Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ALGIERS52
2007-01-17 16:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Algiers
Cable title:  

POLISARIO AMBASSADOR HOSTILE TO AUTONOMY

Tags:  PREL PBTS PHUM MO AG WI 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHAS #0052/01 0171605
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171605Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2703
INFO RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 6432
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 1576
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 5892
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1487
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2049
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 8511
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 2837
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0417
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0387
C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000052 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2017
TAGS: PREL PBTS PHUM MO AG WI
SUBJECT: POLISARIO AMBASSADOR HOSTILE TO AUTONOMY
DISCUSSIONS

REF: A. 06 STATE 662755

B. 06 ALGIERS 1450

C. 06 ALGIERS 2025

Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford; reasons 1.4 b, d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000052

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2017
TAGS: PREL PBTS PHUM MO AG WI
SUBJECT: POLISARIO AMBASSADOR HOSTILE TO AUTONOMY
DISCUSSIONS

REF: A. 06 STATE 662755

B. 06 ALGIERS 1450

C. 06 ALGIERS 2025

Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford; reasons 1.4 b, d.


1. (C) SUMMARY: Polisario Ambassador Beissat told us January
14 that the Polisario had perceived a marked recent shift in
U.S. policy on the Western Sahara. The Polisario now viewed
the U.S. as doing France's bidding and supporting the
Moroccan position. Beissat insisted that any discussions
with Morocco on the Western Sahara needed to take up where
the Baker Plan left off: the holding of a referendum. DCM
noted that Morocco ultimately rejected the Baker Plan and
encouraged the Polisario to talk directly with Morocco about
its expected autonomy proposal. The Polisario should see the
Moroccan proposal as a beginning rather than an end. Beissat
indicated the Polisario would talk with Morocco about a
solution only within the correct international legal
framework. Even if that occurred, he believed that only a
member of the Moroccan royal household could be a legitimate
interlocutor.


2. (C) Summary (cont'd): Beissat complained that the
government of Algeria did little to advance the Polisario's
cause diplomatically beyond reciting standard talking points
on the right to self-determination. He said his usual
interlocutor on Polisario issues at the MFA was Minister
Delegate Messahel, but he had occasional meetings with FM
Bedjaoui. He also claimed he had good access to Algerian
ministers and did not face the same constraints from MFA in
arranging meetings as other ambassadors in Algiers. Beissat
closed the discussion by noting that time for finding a
solution on the Western Sahara was on the side of the
Polisario because it was supported by international law and
the United Nations. In his view, Morocco would respond to
Sahrawi grievances only under pressure. While Morocco needed
a speedy settlement for internal political reasons (growing
Islamist pressure),Beissat maintained that the Polisario
would rather wait -- or push -- for the right settlement of
the Western Sahara dispute than accept autonomy. He did not

completely rule out negotiations with the Moroccans, but made
clear they would have to occur within a UN framework. END
SUMMARY.

U.S. HAS TAKEN MOROCCO'S SIDE
--------------


3. (C) Polisario Ambassador to Algeria (and Sahrawi MFA
Secretary General-designate) Mohamed Beissat, in a discussion

SIPDIS
with DCM and PolEc Chief January 14, expressed sharp
disappointment at the U.S. abstention on the recent UNGA
Fourth Committee resolution on the Western Sahara. He said
the change in the U.S. position on a resolution that was
identical to what the U.S. had supported the previous year,
combined with the NSC's September meeting with CORCAS,
underscored a dramatic shift in U.S. policy in favor of
Morocco. The U.S., he complained, had no reason to do the
bidding of France; the Polisario and the Sahrawi people had
done nothing to merit such treatment. DCM noted that the
U.S. was not alone in abstaining on this year's resolution
and that other European nations had also changed position and
abstained. DCM rejected the notion that the U.S. was
colluding with France, underscoring that the U.S. position on
the Western Sahara had not fundamentally changed.

AUTONOMY CANNOT BE THE BASIS FOR DISCUSSION
--------------


4. (C) Beissat clearly stated the Polisario's opposition to
any discussions on the future status of the Western Sahara
that started at a point other than Morocco's acceptance to
hold a referendum, which Beissat maintained was agreed to as
part of the Baker Plan. After listening patiently to
Beissat's review of Polisario grievances with Morocco in past
negotiations, DCM observed that Morocco ultimately refused to
accept the Baker Plan -- which was why the U.S. was now
pursuing an alternative approach. He told Beissat that the
U.S. had stressed to Morocco the need to present a credible
autonomy proposal as a basis for negotiation. DCM also
pressed Beissat on the need for direct discussions between

Morocco and the Polisario.


5. (C) Beissat said the Polisario could not accept using a
Moroccan autonomy plan as the basis for discussions on the
future of the Western Sahara. For one thing, accepting
discussions on autonomy would signal Polisario abandonment of
the Sahrawi people's right to self-determination. For
another, Morocco "has no right" to make a one-sided proposal.
The conflict is a UN issue, he said, and any discussions
should occur within that framework. A referendum, he
continued, was the only way for the Sahrawis to choose
independence from Morocco, integration with it, or some form
of autonomy. Starting discussions on an autonomy proposal --
an approach that Beissat insisted had no basis in
international law -- was unacceptable.

