POLISARIO AMBASSADOR ON TALKS WITH MOROCCO

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000637

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2017
TAGS: PREL PBTS PHUM AG MO WI
SUBJECT: POLISARIO AMBASSADOR ON TALKS WITH MOROCCO

Classified By: DCM Thomas F. Daughton; reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) The Polisario was generally satisfied with UNSCR 1754,
Polisario Ambassador to Algeria Mohamed Beissat told DCM May
7, but took issue with the resolution's praise for Morocco's
"serious and credible" autonomy proposal. Such language
would embolden Morocco, Beissat said, to approach the
negotiations from a position of confidence that it had U.S.
backing, and was also inconsistent with the search for the
solution providing for Sahrawi self-determination described
in the resolution. Beissat was also disappointed that the
resolution referred to "the parties" and not to Morocco and
the Polisario specifically. He preferred the wording about
the parties in the UNSYG's report to the Council. Beissat
said ultimately only the Polisario and Morocco were parties
to the dispute, even though he took the DCM's point that one
aim of the resolution was to involve neighboring countries in
efforts to find a lasting solution.


2. (C) Turning to the process by which UNSCR 1754 was
adopted, Beissat suggested that the Friends played too great
a role in determining the language of the resolution. DCM
noted in response that the approach was not an unusual one
and served to expedite reaching a final draft, but Beissat
grumbled that it was "undemocratic." Beissat further
expressed the Polisario's disappointment that the United
States did not support efforts to make the Sahrawi people's
right to self-determination a primary aim of the resolution.
Fortunately, he said, the final resolution included the
principle. He added that the Polisario also felt betrayed by
Spain, whose actions with respect to the resolution did not
reflect the positions that Spanish officials had outlined to
the Polisario in the lead-up to it. Nonetheless, Beissat
made clear, the Polisario was generally satisfied by the
resolution and would approach dialogue with the Moroccans in
good faith. He opined, however, that the Moroccans were
unlikely to take the discussions seriously, having already
been "armored" by strong U.S. support.

SPECULATION ABOUT THE MEDIATOR
--------------


3. (C) Beissat said it was "well known" that the Polisario
did not think highly of UN Secretary General's personal envoy
on the Western Sahara, Peter Van Walsum. Polisario Secretary
General Mohamed Abdelaziz had communicated that view, he
said, to Ban ki-Moon. Beissat said the Polisario would
attend the talks with the Moroccans regardless of the
mediator the UNSYG selected, but he implied that their
preference would be for a Scandinavian. While the Polisario
had historically been most comfortable with an American
mediator like James Baker, Beissat said, this was now out of
the question given the U.S. alignment with Moroccan views.
Likewise, the Polisario no longer desired to hold the talks
in the U.S. He said the Polisario would not object to a
non-European mediator, but stressed that the mediator needed
to be of sufficient international stature and immune to
corruption by Morocco. Beissat explained that having a
mediator of stature was important so that neither party could
walk away from the talks without consequences on the
international stage.

CHOOSING SIDES
--------------


4. (C) Beissat said the Polisario leadership would select its
delegation to the talks after consultations in May with UN
officials. That said, he believed that Mohamed Khaddad and
Ahmed Boukhari (Polisario representatives to MINURSO and to
the UN in New York respectively) would "definitely" be part
of the delegation. He observed that Mohamed Abdelaziz had
special confidence in Khaddad in these matters. Beissat was
unsure if the three other Polisario delegates to the Baker
Plan talks -- Brahim Ghali, Rhadi Sgheir Bachir and Brahim
Mokhtar -- would participate, but appeared to think it
likely. As for the Moroccan side, Beissat stated a clear
Polisario preference for a senior Moroccan delegation
including individuals close to King Mohammed VI. He also
asserted strongly that the Polisario did not want to see on
the Moroccan delegation any "converts" -- former Polisario
members who had gone over to the Moroccan side -- or members
of CORCAS. The personal dynamics of the discussions would be
far better, he said, if no Moroccans with direct ties to the
Sahrawis or Western Sahara participated.
COMMENT
--------------


5. (C) Beissat invited us to meet with him and was clearly
probing for information on two specific issues: whether the
U.S. has a particular agenda it plans to pursue with respect
to the Polisario-Morocco negotiations (especially as regards
backing the Moroccan autonomy plan); and whether we have a
specific mediator/facilitator in mind. We told him we had no
reason to believe that Washington had made any decisions in
either respect. Overall, he was noticeably less belligerent
than during our last meeting before the vote on UNSCR 1754,
and confined his warnings to remarks about the need for the
U.S. not to back the autonomy plan openly. It may be
noteworthy that Beissat in this discussion referred
repeatedly to a "popular consultation" as the outcome the
Polisario desired for the Sahrawis, rather than specifically
a "referendum." When we questioned him about that, he seemed
to equate the two, but it was a departure from his usual
rhetoric.


6. (C) Although Beissat caveated his views as those of a
"junior diplomat," he noted that most every matter of
significance to the Polisario leadership was on his radar
screen given the importance of the Polisario's relationship
with Algeria. Listing the activities his embassy was
required to support, Beissat even mentioned military training
provided by the Algerians to the Polisario. At another loose
moment, Beissat mentioned that Mouloud Said, the Polisario
representative in Washington, had been assuring the Polisario
leadership until late in the process that the U.S. would
maintain its express support for self-determination. When
the U.S. draft resolution omitted mention of
self-determination, Abdelaziz had been unpleasantly
surprised. Beissat noted, perhaps jokingly, that Mouloud
Said might not be in Washington much longer.
FORD