Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ALGIERS410
2007-03-27 07:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Algiers
Cable title:  

OPPOSITION PARTIES TAKING DIFFERENT PATHS

Tags:  PGOV KDEM AG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAS #0410/01 0860741
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 270741Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3309
INFO RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 6537
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 1694
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2120
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1553
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0884
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 2917
C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000410 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM AG
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION PARTIES TAKING DIFFERENT PATHS

REF: A. ALGIERS 282


B. ALGIERS 330

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Thomas F. Daughton;
reasons 1.4 (b, d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000410

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM AG
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION PARTIES TAKING DIFFERENT PATHS

REF: A. ALGIERS 282


B. ALGIERS 330

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Thomas F. Daughton;
reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The four major Algerian opposition parties
-- the Socialist Workers' Party, the moderate Islamist
Movement for National Reform (Islah),the Rally for Culture
and Democracy (RCD),and the Front of Socialist Forces (FFS)
-- are taking very different approaches in the lead up to May
17 parliamentary election. The FFS has chosen to boycott the
poll; the Socialist Workers' and RCD Parties are actively
competing for seats; and Islah, prohibited by the government
from appearing on the ballot under the leadership of its
leader, Abdallah Djaballah (ref A),is trying to run
candidates as independents. According to an Islah MP,
Interior Minister Zerhouni told Djaballah that the latter's
arch rival, Mohamed Boulahia, was officially considered to be
Islah's "temporary leader." While effectively sidelining
Djaballah's Islah from the electoral process, the government
has given the RCD leader, Said Sadi, unprecedented access to
government-owned media in an attempt to showcase that the May
election will be fully contested. End Summary.

OUT OF THE GAME ENTIRELY
--------------


2. (C) Islah Party Secretary and MP Lakhdar Benkhellaf gave
PolEc Chief a readout March 26 of the meeting he and
Djaballah had the previous day with Interior Minister
Zerhouni. According to Benkhellaf, Zerhouni said that Islah
could not appear on the ballot for the May parliamentary
election under Djaballah's leadership. Zerhouni informed
Djaballah that the government considered Mohamed Boulahia the
"temporary leader" of Islah while disputes surrounding the
party leadership were resolved in the Algerian courts.
Djaballah, according to Benkhellaf, pointed out to Zerhouni
that two separate 2006 court decisions resolved matters in
his favor, not Boulahia's. Zerhouni did not respond to
Djaballah's "case closed" argument. Zerhouni conceded,
however, that Djaballah and his leadership could continue to
occupy Islah's headquarters since Boulahia's leadership was
only "temporary." (Comment: Zerhouni is doing Djaballah no
favors and likely wishes to avoid the spectacle of evicting

Djaballah's loyalists by force. End Comment.) Benkhellaf
predicted that the cloud over Djaballah's leadership of Islah
would dissipate following the election and that he would once
again be allowed to lead Islah "permanently." Of course,
added Benkhellaf, Islah at that point will be but a shell of
its former self.


3. (C) According to Benkhellaf, in their meeting Djaballah
asked Zerhouni for a written decision on the party's
leadership. Zerhouni said there would be no written decision
and stated that Boulahia -- as "temporary leader" of Islah --
could field candidates in the May election under the Islah
banner. Benkhellaf told PolEc Chief that Boulahia and his
leadership comprised a maximum of ten individuals, and the
Islah MP claimed that the total number of Boulahia loyalists
was no more than 30. Benkhellaf observed that Boulahia would
be unable to win any seats given that level of support. That
being the case, he said, Djaballah had told Zerhouni that
Boulahia's status as "temporary leader" was clearly part of a
larger government conspiracy to prevent Islah from winning
any seats as a party. Benkhellaf observed that the only way
he and other Islah members could win parliamentary seats
would be by running as independent candidates. He said this
was an uphill battle, but he believed there was a good chance
that he and nine other Islah members could win the ten seats
required to form a parliamentary group in the next session of
parliament. Benkhellaf nonetheless conceded that quantity of
seats was a far cry from the 42 seats Islah won in the last
parliamentary election.

