AUGUST STARTS OUT BADLY FOR AQIM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 001118

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2017
TAGS: PTER ASEC PREL MOPS KISL AG
SUBJECT: AUGUST STARTS OUT BADLY FOR AQIM

REF: ALGIERS 1094

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Thomas F. Daughton;
reasons 1.4 (b),(d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Local newspapers reported August 2 that two
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) figures, Ali Dix and
Haroun Ashashi, were killed in an ambush by security forces
in the mountains around Djurdjura (Tizi Ouzou province) east
of Algiers. Indications are that the two were close to AQIM
leader Droukdal, and were probably directly connected to the
April and July suicide attacks in Algeria. We believe that
with the elimination of the two, AQIM is now weaker than it
was a month ago, at least temporarily. The reports came just
days after the press revealed the surrender of AQIM Sahara
region Moussaab Abou Daoud to the Algerian authorities in
July. The combination appears likely to have dealt a blow to
AQIM morale at a time when it was already hit by internal
dissent and desertions. As of August 6, AQIM had not issued
any new communiques concerning the press reports -- a sharp
contrast to the flurry of communiques issued in the month of
June. Other reports suggest, however, that AQIM is
continuing to recruit at a healthy rate. End Summary.


2. (C) On August 2, the Arabic-language Algiers daily
Echourouk el-Youmi headlined that two terrorist "emirs" were
killed in an ambush in the province of Tizi Ouzou. The two
were identified as Sid Ali Rachid (aka Ali Dix -- "Ali 10")
and Nour Mohamad (aka Haroun Al-Ashashi). Press reports
portrayed Ali Dix as AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdal's
military advisor and right-hand man. He was reported to be
the "executive supervisor" of the April 11 suicide attacks in
Algiers that killed 32 and wounded more than 200 civilians.
Ali Dix was also described as the "mastermind" behind the
July 11 suicide attack on a military barracks in Lakhdaria
that killed at least 10 soldiers and wounded more than 30.


3. (U) According to the Arabic-language daily El-Khabar on
August 2, locals from Iboudrarene region of Tizi Ouzou
provided information to the security services on the location
of the two terrorists. After several days of investigation,
Algerian forces were able to ambush them in the mountains of
Djurdjura. Ashashi is said to have died immediately at the
scene, while Ali Dix died several hours later from his
wounds.


4. (C) Both El-Khabar and Echourouk el-Youmi reported on
August 2 that Ali Dix had traveled to Algiers to conduct
surveillance operations, pinpoint the targets, identify the
suicide volunteers and purchase the vehicles for the April 11
attacks. Ali reportedly also wired the vehicles with remote
detonators in case the suicide bombers had second thoughts
about the mission. He watched as the bombs went off and
videotaped the suicide operation that subsequently appeared
on jihadi websites. (Note: This was the same tape that was
broadcast on Al-Jazeera TV on April 11.)

Who Were Sid Ali Rachid and Nour Mohamad?
--------------


5. (C) According to Echourouk el-Youmi, Sid Ali Rachid was
responsible for conducting terrorist activities in AQIM Zone
2 against military and security personnel (Zone 2 covers
Algiers, Tizi Ouzou, Boumerdes, Bejaia and Bouira provinces).
He had a diploma in mathematics and was an expert on
explosives, a skill he learned and excelled in when he joined
the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in 1994. He was born in 1974
and was a native of Lakhdaria, Bouira, site of the July 11
attack. It is also believed that Ali Dix played a major role
in recruiting Algerian youth and laundering funds from
kidnapping operations.


6. (U) According to the same Echourouk article on August 2,
Nour Mohamed (aka Haroun Ashashi) was a close associate of
Ali Dix. Ashashi's role as a logistics coordinator
responsible for supplying AQIM with arms and ammunition from
the Sahel region (Zone 9) made him a valuable asset to
Droukdal. He was also a native of Bouira born in 1974.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) AQIM's last communique, posted on the internet on July

ALGIERS 00001118 002 OF 002


23, threatened an increase in attacks against the enemies of
God and warned Algerians to avoid gatherings at security
offices and government buildings, including those of the
infidels (reftel). As of August 6, we have seen no new
communiques denying or confirming the deaths of Ali Dix and
Haroun. So far, AQIM has not even sought to clarify what has
happened. In contrast, when Algerian media reported April 27
that AQIM "deputy emir" Samir Saioud (aka Musab Abu Abdullah)
had been killed on April 26 in a skirmish with security
forces, the AQIM media committee quickly issued a
clarification communique confirming Saioud's death, but
denying that he was the deputy emir.


8. (C) Just days before the reported deaths of Ali Dix and
Haroun Ashashi, Algerian media sources with strong ties to
the security services gave broad coverage to the surrender of
AQIM Sahara region "emir" Moussab Abou Daoud. Moussab, who
apparently surrendered to the Algerian authorities in early
July, provided extensive commentary to the press about
internal dissent within AQIM. The combination of Moussab's
surrender and the deaths of two of Droukdal's lieutenants
seems likely to have dealt a blow to AQIM morale, and we
suspect as a result that AQIM is now weaker than it was a
month ago -- at least temporarily. At the same time,
however, evidence suggests that AQIM is continuing to recruit
at a healthy rate. One newspaper reported August 5, for
example, that a terrorist killed near El-Oued in northeastern
Algeria was in possession of a list of over 100 names of 16-
to 20-year-old men who had recently been recruited in the
area by AQIM.
DAUGHTON