Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ADDISABABA80
2007-01-11 05:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

CORRECTED COPY - PM MELES AND TFG PRESIDENT YUSUF

Tags:  PREL EAID KPKO MOPS ET SO ER KE 
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PP RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #0080/01 0110538
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 110538Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4013
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000080 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/E, AND S/CRS
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2017
TAGS: PREL EAID KPKO MOPS ET SO ER KE
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY - PM MELES AND TFG PRESIDENT YUSUF
DISCUSS NEXT STEPS IN SOMALIA

REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 40

B. ADDIS ABABA 72 (NOTAL)

Classified By: DCM JANET WILGUS. REASONS: 1.4 (A),(B),AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000080

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/E, AND S/CRS
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2017
TAGS: PREL EAID KPKO MOPS ET SO ER KE
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY - PM MELES AND TFG PRESIDENT YUSUF
DISCUSS NEXT STEPS IN SOMALIA

REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 40

B. ADDIS ABABA 72 (NOTAL)

Classified By: DCM JANET WILGUS. REASONS: 1.4 (A),(B),AND (D).


1. (U) Revised to correct classification info in paragraph 6.


2. (C) SUMMARY. Prime Minister Meles stressed to Ambassador
and DCM Jan. 9 that this was the best time for stabilizing
and creating a new order in Somalia without warlords and
extremists. He said the Somali clan system and Somalia
practices must be respected and not circumvented in order to
ensure success. In this context, Ethiopia has pushed TFG
President Yusuf to engage and bring into the government
Hawiye and other clan elders, integrate clan militias into a
unified army, meet humanitarian needs with high visibility
and high impact projects, and establish a functioning
government. Ethiopian troops are pursuing elements of the
CIC near Ras Kamboni, but to ensure security, Yusuf and the
TFG must ultimately establish itself as a responsive and
functioning government engaging and earning the support of
the other clans. Meles noted that press reports of an
alleged U.S. strike in Somalia may create diplomatic problems
for the United States, but so long as terrorist targets are
hit and the United States is seen as addressing Somalia,s
humanitarian needs, the United States will make a positive
impact and receive support from the Somali people. Meles
urged the USG to be visible through humanitarian aid. He
suggested that a ship off-loading USAID wheat would go a long
way to earn the support of the Somali people. END SUMMARY.


3. (C) On January 9, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi briefed
Ambassador and DCM on his recent meeting in Addis Ababa with
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) President
Abdullahi Yusuf. According to Meles, Yusuf underscored the
need for inclusive dialogue "from the bottom up," involving

all clans and moving as quickly as possible. Yusuf had noted
the need to establish administrative structures within the
next week or two, particularly a police force for Mogadishu
and Kismayo. Appointing a governor for Mogadishu ("the
toughest nut to crack"),who was approved by all clans, was
another priority. Within two weeks, business leaders,
traditional elders, and others needed to work together to
establish provincial-level government structures and appoint
local officials, such as a governor and police commissioner.
A national reconciliation conference would then follow,
involving representatives from all provinces as well as from
the diaspora, to put national structures into place, building
on the Transitional Federal Charter. The conference could
potentially review clan representation in parliament and make
necessary adjustments.


4. (C) Meles said he had emphasized to Yusuf that political
dialogue was key. The framework was set for an inter-Somali
dialogue, Meles said, but would succeed only when conducted
by Somalis themselves, as in Somaliland and Puntland.
Somalis alone best understood clan dynamics and the clan
basis for some key positions (e.g., director of Mogadishu
port) and needed to resolve these issues with no outside
input. While Ethiopia wanted to ensure that participants
were representative, the content of the dialogue was up to
the Somalis themselves, Meles said.

-------------- --------------
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM NEEDED TO NEUTRALIZE MILITIA
-------------- --------------


5. (C) According to Meles, Yusuf had stated that while
international peacekeepers were needed to bolster fledging
Somali national forces, an outside peacekeeping force could
not keep peace in Somalia; only the Somalis themselves could
do this. Yusuf had further stated that disarmament should be
conducted by clan leaders, not by the government, in
conjunction with the reconciliation process. Yusuf had said
that to neutralize the warlords, militia needed to be
integrated into the national army as soon as possible, and
then paid (which required funding). This would allow
Ethiopia to reduce its visible footprint within Somalia
(while still providing training and intelligence support),
which, in turn, would reduce tension within the country.

