ALGERIAN MFA: WE ARE WAITING FOR TOURE TO KEEP

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 001336

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2022
TAGS: REL MARR AG ML
SUBJECT: ALGERIAN MFA: WE ARE WAITING FOR TOURE TO KEEP
HIS PROMISES

REF: A. BAMAKO 1029

B. BAMAKO 1015

C. BAMAKO 1017

D. ALGIERS 1278

Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: MFA Director General (A/S equivalent)
for African Affairs Chergui told Ambassador on 9/17 that
Malian
President Toure must pull troops out of Kidal and take
steps to start reintegrating Tuareg fighters back into
their communities in order to end the fighting in northern
Mali. Chergui said that both measures were integral parts
of the Algiers Accords and there was no hope of securing
the terms of the accords without them. Chergui said the
Algerian government is sending in more supplies to the
Malian garrison besieged in Tinzawaten, and he acknowledged
that rebel leader Bahanga is also getting supplies, although
he claimed it was only indirectly. He underlined that while
the Algerian government thinks the Malian army should quit
Kidal, it also hopes the Malians will have a credible
garrison permanently in Tinzawaten, backed by Tuareg special
security units under Malian control, in order to police the
Algerian-Malian border. He asked for an American
contribution to the small fund established to help
reintegrate Tuareg fighters into their communities. End
Summary.

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ALGIERS: MALIANS AND TUAREGS ARE TALKING READILY
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2. (C) Chergui asserted that lines of communication
between the Malian government and Bahanga were open. He
thought that Iyad ag Ghali was playing a useful role and
seemed surprised when Ambassador noted we were hearing
reports to
the contrary. Chergui then brushed the issue aside and
noted that the Algerian ambassador in Bamako has a mandate
from Algiers to work with both sides to end the dispute.
The Algerian ambassador, he stated, has good contacts with
both the government and the ADC as well as Bahanga.

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BESIEGED TOWN OF TINZAWATEN AND THE GARRISON'S FUTURE
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3. (C) Chergui said that as part of an agreement with the
GoM dating to the beginning of September, the Algerian army
provided food supplies to the besieged Malian garrison in
Tinzawaten on September 17. The Algerians had agreed
to supply the Tinzawaten garrison for thirty days during
which time they hope a more durable settlement can be
reached; the September 17 delivery was ten days' worth of
food.
Chergui noted that the Algerian army carefully calculates how
many Malian soldiers are in the garrison and exactly how many
supplies they need. (Comment: This must come easily for
the exasperatingly lawyer-like Algerians. End Comment.)
He commented that the Algerians are not directly supplying
the Bahanga forces surrounding the town. Rather, under
the broad supervision of the Algiers Accord implementation
committee, the Algerians are delivering supplies to Tuareg
civilians linked to the ADC. Those civilians in turn,
he stated, may choose turn over supplies to Bahanga's men
"for the prisoners." Chergui insisted that the GoA is not
working directly with Bahanga, nor is it prepared to let
him or his men transit Algerian territory.


4. (C) Chergui said that the GoA is being careful not to
interfere in Malian internal affairs, but that President
Toure (or, he noted, the Malian government) must withdraw
Malian soldiers from Kidal. The Malian insertion of troops
into Kidal had helped start the current conflict and the
Algiers Accords require them to withdraw from the town.
(Chergui observed that the only reason the Malian army sent
the soldiers there in the first place was to tighten
control over the Tuareg, a strategy doomed to failure. He
wondered about the credibility of the Malian promises about
Kidal.) Chergui said that were the Malians to withdraw,
Bahanga would accept a ceasefire around Tinzawaten and
release
the prisoners he holds. He said the Algerians had not
discussed

sequencing of steps with either side, and they had not
communicated to Bahanga that his forces should pull back from
besieged Tinzawaten. Instead, he opined that were the Malian
army to pull out of Kidal Bahanga would be left isolated
among the ADC since many of its leaders had denounced
Bahanga's May 2007 coup effort.


5. (C) Chergui underlined that the Algerian government
wants a credible Malian army presence in Tinzawaten and
that there is nothing preventing it in the Algiers
Accord. Were the town garrisoned, he observed, it would be
harder for the Malian government to claim ignorance about
movements of terror groups in that area of the border.
Chergui said the Algerians also are urging the Malian
government
to move forward with forming all four of the Tuareg special
security units foreseen in the Algiers Accord to help block
terrorist group movements in northern Mali. Two of the
four units are being assembled and Algeria would like to
see the other two created as well. One could, he noted, be
based at Tinzawaten.

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ECONOMIC PROJECTS ARE VITAL
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6. (C) Chergui repeated what he told us last week about
the Malian government also needing to move ahead with a
small economic development program to help reintegrate
former fighters into northern communities. He underlined
the utility of even a small American contribution to the
fund established under the terms of the Algiers Accords.
Without movement on reintegration of Tuareg fighters and a
redeployment out of Kidal, Chergui asserted that there was
little hope of real stability in northern Mali.


7. (C) Chergui believed that the best way to deal with the
current conflict was through negotiations, though he
acknowledged that the military reinforcement of the
Tinzawaten garrison from Kidal might end the fighting "in the
next 48 hours." He asserted that the situation in Tinzawaten
could return to normality "very quickly," but it would
require the Malian government to decide to withdraw from
Kidal. Doing so, Chergui claimed, would reinforce the
relationship between the ADC and the government, and further
isolate Bahanga from the ADC. Chergui acknowledged that,
even with a negotiated settlement, Bahanga's situation would
become "very difficult." Bahanga knows, Chergui said, that
he has made a big mistake.

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COMMENT
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8. (C) At no point in this friendly conversation did
Chergui
state that Algeria was seeking to back President Toure;
indeed, he stayed studiously neutral in tone. (Part of
this may stem from Chergui's long diplomatic career, but we
suspect it also results at least in part from Algeria's
particular interest in the Tuaregs.) We also think that
the Algerians probably know more than their MFA is telling
us so far, and we'll have to keep up the conversation to
extract more from them. Chergui commented that Algeria
hoped the Tuaregs and the Malian government would find
peaceful ways to resolve their differences but he put the
burden of next steps very much on the Malian government.
So far, here in Algiers we sense that the Algerians are
entirely ready to watch the Malian government twist in the
wind while they wait for Toure to make some gesture on
Kidal and economic re-integration.
FORD