BOYCOTT OR PARTICIPATE?
--------------


4. (C) The FFS, a predominantly Berber party with a socialist
orientation, announced in early March that it will boycott
the upcoming election. Its de facto leader, Ali Laskri, told
Charge and PolEc Chief March 19 that as long as the state of
emergency continued and Algerians could not express
themselves freely in a closed political space, there was
little point contesting in a rigged election that at best
would garner the party seats in an ineffective parliament.
Charge told Laskri while we respected the FFS decision to
boycott the elections, we nonetheless regretted it because
the party's winning even a handful of seats in parliament
would give it a national platform for its ideas. Unlike
Laskri, the other socialist leader in the field, Louisa
Hanoune, is on the campaign trail. As the leader of the
Socialist Workers' Party, Hanoune declined to meet with us,
citing her busy campaign schedule. (Comment: Since the
rallying cry of her campaign is opposing U.S. political and
economic aims, the unavailability of members of her party to
meet with us is not surprising. End Comment.)


5. (C) Unlike the FFS, the other predominantly Berber
political party, RCD, is actively campaigning. RCD leader
Said Sadi told Charge and PolEc Chief March 18 that he
expected RCD to win 40-50 seats in May if there was no fraud.
Sadi said in the 1997 parliamentary election RCD was awarded
only four seats in the wilaya (province) of Algiers, even
though it should have rightfully won 15 out of the 24
contested seats that year. Shortly before our meeting, the
RCD leader was invited to speak live on the
government-controlled radio for 90 minutes -- the first such
invitation since 2004. Sadi, who told us that Djaballah had
been excluded from the election without any legal basis,
wondered if his first invitation in three years to appear on
the electronic media was a new opening or a window that would
quickly close after the vote. (Note: Several political
observers have told us Sadi's new-found fame was no
coincidence in light of the decision to exclude Djaballah
from participating in the election. Our contacts, including
Benkhellaf, maintain that the GOA needed a strong opposition
figure on the airwaves to counter the public skepticism over
Djaballah's exclusion. End Note.) Sadi noted that if, as
the government maintains, holding a party congress is a
requirement for fielding candidates for the May elections,
Islah is not the sole transgressor. (Note: While we agree
with Sadi's reasoning, we are aware of no political parties
other than Islah being prevented from appearing on the ballot
for having failed to hold a party congress. End Note.)


6. (C) Sadi argued that despite the tilted playing field
facing opposition parties, there was "no alternative" to
participation in the election. Algeria had many problems, he
said, and from his private discussions with presidential
coalition parties there was an understanding that change was
needed. Sadi said that the governing coalition leaders'
recognition of the need for change had to be translated into
the government recognizing the need for change. If that
transformation took place, Sadi said, discussions with the
opposition could take place with the aim of jointly
addressing and fixing problems. He observed that President
Bouteflika had been a national figure since 1962. Despite
his contribution to removing terrorism as "general threat"
to society, Bouteflika had been on the political scene for
too long. The Algerian people, Sadi said, were frustrated
and joked to each other that Algeria had "much money and much
misery." Sadi said one of his concerns was the deterioration
of the army's cohesion since Bouteflika became president.
While establishing civilian control of the military was
vital, Sadi observed that this once highly functional
institution was now faring no better than the rest of
Algeria.


7. (C) COMMENT: Even in a culture where conspiracy theories
abound, the government's plot against Djaballah appears to be
real (see also ref B). Benkhellaf said Djaballah would soon
organize a press conference denouncing the government's
undemocratic and unlawful behavior. While Djaballah's
complaints will likely not be aired on radio or television,
both controlled by the government, the independent written
press' coverage of Djaballah will undoubtedly further fuel
the despair of Algerians who believe that they cannot
influence their government or meaningfully elect their
leaders. From our conversations with Algerians living in the
capital, it is evident that they see Djaballah's sidelining
and Sadi's sudden fame as a clear government effort to
manipulate them. Farther from the capital, though, we
suspect that Algerians whose primary or sole source of
national news is state media draw a different conclusion.
Those Algerians most likely take at face value Prime Minister
Belkhadem's March 20 assertions on national television that
the government supported the democratic process, meant no ill
will toward Islah, and was examining carefully the merits of
Djaballah's case.
DAUGHTON