC's official
status as an al-Qaida affiliate in North Africa, however, the
GSPC has made more threats against what it calls "crusading"
westerners, particularly American and French citizens.
Two events helped fuel terrorism concerns in Algeria: the
al-Qaida's September 11 recognition of the GSPC and the
conclusion of the amnesty period for Algeria's National
Reconciliation project. There is evidence of the GSPC's use
of al-Qaida style attacks that generate high media attention.
On October 19, an improvised explosive device (IED) exploded
outside a military barracks in the Algiers suburb of
el-Harrach, wounding six, and October 30 two bombs killed two
persons approximately 20 kilometers from downtown Algiers.
On December 10, a shuttle bus carrying expatriate workers of
an American oil services company was ambushed in an Algiers
suburb thought to be secure due to its proximity to
residences of senior government officials and a major western
hotel. This attack, marked by a road-side IED, resulted in
two foreigners dead and several wounded, including an
American worker. The terrorists escaped. The October
bombings and the December 10 attack against a relatively soft
American target generated significant global media attention
and gave the GSPC greater visibility than nearly all other of
its attacks carried out against Algerian government targets.
Given the success of this attack in those terms, the GSPC may
attempt further attacks.
Even before its affiliation with al-Qaida, the GSPC was an
organization whose regional ties were evolving. GSPC support
cells have been discovered and dismantled in Spain, Italy,
Morocco and Mali, and the GSPC is suspected of maintaining
training camps in the Pan-Sahel region. The GSPC's regional
scope, however, was largely the result of successful Algerian
security service and military operations against it on
Algerian soil that have compelled the GSPC to operate outside
Algerian territory. The Algerian services killed
approximately 260 terrorists and arrested an additional 450
in 2006, compared to the combined killed and arrested figure
of about 400 for 2005. The success of the Algerian services,
combined with the public's continued lack of support for
terror, have led the GSPC to seek new methods of financing
its attacks. Algerian media sources reported the use of
extortion in concert with 16 instances of fake roadblocks and
55 kidnappings inside Algeria. The kidnappings, sometimes in
coordination with fake roadblocks, often targeted wealthy
Algerians. Not all of these methods were attributed solely
to the GSPC, however. There is also a growing crime problem
in Algeria. GSPC terrorists such as Mokhtar Belmokhtar have
also taken an active role in regional smuggling in order to
finance GSPC terrorism.
National reconciliation, a major policy initiative of
Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika whose final stages of
implementation took place in 2006, sought to bring closure to
the near civil war between Algeria's secular government and
Islamic terrorists in the 1990's. A cornerstone of this
initiative was the six-month amnesty program in place from
March to September for repentant imprisoned or active
terrorists who had not committed public bombings, massacres,
or rapes. As of September 2006, over 2,300 convicted
terrorists were released and more than 350 terrorists
surrendered to authorities in order to benefit from the
amnesty; statistics on the recidivism of these individuals
were not available. Despite announcing a September deadline
for amnesty, the government has quietly extended the amnesty
grace period indefinitely. In addition, some members of the
banned political party Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) have
returned to the country from self-imposed exile as part of
the amnesty.
Symbolically, national reconciliation was an important step
to try to heal Algerians' wounds from a decade of civil
strife. The amnesty, however, paradoxically appeared to have
hardened the resolve of the remaining terrorists. Indeed,
there were reports of terrorists killing cohorts who
surrendered to the authorities. During the scheduled amnesty
period, March through September, there were 199 security
officials and civilians killed, compared to 107 during the
rest of the year. Perhaps as a show of defiance and renewed
determination, the GSPC was responsible for the death of 78
security officials and civilians in October and November,
immediately after the scheduled amnesty period ended. The
GSPC, thanks in part to high unemployment among Algerian
youth, has been partially successful in replenishing its
numbers after the arrests, surrenders and deaths of over 1000
terrorists. Those remaining appear to be more hardline and
resistant to the Algerian government's amnesty offer.
Overall, the government has greatly improved security from
the situation of the late 1990s. The Algerian security
services and military remain capable of handling the
prolonged battle against internal terrorist threats and
continue to be a formidable ally in the global war on terror.
However, the GSPC's link to al-Qaida, continued
socio-economic problems and a renewed GSPC determination to
abort further national reconciliation could cause new
challenges in 2007.