ROYAL MOROCCAN HOUSEHOLD MUST BE ENGAGED
--------------


6. (C) DCM and PolEc Chief noted that in the current
post-Baker Plan environment, a Moroccan autonomy proposal was
the only vehicle for discussions between the parties. The
Polisario's discussion of it with the Moroccans would not
signal Polisario acceptance of it. The Polisario could make
counter proposals, we stressed. What was not in the
Polisario interest, in the U.S. view, was to turn down the
opportunity to talk. Beissat countered that the Polisario
would be open to discussion of a proposal managed and tabled
by the UN. Agreeing to discuss Morocco's plan, in contrast,
would be tantamount to accepting King Mohammed VI as the
Sahrawi sovereign and was not acceptable.


7. (C) Leaving aside the readiness and willingness of the
Polisario to discuss a Moroccan autonomy proposal, PolEc
Chief asked Beissat for his views on prospective Moroccan
interlocutors. Beissat responded that Taieb Fassi Fihri was
very hostile to the Polisario and made clear in stark terms
that he lacked credibility with the Polisario. Beissat said
a member of the royal family or a senior royal counselor
would be the best interlocutor -- notwithstanding Polisario
objection to discussion of an autonomy proposal -- if there
was to be any hope of a political settlement. Ultimately,
concluded Beissat, the King would determine what was
acceptable to Morocco. Beissat also offered that any
discussions with Morocco, in his view, should take place
under UN auspices in a third country that was trusted by both
parties.

GOA DIPLOMACY LIMITED TO USUAL TALKING POINTS
--------------


8. (C) On the relationship between the Polisario and Algeria,
Beissat commented that during his recent tour of Latin
America to seek diplomatic recognition of the Sahrawi Arab
Democratic Republic, the Algerian government had provided no
support. His hotel arrangements and meetings were
coordinated mainly out of the Polisario's regional embassy in
Havana. Beissat claimed that Algeria did not lift a finger
to help the Polisario in pushing its diplomatic interests
abroad. Quipping that an Algerian diplomat "doesn't say
hello without instructions from Algiers," Beissat said even
when the GOA could be helpful on issues like recognition it
was not. He cited the example of South Africa, with which
Algeria had good relations, as one country that the Algerians
had not helped encourage to recognize the Polisario. Beissat
described Algerian policy as being limited strictly to a set
of talking points supporting the right of self-determination
of the Sahrawi people and the need to resolve the dispute
over the Western Sahara in the context of decolonization.


9. (C) Despite that, Beissat said he had excellent access to
ministers in the Algerian government. While senior Polisario
officials, like the "defense minister" would call Algerian
officials directly, he said most communications with the
government of Algerian went through him. (Comment: Unlike
the rest of the diplomatic corps, Beissat appeared not to be
stymied in his requests for meetings by Algerian MFA
protocol. Beissat told us he generally submitted the
required diplomatic note requests, especially when traveling
outside of Algiers, but called ministers directly to fix a
time for his meetings. Other ambassadors have been rapped on

the knuckles repeatedly for doing this. Beissat said that as
the Sahrawi ambassador he has easy access. Beissat also
mentioned that he met at MFA with FM Bedjaoui, but usually
dealt with Minister Delegate Messahel on Polisario concerns.
End Comment.)

TIME (AND VIOLENCE?) ON POLISARIO'S SIDE
--------------


10. (C) Beissat made a point toward the end of our discussion
of noting that, as regarded finding a solution on the Western
Sahara, time was on the Polisario's side. The Sahrawis had
UN support and international law on their side. At the same
time, past experience had taught the Sahrawis that the
Moroccan leadership ("makhzen") only responded to pressure,
be it international or internal. The U.S. and other members
of the international community should press the Moroccans to
fulfill their obligations under UN resolutions and
international law. If that did not occur, he said, the
Polisario had made problems for Morocco in the past and could
do so again, especially if Morocco was wedded to autonomy as
the only solution. He blustered that the Polisario could
strike the Moroccans again if it wanted to do so. Beissat
claimed that the Moroccan leadership faced growing opposition
from Islamists anyway, and needed a quick resolution of the
Western Sahara conflict for internal political reasons. The
Polisario, he said, would wait for the right solution rather
than accept a bad one. DCM reiterated the importance of
talking to the Moroccans directly and considering any
autonomy proposal as a starting point rather than an end
point.


11. (C) COMMENT: Beissat took a surprisingly hard line in
his discussion with us. When not accompanied by other
Polisario officials in the past, he has sometimes shown signs
of flexibility. This was not one of those times. It was
clear that he and the Polisario believe the U.S. has made a
deliberate decision at the highest level to take Morocco's
side over the disputed Western Sahara. The Polisario appears
to have hardened its attitudes on discussions as a result.
While he hinted that the Polisario might begrudgingly agree
to talk directly with Moroccan officials, he made clear that
it would only occur in circumstances consonant with what he
called "international legality." He once again ruled out a
unilateral autonomy proposal as a satisfactory basis for
discussions.
FORD