ADDIS ABAB 00000080 002 OF 003


Additional recruiting when provincial conferences occurred
could help establish a national military of about 10,000.
Police forces should also be established. Ethiopia would
assist in regularizing these forces, reorganizing Somalia's
military as it grew, Meles said.


6. (C) In addition to reorganizing police and military
forces, Yusuf had also called for intelligence and security
cooperation. Meles said Ethiopia planned to embed personnel
in Somali units, to train and equip Somali intelligence and
assist with operations. It was essential to conduct
clandestine operations against the jihadists, to prevent them
from reorganizing within Somalia, Meles added.

-------------- --------------
MELES RECOMMENDS VISIBLE U.S. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Meles said he had advised Yusuf to dispatch diplomatic
missions to highlight Somalia's needs and to solicit funds
and equipment from donors, particularly Arab states. Meles
considered the World Bank a possible source of funds for
post-conflict reconstruction, but also urged the United
States and the EU to provide funding.


8. (C) Meles recommended to Ambassador that the USG arrange
for a ship to deliver clearly marked "U.S. wheat" to
Mogadishu, to be off-loaded and distributed by Somalis.
Meles also recommended that the USG deliver medical supplies.
High visibility, high impact projects, such as road
improvements, were needed, he added.

--------------
ENDORSEMENT OF U.S. MILITARY
--------------


9. (C) Citing an overlap of Ethiopian national interests in
Somalia, and U.S. interests in the region, Meles told
Ambassador that he was satisfied with cooperation with the
United States. Meles urged the U.S. military, however, to
keep its footprint "slight," so as not to play into the hands
of jihadists who wish to portray action in Somalia as a
crusade against Islam. Meles said he was not concerned about
press reports regarding U.S. action in Somalia, so long as
terrorist targets were hit.


10. (C) Meles told Ambassador that cooperation with Kenya was
"broadly adequate" at the highest levels, but that continued
pressure was needed to ensure that mid- and lower-level
officials did more than pursue their own "vested interests."
Kenyan authorities required adequate, independent information
(e.g., on high-value targets who had fled to Kenya) in order
to ensure their continued cooperation, Meles said.

--------------
NGO REPORTS
--------------


11. (C) In response to Ambassador's discussion of
humanitarian concerns (WFP access to aviation fuel in
Kismayo, and the alleged torture and killing of a UN worker,
as reported by email from Nairobi USAID/EA/FFP office),PM
Meles acknowledged difficulties in obtaining aviation fuel,
due to transportation and cost issues. Meles said he would
look into the alleged killing of the civilian, but noted that
all troops had been issued clear guidelines not to torture or
kill unarmed civilians, prisoners, or non-combatants. Meles
opined that some opponents sought to promote insurgency in
Somalia, as in Iraq, and were thus looking for any possible
sign of larger problems. False rumors needed to be
adequately addressed, the PM said.

--------------
ERITREA "NOT YET READY FOR FULL-SCALE WAR"
--------------


12. (C) Asked about Eritrean violations of the Temporary
Security Zone along Ethiopia's northern border, Meles replied
that Eritrea was "not yet ready for full-scale war" but would
continue to "indirectly" destabilize the region. Meles said

ADDIS ABAB 00000080 003 OF 003


Ethiopia's strategy was to deter Eritrean aggression by
indirectly highlighting that Eritrea could not prevail in a
war with Ethiopia (i.e., through Ethiopia's military success
in Somalia, or acquisition of new military equipment). Meles
recommended targeting Eritrean financial interests as a means
of pressuring Eritrean President Isaias.


13. (C) Meles reiterated his January 4 request to AF A/S
Frazer (ref A) for 3,000-4,000 tons of Title I food
assistance for Ethiopia's urban poor (ref B).


14. (C) COMMENT: Meles has highlighted the need for
Ethiopian forces to withdraw as soon as possible from
Somalia, citing not only the heavy economic burden of their
continued deployment, but also concern about their being
targeted by terrorism (reftel). His discussions with Yusuf
on the need to foster an inclusive inter-Somali dialogue, and
to disarm warlords by integrating militia into national
security structures, highlight that Meles recognizes that, in
addition to the deployment of a neutral deterrent force, the
TFG must make progress toward establishing a political
foundation for Somalia's long-term stability, before Ethiopia
can execute its exit strategy. END COMMENT.
YAMAMOTO