ALGERIA ANTI-EXTREMIST MESSAGING: BIG GOA ROLE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001472

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2017
TAGS: KPAO PTER PREL AG
SUBJECT: ALGERIA ANTI-EXTREMIST MESSAGING: BIG GOA ROLE,
SMALL AMERICAN ONE.

REF: A. SECSTATE 115349

B. RABAT 01487

C. TUNIS 1211

Classified By: Ambassador Robert Ford; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Algerian communication efforts to counter
Al-Qaeda and religious extremism are serious and based on the
premise that greater state involvement in religious life will
prevent a return to the turmoil of 1990s. GOA messaging
tactics are focused primarily through the Ministry of
Religious Affairs (MoRA) on imam training, mosque
construction and staffing, and message control, in addition
to carefully selected moderate religious programming
presented on state-run television. There is no question that
the GOA shares the U.S. goal of undermining the ideological
recruiting grounds for terrorists (ref A),as senior
officials repeat time and again how few others recognize the
problem as viscerally as they do. The GoA has leverage
through salaries and the security services over much - if not
most - of the sermonizing in the mosques. Anecdotal evidence
and press reports suggest that GOA control over mosque
messaging and Islam in Algeria is not fully successful. In
addition, the GoA has little control over what young people
watch on satellite television and the internet. Moreover,
the underlying socio-economic discontent that fuels
radicalization of many young people on religious grounds
remains unaddressed. END SUMMARY.

"BETTER TO BE MANIPULATED BY THE RIGHT PEOPLE"
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2. (C) PolEc Chief and Pol Specialist visited Abdellah
Tamine, Counselor to the Minister and Director of
Communications at the MoRA, on October 3. Tamine is known to
be a more forward-looking and modern official, and is largely
responsible for the MoRA's increased visibility and
engagement with the press over the last year or two. Tamine
explained that the vast majority of the population "are
subject to manipulation" and easily confused by the internet,
external influences and inaccurate religious messaging. He
explained that religious extremism was able to tear the
country apart in the 1990s because "the state was absent,"
and that the top priority of his ministry was to preserve
national and religious unity, avoiding a return to the 1990s
at all costs. By ensuring that Algerian imams are fully
trained and Algerian Muslims are receiving messages of pure,
moderate Islam at the mosque, terrorists will have a smaller
pool of potential recruits from which to draw. As long as
manipulation is a given, "it is better to be manipulated by
the right people," Tamine concluded.

THE MOSQUE FAR OUTREACHES THE INTERNET
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3. (C) Although it is growing at some 8 percent per year,
internet penetration in Algeria remains at less than 3
percent of the population, according to Algerie Telecom. The
MoRA therefore relies heavily on its control of mosque
messaging to counter extremism. Tamine pointed out that
every Friday, 17 million Algerians attend prayers and hear
the Friday sermon. (Note: Post considers this figure to be
an exaggeration; however, we do agree that the mosque has a
greater reach than the internet in Algeria. End note.) This
"human internet" then has the potential to reach the
remainder of the country's population of 35 million by
discussing what they have heard with just one other person.
Meanwhile, the MoRA cooperates with the Ministry of
Communication to present moderate religious programming on
state-run television. The Friday prayer from either Algiers
or the Emir Abdel Qader mosque in Constantine is televised,
and two weekly religious programs address social issues.
Fatawa 'ala el Hawa'a is a Thursday question and answer
program moderated by an imam, in which two sheikhs answer
viewer's questions about social issues such as divorce.
Fada'a el Joma'a, aired after the Friday prayer, features
often non-Algerian Islamic scholars discussing themes such as
educational reform and self-improvement. Both programs call
for moderation and dialogue.

STAFFING CRISIS A MAJOR OBSTACLE
--------------

ALGIERS 00001472 002 OF 003




4. (C) Tamine explained that the GOA was confident in its
ability to disseminate messages of moderation to counter
extremism and terrorist ideology, provided each mosque is
fully staffed with a trained imam at the helm. Currently, a
dramatic mosque staffing crisis is the MoRA's highest
priority. According to Tamine, it takes a staff of five to
run a mosque, including the imam, muezzin (prayer caller),
murshida (women's religious guide) and two others to assist
with upkeep. The roughly 15 thousand mosques across Algeria
are run by a combined staff of 22 thousand, far fewer than
the 75 thousand the MoRA says are required. Tamine explained
that at current budget levels, 500 mosque employees are added
each year, meaning it would be well over a hundred years
before Algeria's mosques are fully staffed, before even
considering that an additional 3600 mosques are in
development.

