Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ALGIERS331
2007-03-14 08:39:00
SECRET
Embassy Algiers
Cable title:  

OUYAHIA INCREASINGLY SEEN AS BOUTEFLIKA'S LIKELY

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM AG 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAS #0331/01 0730839
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 140839Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3212
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1547
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2114
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 1687
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 6531
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 2910
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
S E C R E T ALGIERS 000331 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM AG
SUBJECT: OUYAHIA INCREASINGLY SEEN AS BOUTEFLIKA'S LIKELY
SUCCESSOR

REF: A. ALGIERS 282


B. ALGIERS 30

Classified By: CDA, a.i. Thomas F. Daughton; reasons 1.4 (b, d).

S E C R E T ALGIERS 000331

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM AG
SUBJECT: OUYAHIA INCREASINGLY SEEN AS BOUTEFLIKA'S LIKELY
SUCCESSOR

REF: A. ALGIERS 282


B. ALGIERS 30

Classified By: CDA, a.i. Thomas F. Daughton; reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: Three reliable observers of Algerian politics
have told us recently that Major General Mohamed Mediene, the
powerful head of the intelligence and security services, is
working to favor former Prime Minister Ouyahia as the
eventual successor to President Bouteflika. Their opinions
vary as to whether Ouyahia will become Bouteflika's heir
apparent by returning to the prime ministry or by taking up a
yet-to-be-established office of vice president, but there is
definite agreement that Mediene is backing Ouyahia. These
sources also tell us that Bouteflika and Mediene seek to
reshape Algerian politics into two currents: one
conservative/Islamist led by PM Belkhadem and a second
modernist/nationalist led by Ouyahia.


2. (S) Summary (cont'd): Ouyahia confidant and member of
parliament Abdesslem Bouchouareb believes that Islah
political party leader Abdallah Djaballah's recent "removal"
from office (ref A) was in the making for at least two years
and that Bouteflika was fully complicit in it. Bouchouareb
predicts that the presidential alliance of FLN, RND, and MSP
will garner 65 percent of the vote in the May legislative
elections and that Ouyahia's party, RND, at a minimum will
win between 80 and 90 seats. While not predicting numeric
outcomes for the other two alliance parties, Bouchouareb
expects the FLN to take the lion's share of the seats and the
moderate Islamist Movement for a Society of Peace (MSP) to
struggle. End Summary.

RND MOMENTUM, FLN MISSTEPS
--------------


3. (C) MP Abdesslem Bouchouareb, personal secretary to
National Rally for Democracy (RND) head Ahmed Ouyahia, told
PolEc Chief March 12 that the RND expects to obtain 25
percent of the vote in the May parliamentary elections.
According to Bouchouareb, obtaining a quarter of the vote
would translate into 80-90 seats and place the RND second to
the National Liberation Front (FLN) of Prime Minister
Abdelaziz Belkhadem. He further predicted that the
presidential alliance composed of the RND, FLN and MSP would

collectively win 65 percent of the vote. Bouchouareb posited
that the MSP would struggle to do as well as it did in 2002
and would likely lose seats. He believed the predominantly
Berber Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD),the far-left
Workers' Party, and independent candidates -- many loyal to
Islah's Djaballah -- would garner the remaining 35 percent
and comprise the opposition.


4. (C) Bouchouareb acknowledged that the Algerian political
establishment would watch closely how well the RND performed
in the elections, since many consider the RND's fortunes
intertwined with those of former PM Ouyahia's chances of
succeeding President Bouteflika. Bouchouareb purported to
believe that the two events were not related, however, and
said that Ouyahia was prepared to serve in any leadership
capacity -- be it prime minister, vice president, or
eventually president. He asserted that the RND, alone among
major Algerian political parties in his view, did not face
internal strife. He also expressed satisfaction that the RND
stood to gain from any FLN missteps -- just as the FLN scored
handsomely over the RND in the 2002 legislative elections
when the RND was the largest political party in government.
Noting that the RND performed unexpectedly well in the
December 2006 senate elections (ref B),Bouchouareb made
clear that the party had both the momentum and opportunity to
score well in May, since "Belkhadem has his hands full with
FLN internal strife." In the end, Bouchouareb confided that
his assessment of the RND's chances was intentionally
conservative, as it was always better to score better than
the pubic and press expect.