End Text
FORD
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/MAG
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER ASEC KPAO AEMR KCRM AG
SUBJECT: ALGERIA 2006 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM
REF: STATE 175925
(SBU) Embassy Algiers' submission in cable format for the
2006 Country Terrorism Report follows:
Begin Text
Algeria continued to provide positive counterterrorism
cooperation and is a very strong partner in the global war on
terror. Algeria has battled terrorism for over a decade and
its government has not supported terrorism financially,
diplomatically, or politically, nor has it provided sanctuary
to any terrorist groups. For the majority of the year, the
security situation in Algeria remained relatively unchanged,
marked by stability in the major urban areas and low-level
terrorist activities throughout the countryside. The last
quarter of 2006, however, witnessed four attacks in the
wilaya of Algiers, the first ones since 2004. One attack
targeted employees of a U.S. company. Until this recent
attack, terrorism in Algeria was generally not aimed at
foreign entities; the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
(GSPC) preferred to target Algerian interests. Following
the al-Qaida September announcement of the GSPC's official
status as an al-Qaida affiliate in North Africa, however, the
GSPC has made more threats against what it calls "crusading"
westerners, particularly American and French citizens.
Two events helped fuel terrorism concerns in Algeria: the
al-Qaida's September 11 recognition of the GSPC and the
conclusion of the amnesty period for Algeria's National
Reconciliation project. There is evidence of the GSPC's use
of al-Qaida style attacks that generate high media attention.
On October 19, an improvised explosive device (IED) exploded
outside a military barracks in the Algiers suburb of
el-Harrach, wounding six, and October 30 two bombs killed two
persons approximately 20 kilometers from downtown Algiers.
On December 10, a shuttle bus carrying expatriate workers of
an American oil services company was ambushed in an Algiers
suburb thought to be secure due to its proximity to
residences of senior government officials and a major western
hotel. This attack, marked by a road-side IED, resulted in
two foreigners dead and several wounded, including an
American worker. The terrorists escaped. The October
bombings and the December 10 attack against a relatively soft
American target generated significant global media attention
and gave the GSPC greater visibility than nearly all other of
its attacks carried out against Algerian government targets.
Given the success of this attack in those terms, the GSPC may
attempt further attacks.
Even before its affiliation with al-Qaida, the GSPC was an
organization whose regional ties were evolving. GSPC support
cells have been discovered and dismantled in Spain, Italy,
Morocco and Mali, and the GSPC is suspected of maintaining
training camps in the Pan-Sahel region. The GSPC's regional
scope, however, was largely the result of successful Algerian
security service and military operations against it on
Algerian soil that have compelled the GSPC to operate outside
Algerian territory. The Algerian services killed
approximately 260 terrorists and arrested an additional 450
in 2006, compared to the combined killed and arrested figure
of about 400 for 2005. The success of the Algerian services,
combined with the public's continued lack of support for
terror, have led the GSPC to seek new methods of financing
its attacks. Algerian media sources reported the use of
extortion in concert with 16 instances of fake roadblocks and
55 kidnappings inside Algeria. The kidnappings, sometimes in
coordination with fake roadblocks, often targeted wealthy
Algerians. Not all of these methods were attributed solely
to the GSPC, however. There is also a growing crime problem
in Algeria. GSPC terrorists such as Mokhtar Belmokhtar have
also taken an active role in regional smuggling in order to
finance GSPC terrorism.
National reconciliation, a major policy initiative of
Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika whose final stages of
implementation took place in 2006, sought to bring closure to
the near civil war between Algeria's secular government and
Islamic terrorists in the 1990's. A cornerstone of this
initiative was the six-month amnesty program in place from
March to September for repentant imprisoned or active
terrorists who had not committed public bombings, massacres,
or rapes. As of September 2006, over 2,300 convicted
terrorists were released and more than 350 terrorists
surrendered to authorities in order to benefit from the
amnesty; statistics on the recidivism of these individuals
were not available. Despite announcing a September deadline
for amnesty, the government has quietly extended the amnesty
grace period indefinitely. In addition, some members of the
banned political party Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) have
returned to the country from self-imposed exile as part of
the amnesty.
Symbolically, national reconciliation was an important step
to try to heal Algerians' wounds from a decade of civil
strife. The amnesty, however, paradoxically appeared to have
hardened the resolve of the remaining terrorists. Indeed,
there were reports of terrorists killing cohorts who
surrendered to the authorities. During the scheduled amnesty
period, March through September, there were 199 security
officials and civilians killed, compared to 107 during the
rest of the year. Perhaps as a show of defiance and renewed
determination, the GSPC was responsible for the death of 78
security officials and civilians in October and November,
immediately after the scheduled amnesty period ended. The
GSPC, thanks in part to high unemployment among Algerian
youth, has been partially successful in replenishing its
numbers after the arrests, surrenders and deaths of over 1000
terrorists. Those remaining appear to be more hardline and
resistant to the Algerian government's amnesty offer.
Overall, the government has greatly improved security from
the situation of the late 1990s. The Algerian security
services and military remain capable of handling the
prolonged battle against internal terrorist threats and
continue to be a formidable ally in the global war on terror.
However, the GSPC's link to al-Qaida, continued
socio-economic problems and a renewed GSPC determination to
abort further national reconciliation could cause new
challenges in 2007.
End Text
FORD