WANTED: IMAMS, SALARY COMPETITIVE
--------------


5. (C) The Algerian press reported last week that the GOA was
preparing to raise the salaries of imams in 2008 considerably
more than expected increases in civil service salaries.
Actual increases have not been officially announced in any
sector, but the amount of the anticipated civil service wage
increase is largely perceived as a litmus test of whether the
GOA can redress economic discontent, decreased purchasing
power and the perception that hydrocarbon wealth is not
trickling down to the masses. Tamine said that the MoRA was
eager to recruit new imams, and was doing everything it could
to make salaries stand out from the civil service, although
he was careful not to commit to specific numbers. Salaries,
he acknowledged, were part of the recruiting strategy the GOA
hoped to use to compete with the incentives offered by
religious extremists.


6. (C) Increasing salaries, Tamine said, are also the primary
tool to prevent the politicization of imams. It is only
natural, according to Tamine, for political parties to
recognize the influence of the mosque by trying to buy imam
loyalty in the form of sermons sympathetic to their
particular party. Although the degree of the expected salary
increase remains to be seen, the GOA hopes that these
additional financial incentives will both increase imam
recruitment and also decrease corruptibility.

THE MINBAR IS NOT OPEN TO JUST ANYONE
--------------


7. (C) The MoRA produces imams at eight religious schools
around the country. Three years of study are generally
sufficient to qualify an imam to deliver sermons and lead
prayers. Tamine pointed out, however, that the MoRA
carefully monitored who was allowed to speak at the minbar,
with government officials attending the vast majority of
Friday services across the country. Additional years of
advanced study can lead to the rank of mufti, although there
are only 12 muftis currently in Algeria, according to Tamine.
While there were objective MoRA standards for the
qualification of imams, assessing the credentials of a
would-be mufti depends on a mix of experience, level of study
and publications, much as an American university considers a
professor for tenure.

NOT EVERYONE IS CONVINCED
--------------


8. (C) Anecdotal evidence and press reports suggest that all
is not calm, and that GOA control over mosque messaging and
Islam in Algeria is not fully successful. This control often
serves as a source of resentment among a population which
perceives Islam as just another area in which the GOA has
placed daily life out of reach. According to Tamine, some 96
imams have been assassinated since 2000, and a foreign
diplomat provided an unconfirmed report that a bomb was
discovered and dismantled at the MoRA itself on September 25.
In addition, we have seen little evidence that the GoA can
do much to limit what young Algerians find from Islamist
websites or what they see on some of the harder-line Arabic
satellite networks.


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WHAT THE U.S. CAN DO
--------------


9. (C) Television is the best way to reach the broad
Algerian public, especially outside the largest cities.
Embassy agrees with Rabat and Tunis recommendations (ref B
and C) that the U.S. focus its television efforts on the
pan-Arab satellite channels, and for Algeria al-Jazeera is
the most important although other networks have viewships
too. Algerian television itself is state-run, and even the
most modest PD efforts to air material on Algerian television
have been met with silence. Messages with visible U.S.
fingerprints are not generally credible among Algerians,
although post will continue to engage Algerian media on its
activities across the board. (Most Embassy Algiers media
engagement targets the dynamic and varied print media in
order to influence the Algerian elite.)


10. (C) Embassy also recommends pursuing large-scale
education and English-language initiatives as the most
effective means of countering radicalization in Algeria,
wherever the door is open to such programs. During October 7
meetings with Jared Cohen of the State Department's Policy
Planning Office, for example, the Algerian Secretary Generals
of the Ministries of Higher and National Education responded
favorably to an initial "Teach for Algeria" proposal that
seeks to export the success of Teach for America. Education
administrators report heavy demand among students for English
classes because young people - and our business sector
contacts - think that command of English gives a young
Algerian a far better chance of finding a job. Finally, by
continuing to promote economic and political reform wherever
opportunities exist within Algeria, the Embassy can help
address the root causes of disenchantment and radicalization,
although the GOA must recognize this as the true front line
by taking concrete and visible steps of its own.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) Algeria's greatest fear is any kind of instability
that could cause it to relive the turmoil of the 1990s. Set
in this context, the question of radicalization and
countering extremist and terrorist ideology in Algeria is
largely - but not exclusively - one of socio-economic
discontent. Islam, for now, is not the battleground to fight
extremism and al-Qaeda recruitment in Algeria, the way it is
in Europe and North America where imams are far less
controlled by the state. Although GOA control over religious
messaging is not absolute, the state-managed system joined
with the credibility hit Islamists suffered from the 1990s,
has been effective in limiting the influence of extremist
messengers. The Embassy's diagnosis of potential
radicalization hinges not upon the mosque, but by what the
GOA has missed to date: the urgent need for political and
economic reform. While the great majority of mosques
reliably deliver anti-extremist messages millions every
Friday, the credibility of these messages is still linked
inexorably to popular perceptions of a government that has
failed to address basic needs.


12. (C) Post points of contact on this issue will be
Political-Economic Section Chief Mark Schapiro and Public
Affairs Officer Rafik Mansour.
FORD