MANAGING A TOUGH MIL TO MIL RELATIONSHIP WITH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000977

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS MASS ET SO
SUBJECT: MANAGING A TOUGH MIL TO MIL RELATIONSHIP WITH
ETHIOPIA

Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

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Summary:
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1. (S/NF) In a difficult meeting, Ethiopian Chief of Staff
General Samora outlined for visiting Combined Joint Task
Force ) Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) Commander Admiral James
Hart on March 28 of Ethiopia's new military priorities:

-- General Samora said air mobility was critical as a result
of the conflict in Somalia. Repair of two C-130 and purchase
of additional cargo planes are on the top of the list. The
approaching rainy season makes this urgent.

-- General Samora asked for U.S. assistance in assuring
professional standards for the newly established command and
staff college in Addis. He also talked about sending
Ethiopian officers to U.S. war colleges.

-- General Samora asked the U.S. to close the CJTF-HOA
operating bases in Bilate and Hurso. He offered that the
U.S. might re-establish itself in nearby Dira Dawa or Jijiga,
but not in defended camps. (While Samora claimed that U.S.
training was of limited utility and no longer needed, troops
and sub commanders have all praised the U.S. training.)


2. (S/NF) It is not clear why Samora is so adamant that the
long standing camps at Hurso and Bilate must be closed. It
may be that recent U.S. and British press arguing that the
U.S. was using camps in Ethiopia to launch attacks into
Somalia may have forced the Ethiopians to close the camps,
just as the AC-130 operations closed as a result of articles
in the U.S. press. It is also possible that Samora is
annoyed at what he sees as lack of respect and support for
Ethiopia. It is very clear that we will need to engage the
often prickly General Samora in an in-depth discussion. End
Summary.

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New Priorities
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3. (S/NF) General Samora outlined for Admiral Hart, his
POLAD and Ambassador (notetaker) Ethiopia's new changing
priorities. He said that air mobility was critical. As a
result of the ENDF's experience in Somalia, it was clear that
cargo planes and helicopters were key to Ethiopia's lift
capability of troops to the battlefield and pursuit of
targets. Samora cited the importance of repairing the two
C-130 aircraft provided by the U.S. in 1997. One was
somewhat functional while the second was being cannibalized
for spare parts. Admiral Hart told a skeptical Samora that
the U.S. is trying to repair the 2 C-130 aircraft. General
Samora said he was waiting for the maintenance project for
over seven years and replied that he is willing to buy some
spare parts to try to repair the C-130 aircraft.


4. (S/NF) General Samora said Ethiopia established a command
and staff college but wanted the U.S. to help with books and
materials as well as a curriculum to train senior officers.
He also asked for increased number of war college slots for
Ethiopian officers.


5. (S/NF) He added that the British were helping with
accounting and administrative training for his financial
officers. The U.S. could help with providing training on the
code of operations for the military. General Samora noted
that they were still developing a list and would present it
to the U.S.

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Past Problems Affect Current Operations
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6. (S/NF) General Samora raised briefly past bilateral
problems. He said the U.S. cancellation of two C-130 in 1998
due to Ethiopia's border war with Eritrea and suspension of
some two dozen HUMVEES in 2005 due to use of the HUMVEES to
transport soldiers to quell riots after the 2005 elections

ADDIS ABAB 00000977 002 OF 002


severely strained bilateral relations. He did not see why
the punishment still exists. He said he still needs C-130s
and as for the HUMVEES, he is seeking alternate equipment.


7. (S/NF) Samora emphasized to the Admiral that the U.S.
must leave Bilate and Hurso, not immediately, but eventually.
Part of the problem may be the force protection measures;
towers and fences. Just as Ethiopians cannot occupy a camp
within a U.S. base, the U.S. should not expect to have a camp
within an Ethiopian base. He said that the U.S. could
relocate to Dira Dawa or Jijiga, but cannot establish
defended installations. Samora went on to say that he no
longer wants commando training because the Ethiopians can
conduct the training themselves. He was quite dismissive of
the training, saying that he only sent troops for their
&entertainment8 and as a way of obtaining further US
support. It should be noted that these statements contradict
some of his previous comments as well as the opinions
expressed by many Ethiopian commanders.


8. (S/NF) At the end of the conversation, the General had a
further, private meeting with the Admiral. During this
meeting Samora reinforced his determination to close the
camps, even if it meant canceling civil affairs projects.
Samora dismissed the projects, noting that &no one asked you
to do them.8 Samora did agree to visit Camp Lemonier, but
only after conditions in Somalia improve. Samora displayed
signs of fatigue and discomfort from his multiple war wounds.

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Comment:
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9. (S/NF) It is not clear what has lead Samora to this
hostile position. Clearly, he is offended by past US efforts
to criticize Ethiopia for the war with Eritrea and the
violence against demonstrators following the elections. He
clearly believes that the US has dealt with Ethiopia in bad
faith. The focus on Bilate and Hurso may be due to the
recent U.S. and British press reports of U.S. forces
launching attacks into Somalia from U.S. camps inside
Ethiopia. U.S. press reports led to the closure of the
AC-130 operations at the end of January. It is clear that
the U.S. Embassy must make greater efforts to develop and
work with General Samora directly. After the recent firings
of top Ethiopian generals and potential rivals, General
Samora may be primus interparis among the generals, but he
still has a long way to go before he earns the adoration of
his staff. For the moment, General Samora wants to have
complete control of the military and has demanded that all
requests for training and offers of programs by the U.S. be
given to him directly and not to the liaison office.
Further, it is clear the U.S. Mission must continue contacts
with Samora's generals and mid ranking officers, but must now
focus on General Samora for all programs, events and
activities. This will increase delays in response to U.S.
and other types of training and could impact negatively on
bilateral relations. The Embassy will work closely with
Samora and determine how best to handle essential bilateral
programs, without damaging or detracting from the more
important strategic bilateral relationship. End Comment.


10. (U) This message has been cleared by CJTF-HOA Commander
Rear Admiral James Hart.
YAMAMOTO