ISLAMISTS VERSUS MODERNISTS
--------------


5. (S) Turning to Djaballah's problems with the Ministry of
Interior (ref A),Bouchouareb said what happened to Islah
"was not unexpected and has been in the planning for at least
a couple of years." He said Bouteflika and the head of the
intelligence and security directorate, Major General Mohamed
Mediene, actively supported the formation of two competing
Algerian electoral currents: one conservative/Islamist as
embodied by Belkhadem, and the other "modernist" as embodied
by the RND. Bouchouareb asserted that there was little
difference between Djaballah and Belkhadem "other than the
clothes that they wear." As for the MSP, Bouchouareb said
its foreign (Muslim Brotherhood) origins ensured that it
could not compete over the long term for the Algerian
Islamist vote. Noting that the FLN "leftists" had by and
large joined the Workers' Party, he said the FLN had become
increasingly conservative and Islamist. Meanwhile, the RND
remained the modernist, anti-Islamist party. Bouchouareb
said that while it was important that both currents work
together for the good of the nation, every car could only
have one driver: "Those behind the curtain" (i.e. Mediene)
"want RND doing the driving," concluded Bouchouareb.


6. (S) Bouchouareb said he expected the newly elected
parliament to amend the constitution later this year in order
to create the position of vice president. He emphasized that
Ouyahia had originally suggested to Bouteflika that any
proposed constitutional amendments pass through parliament
rather than by popular referendum. The FLN did not support
the parliamentary approach, however, so Bouteflika did not
pursue it. Bouchouareb, while not saying so explicitly, left
the clear impression that he believed Ouyahia was the leading
candidate to be the first vice president. Ismail Chikhoune,
who heads the U.S.-Algeria Business Council, told the
Ambassador in February that Ouyahia was Mediene's choice to
become either prime minister or vice president. To prevent
Belkhadem from challenging Ouyahia for the presidency before
the office of vice president was created, Chikhoune posited
that Mediene intended to make Belkhadem senate president
following the May elections. As senate president, Belkhadem
would briefly become acting president should Bouteflika die
in office, but would be barred by the constitution from being
a candidate in the elections that would follow. Chikhoune
also said that Bouteflika and Mediene had encouraged Ouyahia
after he stepped down as prime minister to shore up his base
by strengthening and consolidating the RND.

MEDIENE SHAPES ALGERIA'S FUTURE
--------------


7. (S) In a separate March 6 conversation with the Ambassador
and PolEc Chief, Union for Democracy and the Republic
Secretary General Amara Benyounes shared Bouchouareb's

SIPDIS
assessment that Mediene was pushing for the creation of a
Belkhadem-led conservative/Islamist current alongside a
"nationalist" movement under Ouyahia. Benyounes believed
that Belkhadem was a spent force politically, and Mediene did
not want him to remain prime minister following the May
elections. He predicted that Ouyahia, as Mediene's leading
candidate to succeed Bouteflika, would be named to that post
until the constitution could be amended to create a vice
presidency. Benyounes also remarked that Ouyahia was being
given time to strengthen the RND and the only result that
mattered in the May elections was the RND's score, since
Ouyahia's fortunes were linked to it.

COMMENT
--------------


8. (S) The RND is the one major political party (with the
possible exception of the socialist Workers' Party) that does
not visibly suffer from internal divisions. Provided that
situation holds through the elections, and if Bouchouareb's
electoral prediction of RND gains is accurate, Ouyahia will
be strengthened politically. Certainly Bouchouareb is right
that the RND gathered momentum from the recent senate
elections. More telling is the convergence of opinion from
sources close to General Mediene (Benyounes) and former PM
Ouyahia (Bouchouareb) that Ouyahia is Mediene's choice to
succeed Bouteflika. The theme of two competing currents in
Algerian politics, and Bouchouareb's clear linkage of it to
Djaballah's misfortunes, strikes us as the best theory to
date of the direction in which Algerian politics is headed.


9. (S) Algeria has long been governed, alternately more and
less behind the scenes, by varying groups of men known
collectively as "le pouvoir" ("the power"). In recent years,
it has become increasingly clear that the "pouvoir" now
consists primarily of Mediene and Bouteflika. With
Bouteflika's health in question, Mediene appears to be
providing much behind-the-scenes guidance and influence on
Algeria's future direction. In a telling statement,
Benyounes remarked that Mediene was making preparations for
Ouyahia to succeed President Bouteflika even though the
latter "hates Ouyahia." Based on the totality of the
conversations reported here, it appears that Mediene aims to
have Ouyahia replace Belkhadem as prime minister following
the May elections and plans to thwart Belkhadem's
presidential ambitions by moving him to the senate. As prime
minister, Ouyahia would push constitutional changes through
parliament to create a vice presidential post, which he would
then occupy to await Bouteflika's departure.
DAUGHTON