HATTAB CASE SHOWS RECONCILIATION STILL AN OPEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 001618

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2017
TAGS: PTER PGOV KISL AG
SUBJECT: HATTAB CASE SHOWS RECONCILIATION STILL AN OPEN
WOUND

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Thomas F. Daughton;
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Hassan Hattab, notorious for helping create
the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in 1998,
has become a symbol of the unresolved debate over national
reconciliation in Algeria. Although the details of his
situation are shrouded in mystery, a disproportionate amount
of recent press coverage has placed Hattab in official
custody awaiting consideration for amnesty under the 2005
Charter of National Reconciliation. At the same time, no
on-the-record statements have been made about Hattab's case
by Algerian officials. Despite being far less significant
than he once was, Hattab has been exploited as a propaganda
tool in part to take the temperature of a public for which
reconciliation remains a sensitive and unresolved issue. END
SUMMARY.

RECONCILIATION ADRIFT
--------------


2. (C) Amnesty is technically no longer an option for the
majority of ordinary terrorist holdouts, as the window for
applying under the Charter of Peace and National
Reconciliation expired in August 2006. However, according to
prominent human rights lawyer Miloud Brahimi, the terms of
the Charter can still be applied in selected cases at the
exclusive discretion of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika
himself. As a result of this exception, the Charter
continues to "hover in the air," according to Brahimi, with
its future and implementation uncertain. Brahimi, the
brother of respected Algerian diplomat and UN Special Envoy
Lakhdar Brahimi, told us on October 30 that the unresolved
fate of the Charter mirrors the fate of national
reconciliation itself, which remains "an open wound" for many
Algerian families. Brahimi conceded that the government does
not know what to do with reconciliation, since the majority
of Algerians still do not understand what happened to them
during the violence of the 1990s, and remain bewildered by
the savagery that tore families and neighbors apart.

HATTAB: MYTH VS REALITY
--------------


3. (C) In this context, the much-publicized case of Hassan
Hattab has become a symbol and a trial balloon for various
approaches to reconciliation. The November 5 front pages of
the French-language dailies Liberte, Le Soir d'Algerie and Le
Jeune Independant screamed of Hattab's absence from court on
November 4, the date he was expected to present himself for
the start of proceedings for terrorist acts against him.
According to Rosa Mansouri, who wrote the article for Le Soir
d'Algerie, prosecutors pushed the presiding judge to explain
Hattab's absence. Mansouri said the judge withdrew for 30
minutes, then returned and pronounced Hattab "en fuite" (at
large),which Mansouri explained is simply a technical
description of Hattab's absence and did not mean literally
that Hattab was free. Mansouri added that after the
attempted assassination of President Bouteflika at Batna in
September, Bouteflika is sensitive to high-profile terror
cases like Hattab and is playing for time to avoid inflaming
public opinion either for or against government handling of
the case.


4. (C) Algerian press reports assert that Hattab was taken
into custody by security forces at a safehouse just east of
Algiers on September 22, some two years after amnesty
negotiations allegedly began. What remains unclear is
whether Hattab had actually surrendered or was captured.
Continuing press coverage has highlighted his ineligibility
for the amnesty provision of the Charter, given his violent
past and the charges of terrorism against him. Brahimi said
the government is torn between the spirit of amnesty and
redemption that lay behind the concept of the Charter on the
one hand, and the tough stance required by the evolving AQIM
threat on the other. According to Anis Rahmani, editor in
chief of the new Algiers daily newspaper Annahar, the Hassan
Hattab of 2007 is clearly not the same man as the one who
created the GSPC in 1998. Rahmani, an authority on Islamist
and security issues alleged to have close ties to military
intelligence, told us on October 30 that Hattab has been out
of the terror business for over two years. Rahmani asserted

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that Hattab's surrender has had no effect on AQIM's
organization and operations, but Hattab's high profile made
him a perfect propaganda tool for the government.

DETAILS OF HATTAB'S ALLEGED DEAL
--------------


5. (C) Interior Minister Yazid Zerhouni spoke frequently to
the press in 2006 about the number of surrendered terrorists
as a demonstration that the Charter, passed by national
referendum in late 2005, was a success. As of the technical
end of the amnesty period in August 2006, the number of
surrendered terrorists hovered around 300 -- a figure that
was obviously well below expectations, according to Brahimi.
During the same period, the Algerian media began reporting
that the government was negotiating with Hattab to accept the
amnesty provisions of the Charter and use his influence to
convince his fellow extremists to follow suit. Because of
Hattab's sensitive background (he planned and committed or at
least took part in a number of terrorist attacks and
massacres),he himself was technically not eligible to take
advantage of the amnesty provisions, according to a number of
security officers and jurists. However, according to
Rahmani, Hattab has been negotiating with the government to
benefit from the Charter in exchange for information on other
terrorist holdouts. Meanwhile, press coverage on Hattab's
status has come in spurts, alternating between a pro-Charter
approach and a harder, uncompromising line. According to
Brahimi, this is the result of the government using the media
to vet different approaches to Hattab and take the
temperature of the population. It is perhaps significant
that there have been no official statements regarding
negotiations with Hattab; all information surrounding this
case has been disseminated through the media citing anonymous
sources.

THE DEMONIZING OF HATTAB
--------------


6. (C) The periodic press leaks on the alleged negotiations
with Hattab track a pattern set by the government in recent
years with other terrorist figures. Rahmani told us that the
thought of Hattab cooperating with the government presumably
weakened his influence with his extremist counterparts and
sowed suspicion among them. The hoped-for result --
infighting, mistrust and suspicion within the terrorist ranks
-- endangered Hattab's life but also assisted the government
in its ongoing struggle to capture/kill AQIM terrorists.
AQIM has proven effective at assassinating its own members
suspected of collaboration. Pushing Hattab's former
colleagues to turn on him could be seen as a welcome
secondary goal of the propaganda program.

COMMENT: BALANCING AN OLD CHARTER WITH A NEW THREAT
-------------- --------------


7. (C) It is difficult to determine whether Hattab gradually
lost his influence within the GSPC/AQIM as a result of a
successful propaganda campaign or whether he truly had a
change of heart and is cooperating with the government
against his former terrorist associates. What is clear is
that the merger between GSPC and AQIM has complicated the
resolution that the Charter of Peace and National
Reconciliation was designed to achieve. While the Charter
has not become obsolete, its fate is uncertain, as Algerians
try to confront a different terror threat while the open
wounds of the 1990s civil war and incomplete national
reconciliation continue to fester. Many contacts tell us
that President Bouteflika himself remains firmly attached to
the provisions and intent of the Charter, but that others in
the senior leadership have grown less supportive. The case
of Hassan Hattab and the media attention it has received
suggest that the fate of the Charter, like the psychological
status of reconciliation itself, is in limbo, with the
government uncertain of how to proceed.
FORD