EVOLVING AQIM TERROR HAS ALGERIANS CONCERNED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 001352

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2017
TAGS: ASEC PTER PGOV PINS CASC AG
SUBJECT: EVOLVING AQIM TERROR HAS ALGERIANS CONCERNED

REF: A. A. ALGIERS 1329

B. B. ALGIERS 1350

ALGIERS 00001352 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: CDA, a.i. Thomas F. Daughton; reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Meetings with GOA contacts following a
recent bombing uptick in the Kabylie region reveal a
government concerned and sober about its ability to keep up
with an adaptive and increasingly sophisticated enemy. By
reaching out for more technology and information, the GOA
has demonstrated an awareness that its own militaristic
approach to fighting terror has not evolved as quickly as
have enemy terror tactics over the past year. The GOA
continues to capture terrorists in frequent operations that
are embellished and splashed across the front pages, while
privately acknowledging that more terrorists are being
made, and not all are homegrown. Meanwhile, attacks over
the past year have become increasingly cosmopolitan,
featuring a developing use of IEDs, different suicide car
bomb techniques and, for the first time, a suicide vest.
The variation in tactics inspired by Al Qaeda attacks in
Iraq and elsewhere has kept the GOA on its toes, uncertain
of what comes next. END SUMMARY.

THE ENEMY EVOLVES...
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2. (C) Since the multiple car bomb attacks in eastern
Algiers in late October 2006, Algeria's diet of terrorism
has featured IEDs of changing size, target and
sophistication. A roadside bomb attack on an American
company shuttle bus in western Algiers on December 10,
2006, killed two, including one foreigner. February 2007
brought the use of multiple, simultaneous, large VBIED
attacks on government sites in the Kabylie. March saw a
repeat of the December 10 scenario, this time against a bus
carrying Russian and Ukrainian workers near Ain Defla. The
multiple attacks in Algiers on April 11 represented the
first suicide car bomb (SVBIED) attacks in the Algerian
theater, and came less than three months after the former
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) formally
changed its name to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM). Regardless of how formal AQIM's links to the
central Al Qaeda command might be, it seems clear that the
arrival of Al Qaeda-style suicide attacks in Algeria
represented a change in tactics inspired by Al Qaeda's
operations in Iraq and elsewhere.


3. (C) Through the summer of 2007, IED usage increased in
sophistication, making more frequent use of remote control
and cell phone detonators. In the same period, SVBIED use
also increased. As evidenced by the July 11 SVBIED attack
on a military base in Lakhdaria and the very similar
September 8 SVBIED attack on a coast guard base in Dellys,
suicide attacks once considered the exception now appear to
be becoming the norm. For the first time on September 6, a
bomber wearing a suicide vest was responsible for an
assassination attempt in Batna against President Abdelaziz
Bouteflika (he missed Bouteflika but killed 22 other
people). A further innovation -- or importation -- of
tactics was revealed on September 21, when a SVBIED in
motion changed direction on the highway to attack a
military-escorted convoy of the French construction company
Razel. (Note: the French convoy had followed the same
route at regular and recurring times. End note.)

...WHILE THE GOA SCRATCHES ITS HEAD
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4. (C) Publicly, the GOA still presents an aggressive and
confident approach to fighting terror, and press elements
with ties to the security services continue to feature
almost daily reports of triumphant military activities
against pockets of insurgents in the mountains to reassure
a troubled public. The Embassy received the same
consistent message from several different GOA ministers
during recent meetings -- that the war on terror "has been
won" in Algeria and the real challenge now lies in
reforming the economy and finding employment and
opportunity for Algeria's youth.


5. (C) Over the last few days, however, Embassy meetings
with key Algerian military contacts have revealed growing
government concern about how to handle suicide bombers and

ALGIERS 00001352 002.2 OF 002


the increased variety and sophistication of enemy attacks.
Convinced that U.S. technology and information, rather than
a change in approach, would offer a silver bullet to fight
suicide bombers, some GOA officials have revealed their
frustration and relative desperation in the face of this
new threat, even suggesting that the U.S. might be to blame
for not providing Algeria with the tools it needs to defeat
the threat.

THE RAMADAN FACTOR: SHORTCUT TO PARADISE?
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6. (C) Islamic extremists in Algeria consider the holy
month of Ramadan to be a month of Jihad. Extremist
websites espouse the view that suicide attacks conducted
during this month guarantee the bombers a place in
paradise. According to the websites, although Muslims are
banned from fighting other Muslims during Ramadan, they may
engage in attacks against non-Muslims. Two upcoming dates
are of note: Laylat al-Qadr, the night of October 8-9,
during which the gates of paradise are supposedly open to
those who wage war in defense of Islam; and September 29,
the anniversary of the Battle of Badr fought by the Prophet
Muhammad against non-Muslim Persians. AQIM appears to have
adopted some of these views, as the AQIM web video of the
April 11 attack is entitled "the Battle of Badr."

COMMENT: WHAT GOES AROUND...
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7. (C) The GOA has realized it is facing an evolving
threat. Behind its facade of victorious public rhetoric,
GOA sources privately concede that AQIM has become agile
and flexible over the past year, hiding in the mountains
and adapting its technology and tactics faster than
Algerian security services can keep pace. (Ref B reports
on new attacks directed against foreigners during the past
week.) The evolution of AQIM's tactics is due at least in
part to imported techniques, inspiration and training from
Al Qaeda in Iraq and elsewhere. That being the case, we
expect the tactical evolution we have seen since October
2006 to continue. The ability of the Algerian government
to adapt the tactics it forged in the Islamist insurgency
of the 1990s in order to defeat an innovative and suicidal
enemy remains unclear.
DAUGHTON